Reetz v. City of Saint Paul

956 N.W.2d 238

Eric REETZ, Respondent,

v.CITY OF SAINT PAUL, Appellant.

A19-1425

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: March 17, 2021

Francis J. Rondoni, Christopher P. Renz, Gary K. Luloff, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Lindsey M. Olson, City Attorney, Kyle J. Citta, Assistant City Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Susan L. Naughton, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities.

Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association Legal Defense Fund.

OPINION

McKeig, Justice.

The question in this case is whether a municipality is obligated to defend and indemnify a police officer under Minnesota Statutes section 466.07 (2020), in connection with off-duty work. The City of Saint Paul concluded that its employee, Officer Eric Reetz, was not entitled to defense and indemnification when Reetz was sued for allegedly failing to detect a knife at a homeless shelter while working off duty as a private security guard. The court of appeals, by writ of certiorari, reversed in a split decision. The City petitioned for further review, asserting that the court of appeals misinterpreted section 466.07 and did not properly defer to the City's decision. Because we conclude that Reetz was not "acting in the performance of the duties of the position" of a police officer under section 466.07, subdivision 1, when he allegedly failed to detect the knife at the homeless shelter, the City was not required to defend and indemnify him. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

Respondent Eric Reetz is a police officer employed by appellant City of Saint Paul. Reetz also worked part time as a private security guard at the Dorothy Day Center—a homeless shelter in Saint Paul—that is operated by Catholic Charities. Under Reetz's agreement with Catholic Charities, he was described as an independent contractor and his duties included assisting staff in examining clients’ bags to ensure that "no weapons, alcohol, drugs, or other banned items are brought into the facility." Catholic Charities paid Reetz $40 per hour.

Under Saint Paul Police Department Policy 231.00, Reetz was required to have off-duty work approved by the Department. The policy also required Reetz to wear his uniform while working off duty and permitted him to use his patrol car with prior approval. The Department approved Reetz's off-duty work at the Dorothy Day Center, but was not a party to his agreement with Catholic Charities.

On the evening of December 30, 2016, Reetz was working at the shelter, allegedly in uniform and with his squad car present.¹ That evening, after Reetz's shift at the shelter ended, Timothy Dortch stabbed a woman—both clients of the shelter—with a knife that he smuggled in, allegedly during Reetz's shift. The victim sued Catholic Charities and Reetz for negligence, alleging that Reetz failed to detect Dortch's knife.

Reetz asked the City to defend and indemnify him under Minnesota Statutes section 466.07, subdivision 1. Section 466.07 provides that a municipality "shall defend and indemnify" its employees if they were "acting in the performance of the duties of the position" and are "not guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect of duty, or bad faith." The City asked Reetz to explain his rationale for why he qualified under the statute. Reetz, who was represented by counsel, responded by citing case law to assert that off-duty police officers who provide private security services can also be performing police duties because they "perform these duties while in uniform and maintain the arrest power" as if they were on duty. The City then invited Reetz to submit any further documentation to support his claim and offered him the opportunity to make his case in person to the City Attorney.

The City Attorney met with Reetz and his attorney, but Reetz did not submit any additional written materials for the City Attorney to consider. The City Attorney then wrote to Reetz two weeks later, explaining the City's conclusion that Reetz was not acting in the performance of his duties as a police officer while he was working off duty at the shelter. Specifically, the City concluded that Reetz was not performing any "law enforcement duties" at the time of the events in the victim's complaint and that he "was not present at the time of the assault." Accordingly, the City concluded that it was not required to defend and indemnify Reetz, and noted that its decision was final and appealable. Reetz requested that the City reconsider its decision, which it declined to do.

Reetz petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of certiorari. In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and that Reetz was acting in the performance of his duties as a police officer during his shift at the shelter on the day of the stabbing. Reetz v. City of St. Paul , No. A19-1425, 2020 WL 2703843, at *6 (Minn. App. May 26, 2020). The court of appeals concluded that Reetz was acting in a dual capacity as a police officer and a private security guard. Id. at 5 (citing State v. Childs , 269 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1978) ). The court of appeals decided that under the dual-capacity doctrine, Reetz's authority to arrest, even in the absence of an exercise of that authority, qualified him for defense and indemnification under section 466.07 because a private security guard would have no such authority. Id. at *4–5. The court noted that Reetz was "keeping the peace while in uniform ... as a visible representative of the city and its police department." Id. at *5.

The dissent, in contrast, determined that Reetz was acting in a purely private capacity at the time. Id. at *6 (Smith, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent emphasized that Reetz's "only authority to stop clients and search them for weapons was grounded in his role as a security officer enforcing the center's no-weapons policy, not in his role as a peace officer." Id.

The City petitioned for review, which we granted. After briefing concluded, we ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the court of appeals possessed jurisdiction to review the City's decision by writ of certiorari.

ANALYSIS

This case presents two issues. First, whether the court of appeals possessed jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari the City's decision not to defend and indemnify Reetz under Minnesota Statutes section 466.07. Second, if the court of appeals did possess jurisdiction, whether Reetz was "acting in the performance of the duties of the position" of police officer under section 466.07, subdivision 1, when he allegedly failed to detect a knife while performing off-duty security work at the Dorothy Day Center.

I.

We begin with the issue of jurisdiction. The court of appeals, citing its own precedent, stated that a municipality's "decision not to defend and indemnify an employee under Minn. Stat. § 466.07 is a quasi-judicial decision" subject to certiorari review. Reetz , 2020 WL 2703843, at *2 (citing Anzures v. Ward , 890 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2017)). Courts may address issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and parties may not waive that jurisdiction. See McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights , 883 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2016). We review the court of appeals’ jurisdiction de novo. Tischer v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Cambridge , 693 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. 2005). Jurisdiction here depends on statutory interpretation and whether there is a quasi-judicial decision, each of which we review de novo. Id. at 428.

"When a statutory right to review a municipal body's quasi-judicial decision is lacking," certiorari is the exclusive method to seek judicial review. Cnty. of Wash. v. City of Oak Park Heights , 818 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Minn. 2012). A municipality's decision is quasi-judicial if it involves "(1) investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts; (2) application of those facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim." Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advoc. v. Metro. Council , 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 1999). "In general, quasi-judicial decisions ‘affect the rights of a few individuals analogous to the way they are affected by court proceedings.’ " Zweber v. Credit River Twp. , 882 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. , 617 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn. 2000) ).

We conclude that the City's decision not to defend and indemnify Reetz under section 466.07 was quasi-judicial. There was a genuine dispute over whether Reetz was entitled to defense and indemnification under section 466.07, and the City gathered and weighed evidence to reach a decision on that issue. Moreover, the process used by the City—offering Reetz the opportunity to submit evidence, gathering evidence, affording Reetz an opportunity to state his case, and producing a decision based on the facts and law—resembles judicial proceedings. See Handicraft Block Ltd. P'ship v. City of Minneapolis , 611 N.W.2d 16, 20–21 (Minn. 2000). The City then considered the evidence and made a final decision that Reetz was not acting in the performance of his duties as a police officer when he allegedly failed to detect the knife at the Dorothy Day Center. Once the City Attorney issued a decision on defense and indemnification, there is no further right of review provided under the City's process and the City's decision was binding. See Cnty. of Wash. , 818 N.W.2d at 541 ; Rochester City Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester , 868 N.W.2d 655, 662–63 (Minn. 2015). All three requirements for a quasi-judicial decision are therefore met and the City's decision was quasi-judicial.

Having concluded that the City's decision was quasi-judicial, we must now determine whether certiorari...