Ray v. State

Alexander James Ray, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A22-0584

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

December 27, 2022

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-4820

Adam T. Johnson, David R. Lundgren, Lundgren & Johnson P.S.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Kirk, Judge. ^[*]

GAÏTAS, Judge

Appellant Alexander James Ray challenges the district court's denial of his postconviction petition, filed after we affirmed his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct on direct appeal. Ray argues that his appellate public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to (1) argue on appeal that the district court erroneously denied his for-cause challenge of a biased juror and (2) raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ray's postconviction petition, we affirm.

FACTS

In winter 2019, Ray sexually assaulted his then-girlfriend and videorecorded the encounter.^[1] Respondent State of Minnesota subsequently charged Ray with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2018) third-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2018), threats of violence, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018), and domestic assault by strangulation, Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2018). A jury found Ray guilty of all four offenses. The district court sentenced Ray to 90 months in prison to be followed by 10 years of conditional release.^[2] Ray, represented by an appellate public defender, filed a direct appeal. In preparing the appeal, Ray's appellate public defender requested the transcripts of the trial but specifically excluded from the request transcripts of jury selection. The appellate public defender filed a brief with this court arguing that the prosecutor had committed misconduct during Ray's trial. We affirmed Ray's convictions. Ray, 2021 WL 416718, at *4.

Ray subsequently obtained private defense counsel and filed a petition for postconviction relief. His postconviction petition raised claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and trial counsel, among other issues that he does not pursue in this appeal. Of relevance here, Ray's postconviction petition alleged that his appellate public defender provided ineffective assistance by not requesting the transcripts of jury selection, and in turn, by not raising two jury-selection issues on direct appeal. Ray first claimed that the appellate public defender should have discovered and argued that the district court erred in denying Ray's motion to strike a biased juror for cause and in allowing that juror to serve on Ray's jury. And Ray argued that the appellate public defender should have argued that trial counsel was deficient because trial counsel did not personally question the prospective jurors and allowed three additional biased jurors to serve on the jury.^[3] The district court concluded that Ray failed to establish that his appellate counsel and his trial counsel were ineffective. It denied Ray's postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.^[4]

DECISION

Ray challenges the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Appellate courts "review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotations and citation omitted).

In his postconviction petition, and now on appeal, Ray argues that his appellate counsel and his trial counsel provided constitutionally defective representation. Under the federal and state constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn Const. art. I, § 6. This right means "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).

When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the court applies the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn.App. 2017) (citing Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013)). Under that test, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's representation was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland requirements, [a court] need not consider the other requirement." State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017). The ultimate consideration is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance." Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007). An attorney meets the objective reasonableness standard when the attorney "provides [the] client with the representation of an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the circumstances." State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). Prejudice exists if there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's errors. Id.

Because the Strickland test involves mixed questions of law and fact, an appellate court reviews a district court's determinations de novo. State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019). "[T]o determine whether [a defendant's] appellate counsel was ineffective, [a reviewing court] must look to the merits of [the defendant's] underlying claims." Onyelobi v. State, 932 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Minn. 2019).

I. Because the district court did not err in denying trial counsel's motion to remove a juror for cause, Ray's appellate public defender did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue the issue on direct appeal.

Ray argues that his appellate public defender was ineffective because he did not request the transcript of jury selection and consequently failed to argue on direct appeal that the district court erred by denying a for-cause challenge to a biased juror. The juror at issue-juror 14-was a 61-year-old woman who stated during jury selection that she was sexually assaulted by a friend's brother as a teenager. Ray's trial counsel challenged juror 14 for cause, but the district court denied the motion, and juror 14 was ultimately seated on Ray's jury. According to Ray, the district court's decision to allow a biased juror to serve on his jury was structural error that violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury. And, according to Ray, if the appellate public defender had raised this issue on direct appeal, Ray would have prevailed and received a new trial.

Before turning to Ray's allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we examine the merits of the underlying claim. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. "Because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, . . . the bias of a single juror violates the defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 863 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). The presence of a biased juror is a structural error and requires automatic reversal. Id.

An attorney may challenge a juror "for cause" on 11 separate grounds, including that "[t]he juror's state of mind-in reference to the case or to either party-satisfies the court that the juror cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging party." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 5(1). If a party challenges a prospective juror on this basis-for actual bias-the party "must show that the juror exhibited strong and deep impressions that would prevent her from laying aside her impression or opinion and rendering a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 577 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted).

Here Ray's trial counsel challenged juror 14 for cause on the ground of actual bias, and the district court rejected the challenge. To determine whether the district court erred by seating a challenged juror, the appellate court applies a two-step analysis. State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 623 (Minn. 2015). The first step is to determine whether the juror expressed actual bias. Id. In considering this question, the appellate court "must view the juror's voir dire answers in context." Id. "If the juror expressed actual bias, [the appellate court] must then determine whether the juror was properly rehabilitated." Id. A juror is properly rehabilitated when the juror unequivocally agrees to follow the district court's instructions, set aside any preconceived judgments, and fairly consider the evidence. Id. (quoting State v. Prtine, 784 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2010)). "If a district court has ruled on a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror, an appellate court gives great...