Reaves v. State

664 S.E.2d 211

284 Ga. 181

REAVES v. The STATE.

No. S07A1826.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 11, 2008.

Gary V. Bowman, Christopher E. Chapman, McDonough, for appellant.

Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tommy Kenneth Floyd, Dist. Atty., James L. Wright, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

CARLEY, Justice.

Rodney Michael Reaves was indicted for the murder of his 11-year-old daughter and for related crimes, and the State gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. This Court granted interim review and directed the parties to address the following three questions: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress Reaves' statements; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence seized with warrants; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing Reaves' request to have a video recording of his custodial statements examined by the FBI. Reaves' wife was also charged with murder and related offenses, and interim review was granted in her case, which is decided today in Case Number S08A0126.

1. On the morning of December 1, 2003, Reaves called 911 and led law enforcement officers to his daughter's bedroom, where she lay dead, having sustained numerous injuries. After an apparently consensual initial interaction, Reaves at some point gave officers a physical demonstration of his version of the events leading up to the child's death. One to two hours subsequent to the officers' arrival, Reaves was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), waived those rights, and gave a second demonstration which was videotaped. He was then informed that he was under arrest. Thereafter, the officers transported Reaves to the police station and made another video recording, which shows a second reading and waiver of his Miranda rights, followed by a lengthy police interrogation.

In its order on the motion to suppress Reaves' pre-trial statements, the trial court found simply that Reaves "was advised of each of his Miranda rights, that he understood them, that he voluntarily waived them, and that he thereafter gave his statements freely and voluntarily without any hope of benefit or fear of injury." "`"`Factual and credibility determinations made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous. (Cit.)' (Cit.)"' [Cit.]" Baldwin v. State, 263 Ga. 524, 525(1), 435 S.E.2d 926 (1993). The trial court's findings of fact are supported by uncontradicted evidence in the record to the extent that they pertain to the first Miranda waiver and subsequent physical demonstration, as well as the second Miranda waiver and subsequent lengthy interrogation. However, the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous with respect to statements which Reaves made at his home prior to any Miranda warning.

The admissibility of those pre-Miranda statements depends upon whether "`a reasonable person in the place of the defendant would feel so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest. (Cits.)' [Cit.]" Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 358(2), 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006). However, the trial court has not yet made the findings of fact necessary to decide this question, including, but not limited to, whether Reaves was ordered to sit, and whether and when he was forbidden to use his cellular telephone. Therefore, we remand the case for the findings of fact which are necessary to determine whether Reaves was in custody prior to his first Miranda warning. See Hicks v. State, 255 Ga. 503, 504(1), 340 S.E.2d 604 (1986); Livingston v. State, 267 Ga.App. 875, 877(2), 600 S.E.2d 817 (2004).

On remand, the trial court should note that, contrary to Reaves' argument, whether officers focused their "unarticulated suspicions" on him and whether they secretly possessed probable cause to arrest him are irrelevant to the question of whether he was in custody. Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2), 463 S.E.2d 16 (1995). If on remand any of Reaves' statements prior to his Miranda warnings are deemed inadmissible, the trial court should also consider whether those statements which were preceded by Miranda warnings and waivers are nevertheless also inadmissible. State v. Pye, 282 Ga. 796, 799-800, 653 S.E.2d 450 (2007).

2. (a) Prior to the issuance of any warrant, the police officers seized a blood sample, which the uncontradicted testimony shows was discovered on the floor of Reaves' garage when the officers entered it pursuant to his consent. As for the remaining physical evidence, the State argues that no warrants were necessary, because the officers were lawfully present at a known crime scene and, therefore, were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the premises. When police officers have lawfully entered a crime scene, they may take actions justified by exigent circumstances, such as a search to find other victims or perpetrators or to secure evidence that is subject to imminent destruction, and they may seize any evidence which is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-394(I), 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Lawler v. State, 276 Ga. 229, 233(4)(b), 576 S.E.2d 841 (2003). However, law enforcement officers may not conduct any other warrantless search of a known crime scene simply because they are lawfully present and "a homicide recently occurred there, as there is no `murder scene exception' to the warrant requirement. [Cit.]" Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 322(2), 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007). See also Mincey v. Arizona, supra at 393-395(I), 98 S.Ct. 2408.

(b) Reaves contends that the search warrants for his home were invalid because the police officers used the statements he made prior to any Miranda warnings to show probable cause. However, Reaves does not argue that his pre-Miranda statements were involuntary. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that physical evidence obtained as the fruit of a statement made without the required Miranda warnings should not be suppressed so long as the statement was voluntary. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004) (plurality opinion with concurrence). It follows that physical evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained with a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda is also admissible. United States v. Phillips, 468 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir.2006); Brown v. State, 292 Ga.App. ___, ___ (1), 663 S.E.2d 749, 754 (2008).

(c) Reaves further contends that the search warrants were tainted by an earlier, warrantless search of his home that extended beyond the garage. A finding by the trial court as to whether such a warrantless search actually occurred is not necessary to determine whether the warrants were valid. A review of the record shows that, other than the evidence which was discovered by the officers when they entered the garage with Reaves' consent, no information obtained during a warrantless search was used to obtain the warrants. Moreover, the evidence presented to the magistrate was sufficient to show probable cause to support the search warrants. Whether other, illegal searches occurred "is irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because there was an independent source for the warrant[s] under which that evidence was seized." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-814(V), 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). See also State v. Lejeune, 277 Ga. 749, 754-755(3)(A), 594 S.E.2d 637 (2004). Accordingly, we conclude that the warrants were not invalid because of any warrantless search that might have previously occurred.

(d) Reaves urges that the search warrants in this case violated the requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution that "no Warrants shall issue ... [without] particularly describing ... the ... things to be seized." Although a warrant "cannot leave the determination of what articles fall within [its] description and are to be seized entirely to the judgment and opinion of the officer executing the warrant[,]" the degree of specificity in the description "is flexible and will vary with the circumstances involved." Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 164(3), 415 S.E.2d 168 (1992). "[T]he Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108(I), 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).

The record in this case contains three search warrants for Reaves' home and one for an automobile. The first warrant for the house authorized the seizure of

[b]lunt objects, speaker wire, blood, hair, fibers, fingerprints, bodily fluids, papers and notes, and any other item of evidence pertaining to possible child abuse or neglect or any other item(s) that tend to lead to probable cause that a crime has been committed. Which is ... Cruelty to Children[.]

The second search warrant for the house specified

speaker wire, wooden paddle, chain encased in plastic (protective covered bicycle lock), notes and papers, scissors and any other item of evidentiary value tending to lead to probable cause that a crime has been committed. Which is ... Murder ...; Cruelty to Children[.]

The third warrant for the house authorized the seizure of a

Personal Home computer, school agenda, diary, rubber-maid type tub with personal items of [the victim], as well as notes and papers and any other evidence that would tend to lead to probable cause that a crime has been committed: to wit: Murder ... and Cruelty to Children....

The warrant for the automobile specified a

wooden paddle, chain encased in plastic (protective covered bicycle lock), padlocks, as well as notes, papers, clothing, hair, fibers and any other trace evidence that would tend to lead to probable cause that were used in [the] crime of Murder ... and Cruelty to Children....

We do not view the slight differences...