Rattray v. The City of New York

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WENTWORTH RATTRAY, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK et al. Defendants.

No. 17-CV-8560 (PGG) (KHP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 14, 2022

HONORABLE PAUL G. GARDEPHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KATHARINE H. PARKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this action, Plaintiff Wentworth Rattray (“Plaintiff”) alleges a Section 1983 unlawful search claim against Officers Jose Cadavid (“Cadavid”) and Alyssa Trigueno (“Trigueno”); a Section 1983 false arrest claim against Cadavid; and Section 1983 failure to intervene claims against Trigueno based on the alleged search and arrest.^[1] The claims arise out of an incident on November 5, 2016, when in response to a 911 call from the mother of Plaintiff's child reporting a custody dispute Cadavid entered and searched Plaintiff's home without a warrant and stayed in the home for about an hour while Trigueno stood in the hallway just outside the apartment's entrance.

Before me for a report and recommendation is Defendants' motion for summary judgment at ECF No. 206. For the below reasons, I recommend DENYING the motion as to the unlawful search claim against Cadavid and the related failure to intervene claim against Trigueno, and I recommend GRANTING the motion as to the unlawful search claim against Trigueno, the false arrest claim against Cadavid, and the failure to intervene in the false arrest claim against Trigueno.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

On November 5, 2016, Plaintiff had full custody of his then ten-year-old daughter. (ECF No. 211, Pl. Opp. at 6). At 6:49 p.m. that evening, Ms. Wendy Sandy (“Sandy”), the child's mother, called 911. (ECF No. 216, Def. 56.1 ¶ 16.) According to the 911 Event Chronology Report (“911 Report”), Sandy stated Plaintiff was refusing to give her their child, that she was in front of Plaintiff's home, and that there were “no weapons” and “no injuries” involved. (ECF No. 207-6.)^[2] The 911 Report states Sandy was “hysterical crying.” (Id.)

Cadavid and Trigueno responded to the 911 call. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 18.) When the officers arrived at Plaintiff's apartment building, Sandy approached them and informed them she was the 911 caller. (Id. ¶ 19). Sandy told the officers that it was her time to pick up the child; that Plaintiff refused to let her see the child; that she had not heard from the child; and that the child was not answering her phone. (Id. ¶ 20.)^[3]

The parties dispute whether Sandy indicated that she was concerned for the child's safety. Cadavid testified at his deposition that Sandy told him she believed her daughter's life was in danger because Plaintiff used drugs and had drug dealers over. (Id. ¶ 22.) However, in a sworn statement, Sandy denied telling the officers that she was concerned for the child's safety or that Plaintiff is a drug user, and she stated she would “never” say that because “that's not the truth.” (ECF No. 211-1, Sandy Decl., 24:11-25:17.)^[4] Both officers testified at their depositions that they were concerned for the child's safety based on the information relayed to them by Sandy. (ECF 207-4, Trigueno Tr., 112:12-22; Cadavid Tr., 9:25-10:23.) The officers then proceeded upstairs to Plaintiff's apartment. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 23).

The Officers arrived at Plaintiff's apartment at 7:01 p.m., knocked on the door, announced themselves as police officers, stated they wanted to talk to Plaintiff, and asked Plaintiff to open the door. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff did not immediately open the door and informed the officers he could hear them fine. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31, 33.) Cadavid informed Plaintiff that if he did not open the door, Cadavid might take it down, at which point Plaintiff opened the door. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) The officers informed Plaintiff they needed to see the child, and Plaintiff stated that the child lived with him but was not home. (Id. ¶ 42.) The officers instructed Plaintiff to tell the child to come to the door. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff responded, “No, I already told you she's not here.” (Id. ¶ 44.)^[5]

Trigueno then demanded that Plaintiff present proof he had custody of the child, or he would go to jail. (Rattray Tr. 50:21-51:4). Plaintiff stated that he was “done talking” and attempted to close the front door, but Cadavid blocked the door with his foot. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 50-51.) Cadavid then forcibly entered Plaintiff's home, walked through the apartment looking for the child, and found the child was not there. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 56-57.) The walkthrough search lasted somewhere between one to fifteen minutes. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 56.) Trigueno remained just outside of the apartment on Plaintiff's doormat. (Id. ¶ 54.)

