Rawls-Dolin v. Riverside Reg'l Jail, Civil Action No. 3:19cv740

CHRISTINA RAWLS-DOLIN, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE REGIONAL JAIL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19cv740

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

September 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on eight motions¹:

(1) Plaintiff Christina Rawls-Dolin's Motion for Leave to File Electronically (the "Motion to File Electronically"), (ECF No. 3);

(2) Defendant Jordan Kindred's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)² (the "First Kindred Motion to Dismiss"), (ECF No. 10);

(3) Kindred's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the "Second Kindred Motion to Dismiss"), (ECF No. 19);

(4) Defendants Riverside Regional Jail ("Riverside"), Sergeant Devin Holland, Lieutenant William Bain, Sergeant Brandon Edmonds, Sergeant Angela Moore, Sergeant Nicholas Sample, Sergeant Shanta Brown, Retired Major Dawn Flippin, and Lieutenant Charlene Jones (collectively, the "Riverside Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (the "Riverside Motion to Dismiss), (ECF No. 25);

(5) Rawls-Dolin's Motion for Subpoena for Address (the "Motion for Subpoena"), (ECF No. 29);

(6) Defendant Erica Gordon's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (the "Gordon Motion to Dismiss"), (ECF No. 41); (7) Rawls-Dolin's Motion for Scheduling Order (the "Motion for Scheduling Order"), (ECF No. 45); and,

(8) Rawls-Dolin's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Bill Wilson, (the "Motion for Default Judgment"), (ECF No. 46).

No Defendant has responded to Rawls-Dolin's pending motions and the time to do so has expired. Rawls-Dolin, proceeding pro se in this action, timely responded to the First Kindred Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 17.) Rawls-Dolin also timely responded to the Second Kindred Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 31), and Kindred replied, (ECF No. 30). Rawls-Dolin timely responded to the Riverside Defendants Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 33), and the Riverside Defendants replied, (ECF No. 36). Rawls-Dolin also filed a Supplemental Response to the Second Kindred Motion to Dismiss and the Riverside Defendants Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 39), and Kindred and the Riverside Defendants replied to Rawls-Dolin's Supplemental Response, (ECF Nos. 40, 44).³ Rawls-Dolin did not respond to the Gordon Motion to Dismiss and the time to do so has expired. These matters are ripe for disposition.

The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process.⁴ The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.⁵ For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Second Kindred Motion to Dismiss and the Gordon Motion to Dismiss. The Court will grant in part and deny in part the Riverside Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The Court will deny the Motion to File Electronically, the First Kindred Motion to Dismiss,⁶ the Motion for Subpoena, the Motion for Scheduling Order, and the Motion for Default Judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Rawls-Dolin, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, seemingly brings this Title VII and related-claims action against twelve defendants.⁷ Her claims stem from two related events: (1) the alleged sexual harassment perpetrated by Kindred, a Riverside employee, that she faced while working at Riverside; and, (2) Riverside's revocation of her security clearance, which resulted in Rawls-Dolin losing a necessary qualification to work at Riverside.

A. Factual Background⁸

Rawls-Dolin acknowledges, as she must, that she was not a Riverside employee, but states that she "was employed at . . . Riverside . . . starting in late October 2017 through Corizon and later Wellpath as a Mental Health Professional." (Am. Compl. 4, 7, ECF No. 9.) For example, Rawls-Dolin avers that she "was improperly subjected to treatment as a Riverside employee (which [she] was not)." (Id. 7.) Rather, she identifies "Corizon and later Wellpath" as her employer, (id. 2), and states that Riverside "treated [her] as a common law employee," (id. 7). She states that although she "was never terminated from [her] employment with Wellpath," on April 15, 2019, her "security clearance was revoked and [she was] forcefully removed from the [Riverside] site." (Id. 7-8.)

In her convoluted Amended Complaint, Rawls-Dolin makes allegations against all twelve defendants, but her allegations arise from the sexual harassment perpetrated by Kindred throughout her employment at Riverside. The Court will first introduce the allegations against Kindred. Then, the Court will recount the related allegations against the remaining defendants.

1. Allegations Against Kindred

Rawls-Dolin alleges that Kindred worked as a Riverside Correctional Officer during her time at Riverside. (Id. 1.) She states that Kindred's inappropriate actions began "at the start of [her] employment" and continued "throughout [her sixteen] months of employment." (Id. 4, 10.) She describes Kindred's conduct as "malicious, stalking continuous leering, pervasive flirting and threatening." (Id. 4.) She describes how Kindred would "would watch who [she] was talking to, interfer[e] during assessments with inmates to compliment [her], constant[ly] love bomb[], talk[] about [her] body parts, continuous[ly] professing his feelings towards [her] and com[e] to [her] office and circl[e] around [her]." (Id. 11.) Rawls-Dolin maintains that "Kindred was always the aggressor."⁹ (Id. 12.) She asserts that other employees observed some of Kindred's behavior and that several Riverside employees knew of Kindred's propensity for this type of behavior. (See id. 4, 12.)

