Razak v. Uber Techs.

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ALI RAZAK, et al. v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.

Civil Action No. 16-573

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

June 4, 2024

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON United States District Court Judge

Following a hung jury, both Plaintiffs (ECF 280) and Defendants (ECF 282) in this case filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED. The Court will convene a second jury trial as of June 10, 2024.

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Plaintiffs are three UberBLACK drivers that operated in the Philadelphia area between 2013 and 2018. Plaintiffs allege that Uber “misclassified” Plaintiffs and other similarly situated drivers as independent contractors, rather than employees, thus precluding Plaintiffs from certain benefits and compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 P.S §§ 333.101-333.115, and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.45. ECF 299 at ¶ 1.

This case has a lengthy procedural history, and the following is a short summary. After the case was filed in Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and removed to this Court, ECF 1, extensive discovery took place. Following this Court's denial of a number of pretrial motions, see, e.g., ECF 94, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as of January 26, 2018, ECF 114. In a thirty-eight-page memorandum dated April 11, 2018, this Court granted Defendants' motion. ECF 124.

The Third Circuit reversed, vacated, and remanded the case, finding that there were a number of material factual disputes that prevented summary judgment. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 145 (3d Cir.), amended, 979 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[W]here there are genuine questions of material fact that need resolution, these questions must go to a fact-finder. This case presents such genuine disputes of material facts”).

Following what the Parties reported were extensive but unsuccessful settlement discussions, a trial took place in this Court beginning on March 4, 2024. ECF 243. As stipulated by the Parties, that trial was limited to “the threshold liability question of whether the three individual Plaintiffs were Defendants' employees under the FLSA, PMWA, and/or WPCL.” ECF 146. Likewise, the Parties limited the relevant time period to “only events occurring . . . prior to January 11, 2018.” Id.

After a five-day trial, the jury could not unanimously agree on whether Plaintiffs had proved-by a preponderance of the evidence-that Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants. ECF 269. Following the jury's report of a deadlock on this ultimate issue, the Court decided to submit specific questions to the jury on (1) the six “economic reality” factors that guide the “misclassification" determination under the FLSA and PMWA, as set forth by the Third Circuit in Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1985), and (2) the ten factors that guide a similar holistic analysis under Pennsylvania's WPCL, as endorsed by the Third Circuit in Williams v. Jani-King of Philadelphia Inc., 837 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2016). ECF 269.

When the Court proposed use of this supplemental form, both parties initially objected. Defendants maintained that objection throughout trial, whereas Plaintiffs ultimately informed the Court that Plaintiffs did not “have an objection to this general process.” Trial Tr. at 5, Mar. 11, 2024, ECF 277. The Court went ahead with the poll, which showed that a majority of the jury, on the majority of the questions, favored Uber's position that Plaintiffs had failed to prove that they were “employees.” ECF 269.

Ultimately though, because the Court had not given clear advance notice to counsel that it was going to use such a poll, the Court determined that-even if it had been permissible to use an advisory jury for a damages claim under the FLSA-the poll could not have had any legal significance at that time and place in this case. Trial Tr. at 10, Mar. 11, 2024, ECF 277; see also Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 1989).^[1]

The Parties-both of whom had previously filed Rule 50(a) motions-each moved for Rule 50(b) post-trial relief in due course.^[2]ECFs 280, 282. While the Court has previously indicated to the Parties that the Court intended to deny those motions, or potentially hold the motions until after a second trial, the Court has not expressly ruled on them. Thus, those motions are currently before the Court.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a district court to enter judgment as a matter of law, upon renewed motion after a hung jury, “only if, as a matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.” Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Stewart v. Walbridge, Aldinger Co., 882 F.Supp. 1441, 1443 (D. Del. 1995); Greco v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2005 WL 3591196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2005).

This remedy is to be invoked “sparingly,” Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007), as a district court may grant judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability,” Le Page's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, the court “may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury.” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691-92 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. Of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003); see also LePage's, 324 F.3d at 146 (“[R]eview of a jury's verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict.”). Likewise, “conflicting evidence which could reasonably lead to inconsistent conclusions will not justify a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ....It is the function of the trier of fact alone . . . to evaluate contradictory evidence and to draw inferences therefrom.” Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (citations omitted). Thus, “[n]ormally, when the evidence is contradictory, a JNOV is inappropriate.” Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 811 (3d Cir. 1984).

III. Party Contentions

Defendants move for Rule 50(b) relief on each of Plaintiffs' claims. ECF 282 at 1. Plaintiffs, by contrast, limit their cross-motion to their state law claims under the PMWA and WPCL.^[3]ECF 280. Notably, Plaintiffs' motion hinges on the novel legal argument that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-if given the opportunity-would “likely” adopt a new, workerfriendly classification test for these two statutes. ECF 280 at 2. This Court already rejected that argument at trial, Trial Tr. at 168, Mar. 7, 2024, ECF 275, but it takes this opportunity to expand on that ruling below.

A. Defendants' Contentions

Defendants contend that “[n]o reasonable jury could find that Plaintiffs were ‘employees' under the FLSA, PMWA, and WPCL, which was the sole issue presented at trial.” ECF 282-1 at 3. In so doing, Defendants note that “while the Third Circuit held that disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment, the evidence presented at trial-which has superseded the summary judgment record[]-is even more one-sided in favor of independent contractor status” for each of the six “economic reality” factors. Id. (citing to Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. 729, 734 (2023)).

On the “right to control,” Defendants assert that (1) “[t]he evidence at trial revealed that the parties' contracts explicitly disavow Uber's right to control Plaintiffs in the performance of their services providing transportation using the Uber App,” and (2) “actual practice was consistent with the contracts,” with significant trial testimony indicating that Plaintiffs had the freedom to choose their own hours, select their own routes, and to work for Uber's competitors. ECF 282-1 at 4-5 (record citations omitted).

Defendants further argue that much of Plaintiffs' counterevidence regarding Uber's right to control amounted to inadmissible hearsay, as Plaintiffs repeatedly testified that “unidentified” Uber personnel had imposed various rules, restrictions, or quality assurance measures. Id. at 6. Likewise, Defendants contend that “[m]any of the so-called ‘rules' of which Plaintiffs complain were required by law, and thus could not constitute ‘control' under the economic realities test.” Id. (citing to 29 C.F.R. § 795.110(b)(4)).

On “opportunity for profit or loss,” Defendants assert the evidence at trial demonstrated that each of the three Plaintiffs (1) “owned and operated their own businesses and engaged in activities (like advertising) to drum up additional business outside of the relationship with Uber,” and (2) “could also be strategic when using the Uber App in order to maximize profit.” Id. at 7.

On “investment in equipment or materials,” Defendants again direct the Court to the fact that Plaintiffs “paid for and owned their vehicles” and “made other substantial investments, including in advertising.” Id. at 7. Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs' attempts to highlight the “relative” investment by Uber in its platform misconstrue the scope permissible considerations for this factor. Id. at 7-8...