Reeves v. Anne Arundel Cnty.

1

MICHAEL H. REEVES v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, ET AL.

No. 1035-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

August 22, 2024

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND ^[*]

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No C-02-CV-15-002956

Kehoe, C. ^[**] Nazarian, Salmon, James P. ^[***] (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Kehoe, J. Michael H. Reeves appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the Honorable Glenn L. Klavans, presiding,^[1] that denied his motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The appellees are Anne Arundel County and Rodney Price, a former member of the Anne Arundel County Police Department (collectively "the County").

The parties present two issues which we have reworded slightly:

1. Was leave of court required to amend the ad damnum clause of the Prince George's County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 500 (2011), claim given that it had been bifurcated, there was no deadline for amendment in the applicable scheduling order, and trial was more than thirty days away?

2. To whatever extent leave was required, did the trial court prejudicially err in denying the plaintiff leave to amend the ad damnum clause of his Longtin claim to more clearly seek injunctive and declaratory relief?

We will affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

This is the third time that aspects of this case have been considered by a Maryland appellate court. See Anne Arundel County v Reeves, 474 Md. 46 (2021) ("Reeves II"); and Reeves v. Davis, No. 1191, Sept. Term 2018, 2019 WL 5606605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., filed Oct. 30, 2019) ("Reeves I"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 474 Md. 46 (2021). We will summarize the relevant facts, drawing from Chief Judge Barbera's opinion for the Court in Reeves II, 474 Md. at 53-59, as well as the panel's opinion in Reeves 1, 2019 WL 5606605, at *1-4:

On the afternoon of February 1, 2014, Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price was conducting an investigation into daytime burglaries in a residential neighborhood in Glen Burnie. He approached Mr. Reeves' residence, knocked on the door, received no response, and turned away. While standing in Mr. Reeves' front yard, Officer Price was approached by Vern, Mr. Reeves' Chesapeake Bay retriever. Officer Price shot Vern twice, inflicting fatal injuries.

On September 24, 2015, Mr. Reeves and his sons, Michael Reeves Jr., and Timothy Reeves, filed a civil action against Officer Price; Kevin Davis, who was the chief of the Anne Arundel County Police Department at the time of the shooting; and the County itself. The complaint asserted thirteen causes of action. Among them were claims that: (1) Vern's death was the result of a longstanding pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by the Police Department that resulted in the needless and avoidable shootings of dogs (Count 1),^[2] and (2) this pattern or practice was the result of a conspiracy among members of the Department (Count 13).^[3]

Each count contained a claim for relief. The claim for relief in all but two of the counts were identical:

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants, individually, jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined at trial, but in excess of the jurisdictional amount of $75,000.00 plus interest, costs, and attorneys' fees, and punitive damages, in an amount to be determined at trial, and such other and further relief as the nature of the case requires.^[4]

(Emphasis added.)

On November 19, 2015, and pursuant to Md. Rule 2-303(b), the County filed a motion to bifurcate the Longtin and conspiracy counts from the remaining counts. The plaintiffs did not respond to the motion.

On December 7, 2015, the circuit court issued a scheduling order that set the following relevant deadlines:

March 23, 2016 as the deadline "for any party seeking to add an additional party and/or amend a claim to file the appropriate pleading[;]" and June 6, 2016 as the deadline "for completion of all depositions, and other methods of oral and written discovery . . . [other than] de bene esse depositions."

(Formatting altered.)

On March 3, 2016, the circuit court granted the motion to bifurcate. The bifurcation order stated in pertinent part:

ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate Counts I and XIII and for Separate Trials be, and hereby is GRANTED; and it is further,

ORDERED that there be separate trials of those issues relating to the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Rodney Price and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Anne Arundel County, Maryland and Chief Kevin Davis as to Counts I and XIII- Unlawful Pattern or Practice of Violating the State Constitution and conspiracy; and it is further,

ORDERED that discovery regarding Plaintiffs' [Longtin] and conspiracy claims against Anne Arundel County, Maryland and Chief Kevin Davis [is] stayed unless a second trial is necessary, and it is further,

ORDERED that if, in light of the result of the first trial and existing circumstances, it will be necessary to proceed with Plaintiffs' [Longtin] and conspiracy claims against the Defendant Anne Arundel County, a second trial will be scheduled. However, prior to the second trial:

a. The parties will be permitted a reasonable period of time to engage in discovery as to Plaintiffs' claims against the County and the alleged individual conspirators, including a new scheduling order if the Court deems necessary; and,

b. The Court will consider, in due course, any dispositive motions addressed to Plaintiffs' claims against the County and alleged conspirators.

