Redding v. State

897 S.E.2d 801

REDDING

v.The STATE.

S23A1018

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 6, 2024

Superior Court, Muscogee County, Bobby Peters, Judge

Kennon Peebles, Jr., 3296 Summit Ridge Parkway, Duluth, Georgia 30096, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Michael Alexander Oldham, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Meghan Hobbs Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Frederick Lewis, A.D.A., Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, 100 10th Street, Columbus, Georgia 31901, Sadhana Pandey Dailey, A.D.A., Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 1340, Columbus, Georgia 31902, for Appellee.

LaGrua, Justice.

Following a 2018 jury trial, Appellant Merrick Redding was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Joseph Davis.¹ In his first appeal to this Court, we held that the evidence presented at Redding’s trial was legally sufficient to support his murder conviction, but we otherwise vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to make factual findings and legal conclusions regarding Redding’s allegation of a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.² See Redding v. State, 309 Ga. 124, 129-130 (2), 844 S.E.2d 725 (2020) ("Redding I").

On remand, the trial court issued a written order denying the speedy-trial motion. Red- ding filed a second appeal, again contending his speedy-trial rights were violated along with other claims of error. This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case a second time "because the trial court misstated and misapplied the law regarding the prejudice factor, failed to weigh each Barker factor, and conflated its consideration of some factors…." Redding v. State, 313 Ga. 730, 736, 873 S.E.2d 158 (2022) ("Redding II").

On remand, the trial court entered a second written order denying the speedy-trial motion. Redding filed his third appeal, presently before the Court, again raising his speedy-trial claim along with other previously unaddressed claims. For a third time, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for the trial court to resolve the speedy-trial claim. We will not address the remaining claims of error.

[1–4] 1. A constitutional speedy-trial claim is evaluated under the two-part framework set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct, 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1072) and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1002). As we explained in Redding II,

[f]irst, the trial court must consider whether the length of time between the defendant’s arrest and trial is sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial. If hot, the speedy-trial claim fails at the threshold. A delay of one year or more is typically presumed to be prejudicial. In Redding I, we concluded that the presumptive-prejudice threshold was crossed in this case.

When that threshold is crossed, the trial court proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial. These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Redding II, 313 Ga. at 731-732, 873 S.E.2d 158 (citation and punctuation omitted). Consideration of the Barker-Doggett factors "requires courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process," and the four factors have no "talismanic qualities and must be considered together." Leonard v. State, 316 Ga. 827, 830 (6), 889 S.E.2d 837 (2023).

[5, 6] When reviewing the trial court’s weighing and balancing of the factors, this Court

must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion, even though we might have reached a different conclusion were the issue committed to our discretion.

Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2), 850 S.E.2d 152 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). But in the context of a constitutional speedy-trial analysis, if the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous or the trial court "significantly misapplies the law," then "the trial court’s exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court used the correct fact[ual] and legal analysis, it would have had no discretion to reach a different judgment." State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d), 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011). If the trial court would still have discretion to reach a different judgment, we remand for the trial court to reweigh the factors and exercise its discretion using the correct factual and legal analysis. See State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863, 868 (3), 734 S.E,2d 12 (2012).

2. Redding was arrested on September 12, 2016, indicted 19 months later on April 24, 2018, reindicted on the same charges on May 22, 2018, and tried 5 months later on October 24, 2018. The trial court properly found this cumulative 25-month period was presumptively prejudicial—as we also concluded in Redding I—and proceeded to consider the Barker-Doggett factors. See Redding I, 309 Ga. at 129 (2), 844 S.E.2d 725 (holding the presumptive-prejudice threshold was crossed in this case).

(a) The length of the delay.

[7–10] The trial court erred by weighing the length-of-delay factor neutrally.

The length of the pretrial delay in absolute terms plays a role in the threshold determination of presumptive prejudice. However, it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.

Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56 (2) (b) (i), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008) (emphasis supplied). While similar, the presumptive prejudice threshold and length-of-delay factor are separate inquiries. Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 57 (2) (b) (i), 663 S.E,2d 189. In considering the length of the delay, a court must consider "whether delay before trial was uncommonly long." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 (II), 112 S.Ct. 2686. "[T]he delay that can be tolerated in a particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and seriousness of the charges in that case," and a delay may be uncommonly long when the case is "not prosecuted with the promptness customary in such cases …." State v. Buckner, 292 Ga. 390, 393 (3) (a), 738 S.E.2d 65 (2013). Uncommonly long delays should generally weigh against the State, at least lightly.³

[11] Here, the trial court found the delay was uncommonly long. However, instead of weighing the length-of-delay factor against the State, the trial court examined the reasons for the delay and weighed it neutrally. Specifically, the, trial court referenced a backlog at the State Crime Lab and found that the State did not intentionally delay trial, noting that "both sides requested delays." But the reasons for the delay is its own factor. The length-of-delay factor should consider only the length of the delay itself, not the reasons for it. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56 (2) (b) (i), 663 S.E.2d 189 (explaining the length of pretrial delay "in absolute terms" plays a role as one of the four Barker-Doggett factors). Because the trial court based the weight of the length-of-delay factor on the reasons for the delay (which is a separate factor), it misapplied the law. The trial court should have weighed the length-of-delay factor against the State.

(b) The reasons for the delay.

[12] The trial court also erred by weighing the reasons-for-delay factor neutrally. In considering the reasons-for-delay factor, we have explained

the trial court must consider which party was responsible for the delay, whether the delay was intentional, and, if it was intentional, what the motive was for seeking or causing the delay. As to the amount of weight assigned to this factor, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the' government, and an unintentional delay, such as that caused by the prosecuting attorney’s mere negligence or the trial court’s overcrowded docket, should be weighted less heavily.

Leonard, 316 Ga. at 849-850 (6) (b), 889 S.E.2d 837 (citations and punctuation omitted). "Of course, delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant." Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 287 (4) (b), 845 S.E.2d 625 (2020).

[13] The trial court found the 25-month delay "between [Redding’s] arrest and the date of his trial can … be attributed to the need for the State to collect evidence" and "for the court to provide timely trials to other cases…." The trial court also found the State did not deliberately delay indictment or trial. However, the trial court also found "both sides requested delays," citing March and November 2017 hearings where the trial court claimed defense counsel requested more time to obtain a witness and was not ready for trial. Because the trial court believed the delay was attributed to "both sides," the trial court weighed the reasons-for-delay factor neutrally.

The trial court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. While Redding did request more time to prepare for his probation revocation at those hearings, he never requested a delay of trial at either hearing or anywhere else in the record. Thus, the trial court’s reason for weighing this factor neutrally is unsupported by the record. The record shows the reasons for the delay of the trial were solely attributable to the State, so this factor should be weighed against the State. See Leonard, 316 Ga: at 849-850 (6) (b), 889 S.E,2d 837.

(c) The assertion of the right to a speedy trial.

[14] The trial court weighed the assertion-of-right factor neutrally and did not abuse...