Rawls v. Progressive N. Ins. Co.

310 Conn. 768

83 A.3d 576

Ronald RAWLS

v.PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 18855.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 20, 2013.

Decided Jan. 7, 2014.

Nathan C. Nasser, Danbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Stephanie A. Onorato, for the appellee (named defendant).

Stephanie Z. Roberge and Christine K. Lassen, New Haven, filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD and ESPINOSA, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

The plaintiff, Ronald Rawls, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment in an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendants, Progressive Northern Insurance Company (Progressive) and Zabian Bailey,¹ for negligence and underinsured motorist benefits. The action arose from a rear-end collision allegedly caused by Bailey on March 27, 2006, at a red traffic light in the city of Bridgeport. The plaintiff claims that the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to reasonably find negligence and causation and, therefore, that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Progressive's motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the jury verdict. Progressive responds that the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court's judgment because the plaintiff proved only that a rear-end collision occurred at a red traffic light. Thus, Progressive contends that the jury must have engaged in conjecture and surmise in finding negligence and causation. We agree with the plaintiff that the evidence in the present case was sufficient for a jury to reasonably find or infer that it was more probable than not that Bailey was negligent and that his negligence caused the collision. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On March 27, 2006, the plaintiff was traveling westbound on North Avenue in Bridgeport at approximately 11:30 p.m. when he brought his vehicle to a complete stop at an intersection with a red traffic light. The only vehicle ahead of the plaintiff's was a vehicle occupied by Hsiupian Li. The plaintiff testified that, about fifteen seconds later, he “heard a noise, and all of a sudden [he] blacked out” for “a couple of minutes” because his “car was hit from behind real hard....” The rear-end collision was caused by Bailey's vehicle, which “forc[ed] [the plaintiff's] vehicle to [propel] forward and collide with [Li's] car....” Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 130 Conn.App. 502, 505, 23 A.3d 100 (2011). The plaintiff later explained that, when the collision occurred, his head “hit the steering column” before he was thrown backward and “blacked out....” The plaintiff awoke a few minutes later to find that his head “hur[t] real bad” and that he had “glass all over [him].” The plaintiff did not see Bailey's car prior to the collision, did not know where Bailey was looking when the accident occurred, was not aware of Bailey's speed, and could not state whether Bailey had applied his brakes or swerved prior to the collision.

The plaintiff further testified that it took him approximately four minutes to get out of his car. He immediately inspected the damage to the vehicles and saw that the back of his own vehicle was “destroyed” and that the front was “heavily damaged.” The plaintiff did not speak to either of the drivers of the other vehicles. At trial, the plaintiff was able to demonstrate to the jury how the collision had occurred and the position of all three vehicles. He described the relative impact of Bailey's car on his car as “[e]xtremely heavy” and the impact of his car on Li's car as “[k]ind of heavy.” The plaintiff also introduced photographs of the damage to his car from the collision.

The investigating Bridgeport police officer, Pedro Rosa, testified that, when he arrived, emergency personnel were present at the accident scene. Rosa observed that Bailey's, the plaintiff's, and Li's vehicles “hit up against” each other. He then spoke to the plaintiff and Li before they were transferred to their respective ambulances. Although Rosa also spoke to Bailey, he did not take a statement from him. Rosa testified that there was “[h]eavy front-end damage” to Bailey's vehicle, “a lot of [rear-end] damage” to the plaintiff's vehicle, and “minor rear damage” to Li's vehicle. Finally, Rosa explained that North Avenue was relatively straight, flat, and wide, and that the weather was “fairly clear” that day.

The plaintiff filed a complaint on August 7, 2007, against Bailey for negligence and against Progressive for underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff alleged that Bailey's vehicle had rear-ended the plaintiff's vehicle, causing the plaintiff serious injuries. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted Bailey was negligent because he was following too closely in violation of General Statutes § 14–240(a), failed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout, failed to apply his brakes in time to avoid a collision, failed to turn his vehicle to avoid the collision, failed to keep his vehicle under proper and reasonable control, was inattentive to his surroundings, and was operating his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed. After the plaintiff rested his case, Progressive moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had “not submitted any evidence” from which a jury reasonably could find that Bailey was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Progressive argued that, even if the evidence was considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had proven only that there was a rear-end collision while the plaintiff was stopped at a red traffic light. According to Progressive, this evidence was insufficient for a jury to reasonably find negligence and proximate cause because it required the jury to engage in “speculation, conjecture, or surmise.” The trial court denied this motion. When Progressive renewed the motion at the end of trial, the trial court denied that motion as well.² The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $51,113 in damages. Progressive then filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied on March 16, 2010. On that same date, the trial court granted Progressive's motion for remittitur,³ reducing the award to $31,115, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.

Progressive appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Progressive's motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict. Progressive again claimed that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find or infer negligence and proximate cause. The Appellate Court agreed with Progressive. See Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra, 130 Conn.App. at 504, 510, 23 A.3d 100. The Appellate Court reasoned that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence because the plaintiff's recollection of a loud noise was “not probative of the elements of negligence,” and he had not presented any eyewitness testimony to support his allegations. Id., at 509, 23 A.3d 100. The Appellate Court also relied on its decision in Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Conn.App. 736, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955, 961 A.2d 421 (2008), in which it had concluded that evidence of a rear-end collision with a vehicle that was stopped in a line of traffic was insufficient for a jury to reasonably find negligence and causation. Id., at 741–42, 955 A.2d 1241; see Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra, at 508–509, 23 A.3d 100. The Appellate Court thus reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant Progressive's motion to set aside the verdict and to render judgment for Progressive. Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra, at 510, 23 A.3d 100. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the jury could have found negligence and proximate cause from the circumstantial evidence offered at trial. The plaintiff contends that this court has found evidence insufficient only when the circumstances surrounding the accident were entirely unknown; ⁴ in contrast, the evidence in the present case is adequate because the plaintiff was able to testify about what had transpired. The plaintiff thus asserts that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court's judgment because there was “some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchell v. Whelchel, 66 Conn.App. 574, 582, 785 A.2d 253 (2001). Progressive responds that the Appellate Court correctly concluded as it did because this conclusion was consistent with Schweiger and this court's vehicle collision jurisprudence. Progressive argues that the law is well settled that “[a] plaintiff cannot merely prove that a collision occurred and then call [on] the defendant ... to come forward with evidence that the collision was not a proximate consequence of negligence on his part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 306, 370 A.2d 933 (1976). Because Progressive contends that the plaintiff has proven only that a collision occurred, it argues that the jury must have engaged in speculation in finding that there was negligence and causation. We agree with the plaintiff.

We begin our analysis with the applicable standard of review. “The defendant must overcome a high threshold to prevail on either a motion for a directed verdict or a motion to set aside a judgment. Directed verdicts are not favored.... A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and...