Reece v. Shelby Cnty.

JOSHUA REECE, Plaintiff, v. SHELBY COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:16-cv-00069-GFVT-EBA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION FRANKFORT

March 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER*** *** *** ***

In November 2015, Plaintiff Joshua Reece was assaulted by fellow inmates within the Shelby County Detention Center in Shelbyville, Kentucky. After being discharged from the jail, Mr. Reece brought suit against a number of defendants claiming multiple state law violations and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are three separate motions for summary judgment. Shelby County Defendants¹ and Southern Health Partners, Inc. Defendants² move for summary judgment on all Plaintiff's claims against them [R. 152; R. 156], and Mr. Reece moves for summary judgment against Defendant Deputy Jailer William Carey. [R. 155.] For the reasons that follow, both the Shelby County Defendants and Southern Defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Mr. Reece's motion is also GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I

A

On November 18, 2015, Joshua Reece was arrested for shoplifting and taken to the Shelby County Detention Center to await court proceedings. [R. 1 at ¶ 3; R. 155-1 at 2-3.] Deputy Jailer William Anthony Carey was working at the jail when Mr. Reece arrived and recognized Mr. Reece as the ex-boyfriend of his wife. [R. 179 at 1; R. 155-4 at 8.] At booking, Deputy Jailer Christy Bailey classified Mr. Reece as a minimum-security inmate and, after a brief consultation with Mr. Carey, placed Mr. Reece in Cell 317, a minimum-security cell. [R. 155-1 at 5; R. 156-1 at 4.]

According to Mr. Reece, he was awoken around 2:00 a.m. the next morning by several other inmates, including inmate Corey Hopper, who proceeded to assault him over the course of several hours. [R. 1 at ¶ 15.] Mr. Reece claims the assault was orchestrated by Mr. Carey, that other jail officials were responsible for allowing it to happen, and that he received inadequate medical care from the jail's health care service provider, Southern Health Partners, after the assault. [R. 1 at ¶¶ 15-26; R. 187-1.] To fully address the parties' motions, a brief overview of the health care arrangement at the jail and the medical care provided to Mr. Reece is necessary.

Shelby County contracted with Southern to serve as the health care service provider at the jail, which subcontracted with Dr. Ronald Waldridge, M.D., to serve as medical director. [R. 187-4.] Dr. Waldridge then contracted with APRN Stacy Jensen and PA Christy Coleman to provide clinical services at the jail. Four nurses were also employed by Southern to work at the jail: RN Heather Lowe, and LPNs Kristen Newton, Heather Neal and Geri McClain. [R. 152-1 at 1-2.]

As noted, Mr. Reece alleges he was assaulted in the early morning hours of November 19, 2015. [R. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17.] His injuries were not discovered until later that evening; jailrecords indicate that Mr. Reece was brought to medical around 11:00 p.m. that night. [R. 152-4 at 3.] Beginning with that initial visit, Mr. Reece was seen on seven different occasions by six different medical providers over the next four weeks—from November 19 to December 15.³ [See R. 152-4.] Throughout, Mr. Reece experienced pain in his face and head area and exhibited certain other neurological symptoms. [Id.; see also R. 188-35.] He received two facial X-rays but never a CT scan. Id. During his four-week stay, Mr. Reece was never diagnosed with a facial fracture and never sent out of the jail for outside medical attention. [See R. 152-4.]

On December 18, Mr. Reece was released from the jail. On December 19 he went to a hospital in Shelbyville due to continued concern with "the dent in [his] head" and "the blood in [his] throat." [R. 188-6 at 107.] Mr. Reece received a CT scan at that time which revealed a "right frontal sinus fracture and a right superior orbital rim fracture." [R. 157-1 at 4; R. 188-36 at 6.] Hospital personnel referred Mr. Reece to the University of Louisville where, on December 23, he underwent facial reconstructive surgery to repair the fractures.⁴ [R. 188-37 at 2-3.]

Multiple lawsuits followed. In January 2016, a criminal complaint was filed against Mr. Carey in Shelby County District Court for his involvement in the assault of Mr. Reece. [R. 155-1 at 8-9; R. 155-28 at 1.] Shortly thereafter, Mr. Carey entered a guilty plea to official misconduct in the first degree and complicity to assault in the fourth degree and was convicted accordingly. [R. 155-1 at 9; R. 35-2 at 7.] In September 2016, Mr. Reece brought the present civil suit. [R. 1.] During the pendency of the suit, in the spring of 2019, the United States Attorney brought acriminal action against Mr. Carey for his role in the November 2015 assault, charging Mr. Carey with one count of deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 242. [R. 6, United States v. William Anthony Carey, 3:19-cr-00026-GFVT.] Mr. Carey pled guilty to that charge and on August 17, 2020 this Court sentenced him to four years of incarceration.⁵ [R. 7; R. 10; R. 41, Carey, 3:19-cr-00026-GFVT.]

In his civil complaint, Mr. Reece alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments under Count I, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [R. 1 at ¶¶ 31-46.] Additionally, against the individual Defendants and Southern, Mr. Reece brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and professional negligence (Count II); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III); and conspiracy to violate constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count IV). [R. 1 at ¶¶ 47-56.] Shelby County Defendants and Southern Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding any of Mr. Reece's claims against them. [R. 152 at 1; R. 156-1 at 14.] Mr. Reece moves for summary judgment as to his claims against Defendant Carey, arguing Carey has already admitted "to all issues of fact necessary to establish liability." [R. 155 at 1.]

B

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). "A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows 'that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Olinger v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F.Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying the parts of the record that establish absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, "the nonmoving party must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted).

When applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). However, the Court is under no duty to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, "the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." Id.

II

A

Mr. Reece brings a multitude of federal and state claims against the various Defendants. [R. 1.] The Court has already determined many of these claims are without merit, dismissing Mr. Reece's Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment claims given their inapplicability in the present context. [See R. 65 at 17.] Mr. Reece's civil conspiracy claims, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 "against all individual Defendants and [Southern]," are similarly suspect. [R. 1 at ¶¶ 54-56.] Before proceeding further, the Court will address whether the various Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims, set forth in Count IV of the Complaint. See id.

To state a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive any person or class of persons the equal protection or equal privileges and immunities of the law; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) injury or deprivation of a federally protected right." Royal Oak Entertainment, LLC v. City of Royal Oak, Michigan, 205 F. App'x 389, 399 (6th Cir. 2006). "It is well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim." Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (...