Razmus v. Kent Cnty.

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MATTHEW RAZMUS, Plaintiff, v. KENT COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-451

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 24, 2021

OPINION

HALA Y. JARBOU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a civil rights action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff Matthew Razmus alleges that Defendants Kent County Deputies Jacob Vickery and Anthony Ysquierdo and Defendant Kent County Officer Elizabeth Ondovscik (“Defendant Deputies”) used excessive force when arresting him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also brings claims against Defendant Kent County. The complaint states four claims: (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Vickery, Ysquierdo, and Ondovcsik (Count I); (2) deliberately indifferent policies, customs and established practices, including inadequate training against Kent County (Count II); (3) disability-based discrimination in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) against Kent County (Count III); and (4) disability-based discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against Kent County (Count IV). Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all Counts (ECF No. 36). The Court will grant the motion in part on one theory of Monell liability against Kent County and deny the motion on all other grounds.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2019, Defendant Deputies responded to a domestic dispute on a street in Alpine Township, Michigan. Plaintiff and his girlfriend, Kaitlin Marner, were engaged in a verbal confrontation. Plaintiff explained to Defendants that no assault had occurred. Defendants conducted a routine LEIN check on Plaintiff and determined that he had an outstanding bench warrant for retail fraud. Plaintiff was arrested on account of the bench warrant and not in connection with the initial dispute with Marner.

At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff was recovering from a fracture to his right arm for which he had undergone surgery. Plaintiff had two pins in his right wrist and hand to stabilize the fracture and a splint covering his hand and forearm. Plaintiff claims that when Defendants attempted to handcuff both of his hands behind his back with traditional metal handcuffs, he heard a pop when the metal handcuff latched over the splint in his right hand. Plaintiff states that he expressed his pain and discomfort, that Defendants released the right handcuff, and proceeded to reattach the metal handcuff. He expressed his pain again, after which Defendants changed course and used a flex cuff (a hard plastic zip tie) on his right wrist instead. Plaintiff claims that he complained of pain from the flex cuff as well, and that Defendants disregarded this complaint.

Defendants testified in their depositions to a different version of events. Defendants claim that the arrest occurred without a complaint from Plaintiff. They state that they noticed the splint immediately and used a flex cuff on Plaintiff's injured right wrist from the start. They state that they placed traditional handcuffs over his left wrist to which they connected the flex cuff.

On July 30, 2019, Plaintiff went to the emergency room immediately after his release from jail. Plaintiff underwent surgery the following day to remove the displaced pin. His medical records indicate that he also developed a MRSA infection and cellulitis in his right hand.

II. STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is genuinely disputed when there is “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. City Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1961)). “Courts consider the evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2013).

B. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that protects government officials from liability ‘when a reasonable official in the defendant's position would not have understood his or her actions to violate a person's constitutional rights.'” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720, 729 (6th Cir. 2007)). Under § 1983, officers are entitled to qualified immunity “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.'” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” Id. This legal principle must “clearly prohibit the officer's conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id. at 590. It is not necessary for there to be “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). “This demanding standard protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 589 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). “[C]ourts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.

The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. See LeFever v. Ferguson, 645 Fed.Appx. 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek summary judgment on several grounds. First, they argue that even when applying Plaintiff's version of the facts, Plaintiff cannot show that he experienced “unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Hughey v. Easlik, 3 F.4th 283, 289 (6th Cir. 2021). Second, Defendants argue that the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established right, and because they acted reasonably and in good faith. Further, they argue that because Defendant Deputies cannot be held liable under § 1983, Defendant Kent County cannot be held liable. Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of the disability claims because he was not disabled within the meaning of the statutes at the time of arrest, and that the event of an arrest is not covered under either Act.

A. Count I: Excessive Force by Defendant Deputies & Qualified Immunity

1. Constitutional Violation

“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from excessive force to persons who are stopped, arrested, or held in custody by an arresting officer.” Hughey, 3 F.4th at 289. In Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, courts in the Sixth Circuit use an objective-reasonableness standard that is a “fact-specific, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.” Id. There is a more specific three-part test for determining whether “‘unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing'” constitutes excessive force. Id. (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009)). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show a genuine issue of material fact that: “(1) [they] complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced ‘some physical injury' resulting from the handcuffing.” Morrison, 583 F.3d at 401.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first two parts of this test. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he complained about the tightness of the handcuffs all three times he was handcuffed. Regarding the final handcuffing using flex cuffs, Plaintiff stated:

Q. Okay. Did you complain about the zip tie being tight?

A. Yes, I told them again, something is not right.

Q. Was the zip tie too tight? That's what I'm asking you.

A. I was in pain.

Q. Was it from the zip tie or was it from the two times you said they tried to put metal handcuffs on you?

A. I'm going to say both.

. . . .

A. I said I was in pain from the prior cuffings and the zip tie.

Q. Did you tell them that you didn't want to be handcuffed at all?

A. I did.

Q. And what did they say?

A. They didn't listen.

(Razmus Dep., ECF No. 39-4, PageID.569.) Later in the deposition, Plaintiff reiterated his complaints about the flex cuffs:

Q. All right. And then the third time the officers placed a zip tie on your wrist over that cast, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And you again complained of pain that the zip tie was too tight over the cast, correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And your complaints of pain and tightness were ignored; is that correct?

A. Correct.

(Id., PageID.573.) Despite these two instances, Defendants point to a third instance in which Plaintiff responded ambiguously:

A. So, no, I think it's messed up right now because of you know, of - of improper police work . . . . You know, just I think they - they could have prevented the whole thing from going the way it did, so . . . . They could have prevented me from having - having another surgery and having my hand -

Q. How could they have prevented what happened?

A. By not cuffing me twice over a surgically repaired wound, I would say. What do you think?

Q. So you're saying that they should not have handcuffed you at all?

A. I'm saying what the

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