Rayfield v. State

2020 Ark. 40

592 S.W.3d 237

Demarcus Lee RAYFIELD, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR-17-526

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: January 30, 2020

Demarcus Lee Rayfield, pro se.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Amanda Jegley, Ass't Att'y Gen., for Appellee.

Rhonda k. Wood, Associate Justice

Demarcus Lee Rayfield appeals the circuit court's denial of his petition for scientific testing of evidence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by (1) applying Act 1780 of 2001 to his petition; (2) finding that he did not meet the statutory requirements for testing; and (3) failing to hold a hearing on his petition. We find no error and affirm.

I. Background

The victim and Rayfield's stepfather, Harris, were involved in a sexual relationship. The victim testified that Rayfield and his mother forcibly entered her home, brutally assaulted her, and that Rayfield orally and vaginally raped her. A jury convicted him of rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated residential robbery. Rayfield v. State , 2014 Ark. App. 123, 2014 WL 668214. Although the State charged him with two counts of rape, the jury acquitted him on the count involving vaginal penetration. On direct appeal, Rayfield unsuccessfully challenged his convictions for robbery and aggravated residential burglary. Id.

Rayfield subsequently petitioned for further scientific testing of the vaginal swab collected from the victim. The sample was tested at the time of his trial, and he was excluded as a contributor to the Y-STR profile. His petition sought to compel Harris to provide a DNA sample and to have it tested to determine if Harris is a match to the Y-STR profile from the victim's vaginal swab. Rayfield contends that the victim may have lied when she testified that she only had oral, but not vaginal, sex with Harris earlier in the day of the incident. Rayfield argued that the presence of Harris's DNA would prove that the victim lied at trial, thus impeaching and discrediting her testimony.

II. Standard of Review

Rayfield filed his petition for scientific testing pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2016), which is the codification of Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 (Act 1780). The statute provides that a circuit court can order testing under Act 1780 when the proposed testing of the specific evidence may produce new material evidence that would support the theory of defense and raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner did not commit the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(8)(B) ; Pankau v. State , 2013 Ark. 162, 2013 WL 1694909. When the scientific evidence was available at trial, the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, must be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a) ; Lewis v. State , 2017 Ark. 144, 516 S.W.3d 718.

We do not reverse a trial court's decision to deny a petition under Act 1780 unless it is clearly erroneous. Wells v. State , 2017 Ark. 88, 513 S.W.3d 834. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.

III. Applicability of Act 1780 to Rayfield's Petition

Rayfield invoked Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -208 as the basis for relief in his petition. He contends the circuit court erred in applying Act 1780 because "nowhere in my petition or the amendment to my petition did I present any provisions or arguments governed by or associated with Act 1780." He argues that because he invoked the statutes and not the Act, the circuit court should have held him "strictly under the predicate requirements of A.C.A. § 16-112-201 thru 208." There was no error. The statute is the codification of the Act, and the court applied the correct law. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2016)

IV. Application of the Act

Rayfield raises multiple arguments that culminate with the contention that the circuit court erred in denying his petition on the merits. Act 1780 provides a method for scientific testing of evidence when it may exonerate a wrongfully convicted person. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 —208 (Repl. 2016). An assertion of innocence or a sliver of a possibility that additional testing might alter the outcome of a trial is insufficient. See Martin v. State , 2018 Ark. 176, at 3, 545 S.W.3d 763, 765. A petition for scientific testing merely based on a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim to support the judgment is not cognizable under Act 1780 because the Act does not afford a petitioner an opportunity to retry his case. See McClinton v. State , 2017 Ark. 360, 533 S.W.3d 578.

Rayfield's argument can be summarized as follows: the victim testified that she did not have vaginal intercourse with Harris on that day, and therefore, if Harris's DNA is tested and shown as a match to the Y-STR sample profile, then there would be conclusive evidence to impeach her credibility. Rayfield cites no authority for the proposition that impeachment of a witness on a peripheral matter is sufficient to establish actual innocence. Considering the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that the outcome of the trial would have been different had it been shown through DNA testing that the victim had vaginal intercourse with Harris later than she admitted.

While this scientific evidence has the potential to cast doubt on the victim's veracity as to when she last had vaginal intercourse with Harris, it would not lead to evidence proving Rayfield's actual innocence. This is not a potential mistaken-identity case. First, Rayfield is not alleging Harris committed the rape (by oral penetration), or any of the other crimes for which he was convicted. Second, Rayfield admitted he was present in the victim's home that evening. Third, the victim identified Rayfield as the perpetrator, and the forensic and medical evidence was consistent with the victim's account of the beatings. Fourth, trial testimony established that Rayfield's DNA did not match the Y-STR profile taken from the victim's vagina. And last, the jury acquitted him of the count of rape that involved vaginal penetration. Thus, Rayfield's petition for testing is merely to bolster a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument and to attack the credibility of the victim, and in this case, it is insufficient under the Act.

Additionally, a prerequisite for establishing a prima facie claim under section 16-112-202 includes demonstrating the existence of evidence or scientific methods of testing that either were not available at the time of trial or could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2016). DNA testing was known and available at the time of trial because it was performed to eliminate Rayfield as a contributor. Consequently, Rayfield also cannot meet this requirement.

V. Failure to Hold a Hearing

Rayfield also contends that he was entitled to a hearing on his petition. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-205(a) provides that the circuit court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the petition, files, and records conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Because it was clear that Rayfield was not entitled to relief under the Act, the circuit court was not obligated to hold a hearing. We find the circuit court's decision denying the petition was not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

Hart, J., dissents.

Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, dissenting.

Demarcus Lee Rayfield is entitled to testing of the vaginal swab to prove that Harris had vaginal sex with the putative victim, LB. Mr. Rayfield denied raping LB. Even though LB admitted performing oral sex on Harris, oral swabs from LB did not produce DNA evidence. LB's vaginal swabs excluded Mr. Rayfield. Accordingly, the only evidence that Mr. Rayfield had sexual contact with LB comes from LB's testimony.

If, in accordance with Mr. Rayfield's theory of defense—he had no sexual contact with LB—it was shown that the only evidence of rape came from LB who was conclusively shown to be lying, it would "raise a reasonable probability that [Mr. Rayfield] did not commit the offense." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(8)(B) (Repl. 2016). Conclusive proof that LB was lying would not merely "cast doubt" on her testimony, as the majority suggests. As the appellate courts of this state have stated more than 27 times in the last seven years, a victim's testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for tape. See, e.g. , Breeden v. State , 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5.

In the case before us, the circuit court summarily denied Mr. Rayfield's petition for testing because "the victim immediately identified the persons as the wife of Christopher Harris and her son on the night of the assault." While it was proved that Mr. Rayfield and his mother entered LB's residence and committed a battery, it does not follow that the rape allegations were proven.

Applicability of Act 1780 to Rayfield's Petition

The circuit court found that Mr. Rayfield's petition for testing should be summarily dismissed because

[u]nder Act 1780, the Petitioner must present a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(b). Circumstantial evidence was...