On September 5, 2018, approximately one year after she began working at Riverside, Rawls-Dolin reported Kindred's behavior to "Captain Rochelle informally through communication." (Id. 9.) She states that "Captain Rochelle talked to Kindred about his behavior and to leave [Rawls-Dolin] alone." (Id.)

On March 28, 2019, approximately two weeks before Riverside terminated her security clearance, Rawls-Dolin again reported Kindred's behavior. (Id. 9.) In this instance Rawls-Dolin "wrote an official grievance, which very briefly discussed pervasive sexual harassment, stalking and [Kindred's] obsession during [her] entire [sixteen] months of employment at [Riverside]." (Id.) This second complaint, she alleges, resulted in retaliation against her that eventually led to the revocation of her security clearance. (See id.)

2. Allegations Against Other Defendants

Despite a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally, the Court struggles to identify Rawls-Dolin's counts and which claims run against which Defendant. As to the other defendants, it appears that Rawls-Dolin asserts that some engaged in retaliation following her complaints about Kindred. (Id. 2, 7.) As for others, she asserts that they committed sexual harassment or threatened her with physical violence. (Id. 3, 5-6.) For each of the remaining defendants, it appears that Rawls-Dolin generally alleges that they participated in the Title VII discrimination that she faced while working at Riverside. (Id. 2, 4, 6.)

a. Retaliation Allegations

Rawls-Dolin states that Charlene Jones, "Lieutenant, Office of Professional Review, Riverside," revoked Rawls-Dolin's security clearance "in retaliation for exercising [her First] Amendment right to Freedom of Speech (Protected Speech clause) regarding the sexual harassment complaint [that Rawls-Dolin] had filed on March 28." (Id. 7.) Further, Rawls-Dolin avers that "Jones [and] Riverside . . . both conspired to intimidate [her] for free exercise of [her] First Amendment protected speech rights in speaking about the prevalent sexual harassment that [she] was the unwanted recipient while working in . . . [Riverside's] facility." (Id. 8.) Rawls-Dolin alleges "Jones . . . made excuses for [Kindred]" when Rawls-Dolin filed her complaint. (Id. 14.) Rawls-Dolin explains that "Jones asserted [that Rawls-Dolin] violated a non-disclosure form" as the reason that Jones revoked Rawls-Dolin's security clearance, but Rawls-Dolin maintains that "Jones had [her] sign the incorrect forms on March 28." (Id. 7.) She also alleges that the form "was not even applicable since [she] was not a [Riverside] employee." (Id. 8.)

As to Shanta Brown, "Sergeant, Office of Professional Review, Riverside," Rawls-Dolin states that after Riverside terminated her security clearance, Brown and two other women "escorted" her "out of the facility and all the way to [her] vehicle . . . in excess of Riverside's" Standard Operating Procedures. (Id. 2, 7.) She states that Brown and another woman "would not allow [her] to obtain [her] personal belonging[s] from [her] office due to intimidation." (Id. 14.) Rawls-Dolin maintains that she "was in fear of violence by the three as they had formed a mob to silence [her] for utilizing [her] First Amendment right to Protected Speech for speaking out about their wrongdoings." (Id. 7.)

Rawls-Dolin also maintains that after she reported Kindred's behavior, Brown told her "[w]e need him (Defendant Kindred). We cannot get rid of him. We are short staffed." (Id. 10.) She further states that Brown "made it seem like [Rawls-Dolin] should be happy that [she was] getting unwanted attention" and "minimized what [she] endured." (Id. 13.) Rawls-Dolin believes that these statements show that Riverside "intentionally accommodated [her] aggressor, Kindred" and that "no investigation was conducted." (Id. 10.) Accordingly, Rawls-Dolin alleges that "[Kindred] knew there would not be any ramifications." (Id. 14.)

As to Dawn Flippin, "Sergeant, Office of Professional Review, Riverside," Rawls-Dolin states that after she submitted complaints on two other individuals, Flippin "retaliated against [her] . . . by removing [Rawls-Dolin] from [her] workspace with [her] colleagues, other mental health professionals and an entire area inside" Riverside.¹⁰ (Id. 6-7.) Rawls-Dolin...