Ray v. Besco Plumbing & Heating Sales Corp.

83 Mass.App.Ct. 1121

984 N.E.2d 891

Joseph RAY

v.BESCO PLUMBING & HEATING SALES CORP. & another.¹

No. 12–P–967.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

March 25, 2013.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREBy the Court (GRASSO, TRAINOR & CARHART, JJ.),.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment that dismissed his negligence action as time-barred. The action had been timely commenced in the District Court, but dismissed without prejudice based on the $25,000 amount-in-controversy limitation set forth in G.L. c. 218, § 19. The plaintiff contends the Superior Court judge erred in applying the statute of limitations set forth in G.L. c. 218, § 19A( d ),² rather than that in G.L. c. 260, § 32.³ We affirm.

1. Background. The parties do not dispute that the three year statute of limitations on the plaintiff's negligence action expired on January 2, 2010. Nor do they dispute that the plaintiff's District Court action was commenced within the limitations period ordinarily applicable. See G.L. c. 260, § 2A. The District Court entered a judgment of dismissal of that action on January 7, 2011. The plaintiff refiled his action in the Superior Court on October 10, 2011, approximately nine months later. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the refiled action was filed beyond the thirty-day extension of the statute of limitations for actions dismissed in District Court due to damages in excess of the statutory amount. See G.L. c. 218, § 19A( d ). The Superior Court judge agreed and dismissed the complaint.

2. Discussion. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the applicable statute of limitations is that contained in G.L. c. 260, § 32, because dismissal of the District Court action for exceeding the statutory amount is a “matter of form” within the ambit of that statute's one year grace period. We disagree. Regardless whether dismissal of the District Court action for exceeding the statutory limit is a “matter of form,” the Legislature has determined that the statute of limitations set forth in G.L. c. 218, § 19A( d ), controls the refiling of such actions. By the express and unambiguous language of G.L. c. 218, § 19A( d ), its more restrictive statute of limitations applies in circumstances such as this, notwithstanding other or conflicting statutes of limitations in G.L. c. 260 or elsewhere. See Attorney Gen. v. Commissioner of Ins., 450 Mass. 311, 319 (2008) (“The use of such a ‘notwithstanding clause’ clearly signals the drafter's intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section”).

Were there any residual doubt that the thirty day extension period of G.L. c. 218, § 19A( d ), prevails over the one year extension period of G.L. c. 260, § 32, the express language of G.L. c. 260, § 19, resolves the matter: “If a special provision is otherwise made relative to the limitation of any action, any provision of this chapter inconsistent therewith shall not apply.” General Laws c. 218, § 19A( d ), is unquestionably such an inconsistent special limitation provision. See Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc., 427 Mass. 560, 563 (1998). Cf. Matter of Valuation of MCI Worldcom Network Servs., Inc., 454 Mass....