Raugust v. Abbey

598 F.Supp.3d 988

Richard RAUGUST, Plaintiff,

v.Wayne ABBEY, Defendant.

CV 20-09-H-DWM

United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division.

Signed April 15, 2022

Hillary P. Carls, Sherine D. Blackford, Blackford Carls, P.C., Bozeman, MT, Melinda A. Driscoll, Fred Law Firm, PLLC, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff.

Jason Collins, Jonah P. Brown, Robert J. Phillips, Jared S. Dahle, Garlington Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, MT, for Defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge

This case stems from the wrongful conviction of Plaintiff Richard Raugust for the murder of Joe Tash. Raugust brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant Wayne Abbey, a Sanders County deputy sheriff, premised on Abbey's alleged failure to disclose evidence materially favorable to Raugust in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The crux of Raugust's claim is that Abbey failed to disclose something he observed on the night of the murder that would have substantiated Raugust's alibi defense at trial.

Although there are six motions currently pending in the case, this order addresses only the motions for summary judgment. Abbey seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Raugust's § 1983 claim is time-barred and that Abbey's nondisclosure does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. (Doc. 52.) He further seeks summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. (Doc. 85.) On the other hand, Raugust seeks partial summary judgment on the first two elements of his § 1983 claim on the basis of collateral estoppel. (Doc. 67.) For the reasons provided below, Abbey's motions for summary judgment are denied, and Raugust's motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted, (see Docs. 59, 83, 100), and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam).

I. The 1997 Murder and Investigation

During the late evening hours of July 23, 1997, and into the early morning hours of July 24, 1997, Rory Ross, Joe Tash, and Raugust spent the evening drinking at the Naughty Pine Saloon in Trout Creek, Montana. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 1.) While conducting a routine bar check, Abbey encountered Ross, Tash, and Raugust when they left at approximately 2:15 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) After Ross, Tash, and Raugust departed, Abbey continued to watch them through a window. (Id. ¶ 5.) Abbey observed their vehicle—a white AMC Eagle belonging to Ross ("Ross's vehicle")—drive from the Saloon parking lot across the street to the Miller's Market parking lot to briefly meet up with Randy Fischer. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) After Ross's vehicle left Miller's Market—and central to the dispute underlying Raugust's § 1983 claim—Abbey saw it stop briefly while proceeding down Highway 200, illuminating the brake and dome lights. (Id. ¶ 7.) Abbey observed that Ross's vehicle was stopped long enough for someone to exit the vehicle, but he did not witness anyone do so. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.)

Several hours later, Ross called Sanders County 911 services from a rural home to report that Tash had been shot in the head at a nearby campsite in the woods. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 16.) Abbey was dispatched to the campsite crime scene. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 17.) On his way, Abbey stopped and spoke to Ross, who was hysterical and stated that "Rich shot Joe." (Doc. 54-1 at 36.) When Abbey arrived at the crime scene, he noticed the property was on fire in two different locations. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 18.) Abbey secured the scene, verified Tash was dead, called dispatch for assistance, and attempted to extinguish the fire. (Id. ¶ 19.) Mark Denke, the coroner, and Perry Mock, a Sanders County detective, arrived to assist Abbey. (Id. ¶ 22.) Abbey turned the scene over to Denke and Mock and returned to the Saloon to look for "Rich" Raugust. (Id. ¶ 23.) There, another Trout Creek resident told Abbey that Raugust was working at Brown's trailer park. (Id. ¶¶ 24–25.) Abbey, accompanied by the sheriff, coroner, and undersheriff, proceeded to Brown's trailer park, where they arrested Raugust. (Id. ¶¶ 26–30.)

Abbey provided a written report detailing his investigation and a supplemental report upon request from the prosecutor's office after Raugust's arrest. (Id. ¶ 34; Doc. 100 at ¶ 7.) While the supplemental report established that Abbey had seen Ross, Tash, and Raugust leave together in Ross's vehicle, neither report documented his observations regarding the brief stop of Ross's vehicle on Highway 200. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 35; Doc. 100 at ¶ 8.) The parties dispute the significance Abbey attributed to his observation and the reasons for its nondisclosure. (Doc. 59 at ¶¶ 9, 35–36.)

