Reedy v. Toomey

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JAMES A. REEDY, III, Plaintiff, v. MAURICE J. TOOMEY, III, and ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00726-WSS

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On February 6,2023, Plaintiff James A. Reedy, III (“Reedy”) filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania at Docket No GD-23-1753, alleging negligence on the part of Defendants Maurice J. Toomey, III (“Toomey”) and Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”).^[1] (ECF No. 1-3). Reedy and Toomey were the operators of vehicles involved in an automobile accident on January 6, 2023, on Smith Township State Road in Burgettstown, Pennsylvania. (Id. at 3-4). Toomey was employed by and driving a vehicle owned by Allstate. Reedy pled that he resided in Pennsylvania. As to Defendants, Reedy pled the following: Toomey resided at 2031 Middle Road, Glenshaw, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 15116 and, Allstate is a foreign cooperation that regularly conducts business within Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and which has a principal place of business located at 2775 Sanders Road, Northbrook, Illinois, 60062. (Id. at 3).

Allstate filed a Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) on May 1, 2023, which was consented to by Toomey. (ECF No 1). It was prompted by Toomey's state court Answer and New Matter wherein Toomey denied residing at 2031 Middle Road, Glenshaw, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 15116. Toomey averred that he resided at 3179 Homewood Ave., Steubenville, Ohio 43952. (ECF No. 1-9, pp. 2 and 12). According to Allstate, complete diversity of the parties existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and it timely removed this case within thirty days of Toomey's Answer and New Matter. (ECF No. 1). A day later, Reedy filed a Motion for Remand and to Award Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). (ECF No. 3). For the following reasons, the Court will grant Reedy's motion and remand the case.

I. Standard of Review

Any civil action brought in state court can generally be removed by a defendant to federal district court under the general removal statute: 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and the removal statute is interpreted narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum in state court. Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that removal statutes “are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.”). The requirements for filing a notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 parallel the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). A defendant seeking federal jurisdiction must provide a notice of removal containing a short and plain statement of the grounds. That statement must allege underlying facts supporting all requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1); In re Com. 's Mot. to Appoint Counsel Against or Directed to Def. Ass'n of Phila., 790 F.3d 457, 466 (3d Cir. 2015). When removal is predicated on diversity of citizenship, federal jurisdiction requires that at least $75,000 be at stake, and that the parties are completely diverse, such that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Similarly, the requirements for filing a motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) parallels the defense requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., Inc., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). When confronted with a motion to remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111. Two grounds for remand are “(1) lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal procedure.” PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). A motion to remand based on a defect in the removal process “must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a),” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), but “a motion to remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time before final judgment.” Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).

II. Analysis

Reedy contends that Allstate's Notice of Removal was untimely, and, substantively, that Allstate has failed to meet its burden of proof that Toomey was a citizen of Ohio at the time when Reedy filed his complaint. He argues that, notwithstanding the fact that Toomey may be currently residing in Ohio, Allstate (as the removing party) has failed to demonstrate that Toomey's domicile for diversity purposes was changed to Ohio at the time this action commenced. (ECF Nos. 3, 4, and 11). Allstate carries a heavy burden of showing that this case is properly before the Court.

A. Allstate's Notice of Removal was timely.

Reedy first contends that removal was untimely and that remand is appropriate on this ground alone. Where a case is not removable based on the allegations in the initial pleading but becomes removable at some point thereafter, federal law dictates that the notice of removal be filed “within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). Reedy disagrees that Toomey's Answer and New Matter constituted “other paper” under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and triggered the thirty-day removal period.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not defined “other paper.” District courts within this Circuit, however, have concluded that “other paper” is an inclusive phrase that covers a wide array of documents. Such a broad interpretation of “other paper” is consistent with the statute's purpose to “commence the running of the thirty-day period once the defendant receives actual notice that the case has become removable, which may be communicated in a formal or informal manner.” Broderick v. Dellasandro, 859 F.Supp. 176,178 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citations omitted). Courts have held that requests for admissions can constitute “other paper,” see Brown v. Model's PA II, Inc., No. 08-1528, 2008 WL 2600253, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2008); Marchiori v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., Civ.A.No. 05-5685, 2006 WL 724445, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2006), as well as answers to written interrogatories, see Cabibbo v. Einstein/Noah Bagel Partners, L.P., 181 F.Supp.2d 428, 432-33 (E.D. Pa. 2002). There is nothing in the plain language of the removal statutes, nor in controlling caselaw, that mandates that removal be predicated on a voluntary act of a plaintiff.

The Court holds that Toomey's Answer and New Matter in response to Reedy's complaint, which was filed with the state court, constitutes “other paper” that notified Allstate that the case was removable. Because Allstate filed its notice of removal within thirty days, removal was timely.

B. Remand is appropriate because Allstate has not met its burden of showing that Toomey had changed his domicile to Ohio by the time this action was filed.

In order to meet the strictures of the diversity statute, complete diversity is required, meaning that at the time the complaint was filed, no party can be a citizen of the same state as any opposing party. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2015); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 414 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999). “It has long been the case that ‘the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought.'” Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824)). The rules for determining citizenship of individuals and business entities are well-established. “A natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he is domiciled,” while “[a] corporation is a citizen both of the state where it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “[N]o changes in citizenship after the time of filing (and, as relevant here, the time of removal) can create or destroy diversity.” In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 855 F.3d 126, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

Allstate alleges that diversity existed not only upon removal (which is legally irrelevant), but, critically, at the time of commencement of Reedy's action in state court because Toomey has averred that he resided in Ohio, not Pennsylvania. The terms “resident” and “domicile” or “citizen” are not interchangeable for diversity purposes and they have distinct definitions under the law. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Citizenship is synonymous with domicile and the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation.”) (internal citations omitted); Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Where one lives is prima facie evidence of domicile, but mere residency in a state is insufficient for purposes of diversity.”) (citations omitted). The meaning of citizenship for diversity purposes is synonymous with domicile. See Juvelis by Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 654 (3d Cir. 1995). Domicile is not the same as residence, and a person may reside in one place (or multiple places)...