(Emphasis added.)

The bifurcation order did not address the prior scheduling order's deadline for filing amendments to pleadings.

Eventually, four of the remaining claims went to trial. They were: (1) trespass to a chattel, namely Vern, (2) violation of Mr. Reeves' constitutional rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful shooting of Vern, (3) violation of Mr. Reeves' constitutional rights under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights for the unlawful seizure of Vern, and (4) gross negligence resulting in Vern's death.^[5]

During the trial, Officer Price testified that he shot Vern in self-defense because Vern had leapt onto him with his muzzle and jaws near the officer's face and throat. But there was conflicting evidence as to what actually happened, and the jury did not fully credit his version of events. In Reeves II, Chief Judge Barbera explained:

The jury found a violation of Mr. Reeves' due process rights under Article 24 by depriving him of his dog. However, the jury awarded him $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. The jury further found that Officer Price had violated Mr. Reeves' constitutional rights under Article 26 by "seizing" Vern and/or interfering with the use or enjoyment of the dog. The jury likewise awarded Mr. Reeves $0 in damages for that constitutional claim. As to both constitutional claims, the jury also found that Officer Price did not act with "ill will or improper motivation."

The jury then found that Officer Price was grossly negligent and awarded Mr. Reeves $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages, for a total of $1,250,000. Finally, for the trespass to chattel claim, the jury awarded Mr. Reeves $10,000 in economic damages. The jury also made a factual finding on the verdict sheet that the dog was not attacking Officer Price at the time of the shooting....

The circuit court then reduced the jury award for trespass to chattel from $10,000 to $7,500, pursuant to [Cts. &Jud. Proc.] § 11-110.^[6] The court further reduced the total damages award for the gross negligence claim from $1,250,000 to $200,000 pursuant to the LGTCA, resulting in Mr. Reeves receiving a total of $207,500 in damages.

474 Md. at 57-58 (footnote omitted).

After the circuit court entered this judgment, the focus shifted to the Longtin and civil conspiracy counts. The circuit court entered scheduling orders that imposed deadlines for completion of discovery and filing motions for summary judgment and other dispositive motions. The orders were silent as to a deadline for filing amendments to the pleadings.

The County then filed a motion for summary judgment as to the Longtin and civil conspiracy counts. Among the grounds asserted by the County was that a judgment in favor of Mr. Reeves on those counts would be an exercise in futility because the court had already entered judgment "in the full amount allowed by the LGTCA; [so a further award of] even nominal damages would exceed that cap."^[7] The trial court granted the County's motion on this ground. In his initial brief filed in Reeves I, Mr. Reeves asserted that:

At the summary judgment stage, the defense announced an intention to appeal and, indeed, had already prematurely appealed once, which appeal was dismissed by this Court.

In other words, it was admitted that the defense intended to challenge the jury's verdict. To date, the defense has paid no part of the verdict and the defense has indeed filed the threatened cross-appeal.

Under these circumstances, the trial court had no basis to rule that, "even nominal damages would exceed [the] cap." This is because the trial court had no way of knowing whether this Court, or even the Court of Appeals might one day reduce some or all of the existing verdict as a result of the defendants' appeal. Not knowing whether the verdict might be reduced, the trial court also could not know whether any reduced verdict might still exceed the cap. Therefore, it was error to dismiss the claim on the ground cited by the trial court.

As to both the trial court's ruling and the defense claim that "[t]here is nothing more for the Plaintiff to gain in the instant case" other than "a symbolic victory," such

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