II. Raugust's Trial and Conviction

Raugust's trial took place in March 1998. (Id. ¶ 31.) Abbey was called as a prosecution witness, testifying first on Monday morning and leaving immediately after his testimony. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.) His testimony did not mention seeing Ross's vehicle stop on Highway 200. (Id. ¶ 36.) At trial, Raugust asserted an alibi defense that he had exited Ross's vehicle at approximately the location Abbey observed it stop before the vehicle proceeded to the scene of the crime. (Id. ¶ 38.) Raugust's alibi was that he went to his friend Rick Scarborough's house to rest before work the next morning. (Id. ¶ 39.) The parties dispute whether Abbey had knowledge of Raugust's alibi defense. (Id. ¶ 37; see Doc. 100 at ¶ 4.) And indeed, several witnesses’ testimony contradicted Raugust's alibi defense at trial. Scarborough testified that Raugust did not stay at his residence, (Doc. 59 at ¶ 47), and the Albanos, Trout Creek residents who lived near Tash, testified that they heard Raugust's voice at the campsite on the night Tash was killed, (id. ¶¶ 42, 44). Ross also testified he had not stopped his vehicle on Highway 200 to let Raugust out, and that he had personally witnessed Raugust shoot Tash. (Id. ¶ 46.)

The jury deliberated for ten hours before convicting Raugust of deliberate homicide, attempted arson, and attempted tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. (Id. ¶ 48.) On June 9, 1998, Raugust was sentenced to life in prison for homicide, twenty years for attempted arson, and ten years for attempted evidence tampering, plus an additional ten years for use of a dangerous weapon. (Id. ¶ 49.)

III. Postconviction Proceedings

In 2009, Raugust wrote the Montana Innocence Project requesting help to overturn his conviction. (Id. ¶ 50.) The Montana Innocence Project's investigator interviewed Abbey in August 2013, during which Abbey relayed his observations regarding the brief stop of Ross's vehicle and the illumination of the brake and dome lights. (Id. ¶ 51.) In light of Abbey's observations, Raugust filed a petition for postconviction relief in Montana's Twentieth Judicial District Court, alleging that Abbey's previous nondisclosure constituted a Brady violation. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53.) On November 16, 2015, Judge Wheelis determined that Abbey's nondisclosure was a Brady violation, and accordingly, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order and Notice of Continuing Jurisdiction that reversed Raugust's conviction and ordered a new trial. (Id. ¶ 54; Doc. 59-1.) The State subsequently moved to dismiss the charges against Raugust with prejudice, which Judge Wheelis granted in September 2016. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 55; Doc. 59-2.)

IV. The Present Action

Pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 2–9–301, Raugust sent a demand letter on May 13, 2019, to the Montana Risk Management & Tort Defense Division seeking compensation for his wrongful conviction. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 56; Doc. 59-3.) Among the defendants listed in the demand letter were Sanders County, Perry Mock, and Gene Arnold. (Doc. 59-3.) The demand letter did not personally name Abbey, however, and the parties dispute whether it incorporated Abbey. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 57.) Raugust sent another letter on August 26, 2019, requesting Sanders County notify him if the county commissioners rejected his demand pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 27–2–201(3). (Id. ; Doc. 59-4.)

On December 19, 2019, Raugust filed a Complaint in Montana's First Judicial District Court for claims arising from his wrongful conviction. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 58.) He named the State of Montana, Sanders County, Deputy Abbey, Sheriff Arnold, and the Estate of Perry Mock. (Id. ) He named the individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (Id. ¶ 59.)

On February 4, 2020, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Montana, and it was assigned to Judge Charles C. Lovell. (Id. ¶ 60.) Defendants Sanders County, Abbey, Arnold, and Estate of Mock moved to dismiss the complaint on February 21, 2020, and the State did so on March 25, 2020. (Id. ¶ 61.) The State's motion was granted on June 29, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations barred Raugust's state claims, and on that same basis, Raugust's remaining state law claims against the other defendants were likewise dismissed on July 8, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64; Doc. 27 at 18.) However, because Raugust's federal § 1983 claims had a later accrual date, they survived. (Doc. 59 at ¶¶ 65–66; Doc. 27 at 9–14, 18.) Notwithstanding, the § 1983 claims against Defendants Sanders County, Deputy Abbey, Sheriff Arnold, and Estate of Mock in their official capacities were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim. (Doc. 59 at ¶ 69; Doc. 27 at 14–18.)

In July 2020, Raugust filed an amended complaint alleging § 1983 claims against Defendants Sanders County and Wayne Abbey in his individual capacity, after which both parties again moved to dismiss. (Doc. 59 at ¶¶ 71–74; see Doc. 28.) The County's motion was granted, rendering Raugust's § 1983 claim against Abbey the only surviving claim. (Doc. 59 at ¶¶ 70, 74–76; Doc. 39 at 6–7.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the...