Reese v. State

862 S.E.2d 587

REESE

v.The STATE.

A21A1109

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 24, 2021

Ralph James Villani, Snellville, for Appellant.

Deborah Gonzalez Gonzalez, Robert Dean Schollmeyer, for Appellee.

Rickman, Chief Judge.

After a jury trial, Adrian Reese was convicted of one count of rape.¹ He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by denying his Batson² challenge to the State's use of its peremptory strikes to remove African-Americans from the jury pool. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,³ the evidence shows that on January 3, 2015, Reese followed the victim, a college student, as she visited several bars and a Waffle House in downtown Athens, Georgia. Surveillance video from the Waffle House showed the victim shrugging Reese's arm off her and pushing him off her with his arms. Later that evening, Reese followed the victim to the Boar's Head Bar in Athens. Feeling alarmed, the victim devised a plan to sneak away from Reese at the Boars Head bar through the women's restroom. However, Reese was outside waiting for her when she exited the bar. The victim testified that Reese then forced her into the back of a white pick-up truck against her will. Another man drove the truck while Reese restrained the victim from escaping.

They drove the victim to a house in another part of the city. Reese then forced the victim into the home, where he removed her clothes, threw her on the bed and raped her. The victim began to fight off Reese while he was on top of her until he covered her screaming mouth with bed sheets and began to choke her, making the victim fear for her life. Afterwards, the victim ran out the front door of the house and made it to a hotel in the downtown area where she informed a security guard of the rape. After making it back to her own hotel, the victim decided to call the police to report the rape. The victim identified Reese in a photographic lineup. A sexual assault exam revealed that the victim experienced injuries consistent with penetration. Fingernail cuticle swabbings taken from the victim matched Reese's DNA.

1. Reese argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to sufficiently evaluate the State's reasons for its preemptory strikes. Specifically, Reese argues that the trial court did not conduct a full Batson analysis and that, if it had, it would have seen the State's discriminatory intent in striking African-American potential jurors. Reese also argues that the State failed to strike other non-African American jurors with similar "infirmities." For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

A Batson challenge involves three steps:

(1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent's discriminatory intent. At step two, the proponent of the strike need only articulate a facially race-neutral reason for the strike. Step two does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even reasonable. And, at the third step of the Batson analysis, the trial court makes credibility determinations, evaluates the persuasiveness of the strike opponent's prima facie showing and the explanations given by the strike proponent, and examines all other circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State , 309 Ga. 488, 490-491 (1), 847 S.E.2d 147 (2020). Further, the fact that "a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory strike is not supported by the record or would apply equally to a similarly situationed non-African American juror who is permitted to serve may support a finding of discriminatory intent at Batson's third step." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Finally, a trial court's finding as to whether the opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent is "entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bryant v. State , 309 Ga. App. 649, 650 (1), 710 S.E.2d 854 (2011).

The record shows of the 33 prospective jurors who comprised the venire, there were 12 African-Americans and 21 Caucasians. During jury selection, the State used 8 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove African-Americans from the venire and 7 out of 10 peremptory strikes to remove females from the venire. After Reese made his Batson challenge as to race and gender, the trial court agreed that Reese had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the use of the State's peremptory strikes,⁴ but did not agree that Reese had made a prima facie showing of gender discrimination.⁵

The trial court then required the State, as the second step of the Batson analysis, to provide the reasons for its peremptory strikes. The State gave the following explanations for exercising its peremptory strikes against the following African-American jurors:

(a) The State explained that it struck Juror No. 1, an African-American female, because, when asked if Reese looked like someone who could commit a rape, she looked at the defendant "for a very extended period of time" before stating that "he did not look like someone who would have committed the rape because he seemed very content." The State explained that it did not want a juror who judged a defendant based upon appearance alone. In response, Reese argued that a juror's demeanor was not a sufficient reason to strike them. The trial court then held that the State's reasons for striking were race-neutral. See, Cooper v. State , 220 Ga. App. 531, 531, 469 S.E.2d 790 (1996) (where defendant struck a white female because she "looked at the prosecution in a very accepting way during voir dire," the trial court did not err in accepting this as a race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike).

(b) The State explained that it struck Juror No. 5, an African-American female, because she stated that neither she nor her 21-year old daughter drank alcohol, that she believes that a victim assumes partial blame for an assault if it occurred while the victim was intoxicated, and that she could not understand why a victim of a crime would delay reporting it to the police. Reese made no argument as to why this reason was pretextual, and the trial court held that it was race-neutral.

(c) The State explained that it struck Juror No. 8, an older African-American female, because she was a very religious woman and the State believed that she would negatively judge a younger female who went downtown to consume alcohol. Reese objected to the strike on the grounds that religious beliefs are not an appropriate reason to strike a juror. The trial court ruled that the State's proffered reasons were race-neutral. See Bryant v. State , 288 Ga. 876, 883 (7), 708 S.E.2d 362 (2011) (trial court did not err by concluding that State's explanation for using a peremptory strike against a prospective juror based on the juror's religious beliefs).

(d) The State told the trial court that it struck Juror No. 11, an African-American female, because she had a husband who had been convicted of murder by the same district attorney's office that was prosecuting the instant crime and because she had a relative who had been accused of sexual assault. Reese objected to these proffered reasons for the strike on the grounds that the juror expressed that she believed her husband and relative had been fairly treated by the criminal justice system. The trial court ruled that the State's proffered reasons were race-neutral. See Henry v. State , 265 Ga. 732, 733 (2), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995) (trial court did not err by finding that State exercised its peremptory challenges against two prospective jurors for race neutral reasons because their family members had been prosecuted for felony offenses).

(e) The State told the trial court that it struck Juror No. 20, an African-American male, because his brother had recently been accused of statutory rape and because he believed that he had been racially profiled by law enforcement in Athens-Clarke County. It further noted that Juror No. 20 expressed a belief that a victim might be to blame for any assault against her if she had over-consumed alcohol. The trial court ruled that the State's proffered reasons were race-neutral. See Quillian v. State , 279 Ga. 698, 701 (3), 620 S.E.2d 376 (2005) ("The State may reasonably base its use of a peremptory strike upon a prospective juror's apparent belief that, in general, law enforcement officers are racially motivated") (citation omitted).

(f) The State explained that is struck Juror No. 23, an African-American female, because she felt that she had been racially profiled by law enforcement when she was pulled over for speeding. She also described an experience where her brother experienced racial profiling by law enforcement when he was unfairly ticketed for running a red light. Juror No. 23 further expressed a belief that victims who consumed too much alcohol are partially to blame for sexual assault. The trial court found this explanation to be "valid[.]" See Quillian , 279 Ga. at 701 (3), 620 S.E.2d 376 (the State's explanation that it used a peremptory strike against an African-American juror because of juror's bad experiences with law enforcement and belief that police generally practice racial-profiling was race-neutral for purposes of Batson inquiry).

(g) The State explained that it struck Juror No. 27, an African-American female, because she had previously served on a rape jury that was unable to reach a verdict, she had previously been arrested for a DUI, and her brother had been arrested in the past. Reese objected on the grounds that participation on a hung jury was not a valid reason to strike. The trial court ruled that the State's proffered...