Reddick v. Medtronic, Inc.

DAVID REDDICK, PLAINTIFF v. MEDTRONIC, INC., DEFENDANT

Civil Action No. 22-2715

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

December 23, 2022

SECTION “E” (1)

ORDER AND REASONS

SUSIE MORGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Medtronic, Inc.'s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss.^[1]Plaintiff David Reddick (“Plaintiff”) opposes this motion.^[2] Defendant filed a reply.^[3] The Court held oral argument on November 29, 2022.^[4] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff in December, 2013.^[5] Plaintiff alleges that an Implantable Cardiac Defibrillator manufactured by Defendant and surgically implanted in Plaintiff was the proximate cause of his future medical complications.^[6]

Plaintiff previously brought an action in this Court based on the same alleged injury (“Reddick I”).^[7] On March 2, 2o22, in Reddick I this Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's Louisiana Product Liability Act claims.^[8] On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling on March 9, 2022.^[9]

On April 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.^[10] Plaintiff brings claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”).^[11] Defendant again removed Plaintiff's lawsuit to federal court.^[12] On August 25 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.^[13]

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff has not set forth factual allegations in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief.^[14] “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”^[15]“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”^[16] The court however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”^[17] “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.^[18]

In summary, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”^[19] “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.”^[20] “Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.'”^[21]

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on the basis of several arguments. Defendant argues Plaintiff's claims are (1) barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act; (3) prescribed under Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period; (4) entirely subsumed by the LPLA; and (5) insufficiently supported by facts to survive a motion to dismiss.^[22]Plaintiff opposes each of Defendant's arguments.^[23] In addition, in his opposition Plaintiff requested the opportunity to amend his complaint after discovery.^[24] For the reasons stated below, the Court finds Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and allowing amendment to his complaint would be futile.

At the outset, because the parties invoke this Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of diversity of citizenship between the parties,^[25] the Court must determine whether to apply state or federal law. “Where federal jurisdiction, as here, is based on diversity, [the Court] applies the substantive law of the forum state- [Louisiana].”^[26] Accordingly, the Louisiana law governing res judicata applies.

Louisiana law provides for “a broad application of res judicata to foster judicial efficiency and protect litigants from duplicative litigation.'”^[27] “That said, ‘any doubt concerning application of the principle of res judicata must be resolved against its application.'”^[28] Louisiana's res judicata statute provides that “a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review” and that “all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished.”^[29] The Louisiana Supreme Court has held a second action is precluded by the res judicata statute when five elements are satisfied: (1) “the judgment is valid;” (2) “the judgment is final;” (3) “the parties are the same;” (4) “the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation;” and (5) “the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.”^[30]

Defendant argues it has established each of the above elements and is thereby entitled to dismissal on the basis of res judicata.^[31] In his opposition, Plaintiff challenges only element four, whether the cause of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation, arguing “[a] new and separate cause of action has arisen from Medtronic's admission to the FDA of the defective battery, circuit and Evera, and the April 12, 2021 FDA recall” and as a result, Plaintiff's “new cause of action is not barred by res judicata.”^[32] Even though the Plaintiff did not argue that element five also has not been established, elements four and five are intertwined and the Court will discuss both below.

Considering element four, the Court finds the FDA recall in this case does not create a new cause of action for the purposes of res judicata. An FDA recall does not, in and of itself, create a “cause of action.”^[33] A cause of action under the LPLA exists if a plaintiff can demonstrate “an unreasonably dangerous characteristic of the product proximately caused damages to the claimant when the claimant used the product in a reasonably anticipated manner,” and the product is unreasonably dangerous in one of four ways: (1) in construction or composition; (2) in design; (3) because an adequate warning about the product had not been provided; and (4) because it does not conform to an express warning of the manufacturer about the product.^[34] Notably absent from this list is a cause of action created by the mere fact that a product was recalled by the FDA. A recall, in and of itself, does not create a cause of action but is mere evidence that may be used to support the elements of a cause of action.^[35] Moreover, nothing barred Plaintiff from soliciting expert testimony regarding the battery life of the device in the first suit as a claim under the LPLA, and the FDA recall does nothing more than potentially provide additional evidence as to a new theory of liability-one that Plaintiff could have raised in his first suit. Plaintiff is unable to change a critical fact-that Plaintiff already had the opportunity to litigate and investigate these exact claims in Reddick I. This is the quintessential circumstance in which Louisiana's broad application of res judicata steps in to foster judicial efficiency and protect litigants from duplicative litigation. Accordingly, no new cause of action exists and element four has been met.

In addressing element five, whether the cause of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the first litigation, the Court considers the legislative history of Louisiana's res judicata law. “Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 provides a broad application of res judicata to foster judicial efficiency and protect litigants from duplicative litigation.”^[36] “With the amendment of § 4231 in 1990, Louisiana broadened its res judicata law to correspond with federal law by embracing the notion of ‘extinguishment' of the cause of action through the preclusion concepts of ‘merger' and ‘bar.'”^[37] The 1990 change was explained in detail in Comment A to Louisiana Revised Statute 13 § 4231:

R.S. 13:4231 makes a substantial change in the law. Under the present law a second action would be barred by the defense of res judicata only when the plaintiff seeks the same relief based on the same cause or grounds. This interpretation of res judicata is too narrow to fully implement the purpose of res judicata which is to foster judicial efficiency and also to protect the defendant from multiple lawsuits. For example in Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So.2d 287 (La. 1976) the plaintiff sued unsuccessfully to rescind the lease for lesion beyond moiety and nonpayment of the rent, and then sued to rescind the same lease for fraud. The Supreme Court held that the second action was not barred by res judicata because it was based on a different cause (the legal principle upon which the demand is based).

Under new R.S. 13:4231 the second action would be barred because it arises out of the occurrence which was the subject matter of the prior litigation. The central inquiry is not whether the second action is based on the same cause or cause of action (a concept which is difficult to define)

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