Rathmell v. Smith

1

ANDREW RATHMELL v. WYATT JAMES SMITH

No. 1856-2023

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

October 21, 2024

UNREPORTED ^[*]

Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No C-03-CV-23-001680

Wells, C.J. Albright, Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Hotten, J. Appellant, Andrew Rathmell, appeals the grant by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of a motion to dismiss in favor of appellee, Wyatt James Smith. Rathmell presents three questions for this Court's review,^[1] which we have consolidated and rephrased, as follows:

1. Did the circuit court err in dismissing Rathmell's complaint on the ground that it was barred by the Fireman's Rule?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's grant of the motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2020, Rathmell, a Baltimore County police officer, and another officer responded to the scene of a report that Smith was threatening to kill his family and himself. Upon arrival, the officers separated the family members in an attempt to deescalate the situation. However, a struggle ensued as Smith grabbed his mother's arm when she attempted to show the officers a report reflecting his mental evaluations. Rathmell attempted to separate them while ordering Smith several times to release his mother. When Smith refused, Rathmell took Smith down to the floor and restrained him until he calmed down, then Rathmell released him.

On April 21, 2023, three years after the incident, Rathmell filed suit against Smith in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County alleging that he sustained injuries to his right arm during the course of the struggle, resulting in physical pain, mental anguish, permanent physical impairment, and economic loss, including, but not limited to, loss of wages and expenses for reasonable and necessary medical treatment. Rathmell alleged that the injuries were solely and proximately caused by Smith's negligence in failing to release his mother when ordered to do so, failing to obey a lawful order of a police officer, and in resisting Rathmell's attempts to get Smith to release his mother.

On August 16, 2023, Smith moved to dismiss, claiming that the Fireman's Rule barred Rathmell's claim because Rathmell was allegedly injured while trying to defuse a domestic disturbance under the scope and course of his employment as a police officer, his sole reason and purpose to be in Smith's home. On November 9, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion and found that the Fireman's Rule bars Rathmell's claim in this case. The court reasoned that Rathmell was injured during the period of anticipated occupational risk because his injury occurred during a further altercation between Smith and his mother when Rathmell attempted to restrain Smith. That same day, the circuit court entered an order granting Smith's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Rathmell noted this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss to determine "whether the trial court was legally correct." Hancock v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 480 Md. 588, 603 (2022) (quoting D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 350 (2019)). We do so without deference to the circuit court and "assume the truth of all relevant and material facts that are well pleaded and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn from those pleadings." Id. (quoting Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 374 (2021)). A motion to dismiss should be granted only "where the allegations presented do not state a cause of action." Id. (quoting Wheeling, 473 Md. at 374). The question of whether the Fireman's Rule applies is a question of law for the judge. See Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc. v. Hart, 158 Md.App. 63, 74 (2004).

DISCUSSION

The circuit court's ruling on the motion to dismiss in this case hinged on the applicability of the Fireman's Rule. "[T]he doctrine known as the fireman's rule generally prevents fire fighters and police officers injured in the course of their duties from recovering tort damages from those whose negligence exposed them to the risk of injury." White v. State, 419 Md. 265, 272 (2011); Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704 713 (1993).

The rationale behind the Fireman's Rule was originally based on premises liability law. See Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 123-24 (1925) ("[T]he general rule of common law is that a fireman entering premises to put out fire is a licensee only, and not an invitee, and that the owner or occupant of the premises is not under any duty of care to keep his premises prepared and safe for a fireman."). However, in Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. P'ship, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed course, finding instead that the Fireman's Rule is best explained by public policy. 308 Md. 432, 447 (1987) ("Instead of continuing to use a rationale based on the law of premises liability, we hold that, as a matter of public policy, firemen and police officers generally cannot recover for injuries attributable to the negligence that requires their assistance."). The Court in Flowers further held that "[t]his public policy is based on a relationship between firemen and policemen and the public that calls on these safety officers specifically to confront certain hazards on behalf of the public." Id. In other words, the duties of a public safety officer's job include confronting certain hazards, and thus, the officer may not complain when injured as a result of the hazard.

Rathmell argues that the Fireman's Rule only applies to police and firemen responding to calls in which there was a negligently created risk requiring their presence at the scene, as opposed to a risk created by an intentional or criminal act. Under this argument, since Rathmell was present at the scene due to Smith's intentional and criminal acts of threatening to kill himself and his mother, Smith should not be afforded the protection of the Fireman's Rule.

Rathmell cites Flowers in support of his argument that the Fireman's Rule should be limited to negligently created risks. The Court in Flowers did use language of negligence to describe the act creating the risk.^[2] However, the Court also held that the fireman's claim at issue in Flowers was barred pursuant to the Fireman's Rule despite the fact that there were "not allegations of negligence in the creation of the fire that originally brought the firemen to the apartment building," reasoning that "an accident involving an open elevator shaft nevertheless is within the range of the anticipated risks of firefighting." 308 Md. at 451.^[3]

The Court has at other times indicated that the Fireman's Rule may apply even where the act creating the risk was an intentional or even criminal act. For example, in Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., the Supreme Court of Maryland held that a police officer's tort claims were barred by the Fireman's Rule even though the act creating the risk was the criminal act of attempting to pass a forged check. 282 Md. 238, 246 (1978). And in Tucker v. Shoemake, the Court found that even where the act creating the risk was a domestic dispute, the Fireman's Rule "likely would apply" if the officer had suffered some injury due to a negligent condition where the domestic dispute was or had been in progress. 354 Md. 413, 419-21 (1999). Thus, although it referred to negligently created risks when describing the applicability of the Fireman's Rule, the Court in Flowers did not intend to limit application of the rule to only those cases.

Rathmell also argues that his claim is not barred by the Fireman's Rule because he was injured by Smith's intentional acts. Rathmell is correct that the Fireman's Rule does not bar claims by public safety officers against intentional tortfeasors. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 139 Md.App. 308, 324 (2001) ("[T]he Fireman's Rule does not bar a public safety officer's claim when the defendant intentionally causes harm."). However, Rathmell did not allege in his complaint that Smith intentionally harmed him. Rather, Rathmell alleged that his injuries were "solely and proximately caused by the negligence of Defendant Wyatt James Smith in failing to release his mother when ordered to do so, failing to obey a lawful order of a police officer and in resisting Plaintiff's attempts to get him to release his mother and to restrain him." Thus, absent any allegation of an intentional harm, this argument is irrelevant to the applicability of the Fireman's Rule.

Finally, Rathmell argues that the act causing his injuries occurred after the initial period of occupational risk had passed, rendering the Fireman's Rule inapplicable. We disagree.

Generally "the fireman's rule should not apply 'when the fireman sustains injuries after the initial period of his anticipated occupational risk, or from perils not reasonably foreseeable as part of that risk.'" Flowers, 308 Md. at 448 (quoting Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 252 (1965)). Both this Court and the Supreme Court of Maryland have sought to define the "initial period of anticipated occupational risk" in subsequent cases. Both courts have found that the Fireman's Rule should not apply to bar a claim when the negligence causing the officers' injuries was independent from and unrelated to the situation requiring their services as police officers. See, e.g., Tucker, 354 Md. at 419-20 (finding Fireman's Rule did not apply when police officer was at trailer park in response to domestic dispute call and was subsequently injured after falling into manhole while walking through common area of trailer park); Rivas v. Oxon Hill Joint Venture, 130...