Following the walkthrough of the apartment and after determining the child was not at home, Cadavid remained in the apartment and continued to ask Plaintiff questions.^[6] (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 59-62.) Cadavid asked where exactly the child was located, and Plaintiff responded that the child was on a playdate with friends. (Rattray Tr. 58:24-59:10; Def. 56.1 ¶ 63.) When Defendants asked which friend the child was with, Plaintiff asked why the officers needed to know this information and insisted the child was “safe” and was “where she's supposed to be.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 62, 64.) Plaintiff then asked Cadavid to “get the eff out” of his apartment, but Cadavid did not leave the apartment. (Id. ¶ 62.)

After Plaintiff asked Cadavid to leave the apartment and Cadavid refused to do so, Plaintiff then asked Cadavid if Plaintiff could retrieve his cellphone and Cadavid said, “Yeah. Go ahead.” (Id. ¶ 65.) At 7:12 p.m., Plaintiff called 911 from his cellphone and reported that two officers were illegally searching his home, and that he had asked them to leave but they refused to do so. (Id. ¶ 67; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 67; Pl. Opp. 10.) Either at this point or earlier during the incident, Cadavid also called his supervisor to request assistance. Plaintiff remained on the line with the 911 operator until a supervisor arrived at 8:15 p.m. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 69.) Cadavid remained in Plaintiff's home during this time awaiting the arrival of a supervisor. (Id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that while he was waiting for the supervisor to arrive, he asked Cadavid if Plaintiff could leave the apartment, and Cadavid responded, “No. You got downtown involved. You gotta stay.” (Rattray Tr. 89:18-21.) Cadavid testified at his deposition that he believed Plaintiff was in fact not permitted to leave the apartment at that time. (Cadavid Tr. 47:3-4.) The officers never attempted to place Plaintiff in handcuffs and never told Plaintiff he was under arrest, or that he would be charged with a crime. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 79-82.)

At approximately 8:15 p.m. that evening, the officers' supervisor, Lieutenant Koch (“Koch”), arrived at Plaintiff's apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 71-72; Pl. Opp. at 10.) Plaintiff informed Koch about the details of the custody arrangement and the whereabouts of the child. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 73-74.) Koch asked whether Plaintiff had documents or emails confirming that he had custody of the child, and Plaintiff explained that the court order was not yet available and showed Koch email communications with the Family Court and Sandy regarding the visitation agreement. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 73.) Other than showing Koch the email communications, Plaintiff asserts that he did not share any information with Koch that he had not already provided to Cadavid, and Koch did not conduct any investigation to verify the whereabouts of the child other than asking Plaintiff where the child was located. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 74-75; Pl. Opp. 9, 13.) The officers then left Plaintiff's apartment. (Id. ¶ 75.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Summary judgment is warranted if ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The court must “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in that party's favor.” Id. (citation omitted). However, a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find” for the nonmoving party. Id. (citation omitted).

When the movant properly supports its motion with evidentiary materials, the opposing party must establish a genuine issue of fact by citing to particular parts of materials in the record. Weyant v. Phia Grp. LLC, 556 F.Supp.3d 310, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)). Such materials can include, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, declarations, or admissions. Berbick v. Gonzalez, 2013 WL 4507065, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2013) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)).

A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if he adduces sufficient facts such that no reasonable jury, drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant to believe his actions did not clearly violate an established federally protected right. Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Qualified immunity should be decided by the court as a matter of law when facts are undisputed. Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990).

APPLICATION

1. Unlawful Search Claim against Officer Cadavid

It is undisputed that Cadavid entered and...