Reeves v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

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KATRINA REEVES and JAMES LEE REEVES, Plaintiffs, v. WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; WAYNE COUNTY; WAYNE COUNTY COMMISSION; WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF, RICHARD THOMPSON, individually, TODD ALEXANDER, individually; HOWARD MEDDINGS, individually; and DEPUTY HARRY SOWARDS, individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:20-0423

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Huntington Division

December 2, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability against Defendant Todd Alexander^[1] (ECF No. 181) and Defendant Todd Alexander and Defendant Wayne County Board of Education's (“WCBOE”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No 188). For the following reasons, the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is centered around an alleged break in at a Wayne County Board of Education (“WCBOE”) bus garage in the fall of 2019 and the investigation that followed. There are few undisputed facts here. Plaintiffs Katrina and James Lee Reeves have been employees of WCBOE for years; Mrs. Reeves worked as a school bus driver, while Mr. Reeves worked in the WCBOE bus garage. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-23, ECF No. 21. The Reeveses maintained consistent employment with WCBOE for almost twenty years. Mr. Reeves had one coworker, Defendant Meddings, the parts supervisor at the WCBOE bus garage, with whom he had a contentious relationship. Id.

After being informed of an alleged break-in, the WCBOE superintendent, Mr. Alexander, contacted the Wayne County Sheriff's Office to investigate. Deputy Harry Sowards took the lead on the case and investigated. From there, parties fundamentally disagree over the scope, propriety, and fairness of the investigation and Mr. Alexander's involvement in it.

The investigation led to criminal charges against the Reeves. See Criminal Complaints, ECF Nos. 181-23, 181-24. While the other counts against the Reeveses were dismissed, Mr. Reeves was indicted by a grand jury for embezzlement. See Indictment, ECF No. 181-27; Criminal Judgment Orders, ECF No. 184-32, 184-33. Because of the criminal charges, Mr. Reeves was placed on unpaid suspension. Ex. 17, ECF No. 181-18. Mrs. Reeves was also suspended, and later, terminated. Ex. 29, ECF No. 181-30. The news of their suspension and the criminal charges appeared in local newspapers. See Ex. 10, ECF No. 185-18.

Plaintiffs essentially allege that Mr. Alexander knew that the Reeveses were innocent of the charges because there was no inventory of the bus garage ever taken, several other employees also possessed unused bus parts, and he knew of Mr. Meddings' animus towards the Reeveses. See Pls.' Resp. at 1-4, ECF No. 191. Accordingly, his decision to contact law enforcement to investigate and his involvement in any part of the investigation, including a conversation he had with one of the former employees, Mr. David Sammons, was completely unfounded and potentially malicious. Pls.' Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. at 1-19, ECF No. 181. Similarly, the decision to suspend the Reeveses (and later terminate Mrs. Reeves) based on this problematic investigation was improper and harmed the Reeveses.

These events culminated in the Reeveses filing an eleven-count complaint. Mr. Alexander and the WCBOE are two of seven named defendants in this case. Specifically, they are named in the following counts: (1) Civil Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III); (2) Invasion of Privacy/False Light (Count VI); (3) Defamation (Count VII) (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count VIII); (5) Discrimination/Retaliation for Ms. Reeves' Exercising Rights and Engaging in Conduct Protected Under the Family Medical Leave Act (Count IX); (6) Interference with Plaintiffs's [sic] Rights Under the FMLA (Count X); and (7) Constructive Discharge (Count XI). Plaintiffs moved for Summary Judgment against Defendant Alexander on Counts IV, V, VI, and VII.^[2] ECF No. 181. Mr. Alexander and the WCBOE cross-filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 188) on all counts. The Motions are now briefed and ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).

Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Count III: Civil Conspiracy

“To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff ‘must present evidence that the [defendants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [the] deprivation of a constitutional right.'” Penly v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 658 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 357-58 (4th Cir. 2014)). “This burden is ‘weighty.'” Id. (quoting Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). “While they need not produce direct evidence of a meeting of the minds, [plaintiffs] must come forward with specific circumstantial evidence that each member of the alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective.” Id. (quoting Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421) The evidence “must, at least, reasonably lead to the inference that [the defendants] positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421).

Here, the record shows no direct evidence of a conspiracy involving either Defendant, and Plaintiffs appear to agree, noting only that circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Pls.' Resp. at 6, ECF No. 191. Because of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which recognizes that a corporation cannot conspire with its agents, the conspiracy that must be proven by the record here must lie between Defendant Alexander and Deputy Sowards, or the WCBOE and Deputy Alexander.^[3] See Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 352 (4th Cir. 2013).

Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs have failed to bear their burden by not producing evidence that could reasonably lead to the inference of a common plan or conspiracy. Defs.' Mem. at 3. Plaintiffs' proffered circumstantial evidence, with little to no citation to the record, essentially amounts to the following with respect to Mr. Alexander: that Mr. Alexander actually worked closely with Deputy Sowards in causing the investigation and subsequent criminal charge; that Mr. Alexander knew the bus garage parts room lacked a complete inventory of parts; and that Mr. Alexander ignored reports of Mr. Meddings' misbehavior and had Deputy Sowards focus the investigation on the Reeves. Pls.' Resp. at 7-11, ECF No. 191. Further, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Alexander misrepresented material facts, causing their arrests and violating their constitutional rights in pursuing these allegations. Id. at 11.^[4] The record evidence as to these claims is not sufficiently controverted to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment on this count. The record establishes that Mr. Alexander contacted law enforcement to investigate allegations of a break-in. Alexander Depo. at 225, ECF No. 188-6. The mere act of involving law enforcement to investigate a breakin is not sufficient circumstantial evidence from which to infer a conspiracy. See Davis v. Walmart Stores E., L.P., 687 Fed.Appx. 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (granting motion to dismiss § 1983 claim where well-plead facts indicated nothing more than the occurrence of a single conversation between a law enforcement officer and the person reporting a suspected crime). However, even if he instigated the investigation by contacting law enforcement, there is nothing here to show that Defendant Alexander actually participated in pursuing the criminal charges against the Reeveses.

Even taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the evidence suggests at most that Defendant Alexander knew Defendant Meddings bore a grudge against Mr. Reeves and that the bus garage parts room lacked an accurate inventory of parts. Alexander Depo. at 15-20, 72-73 ECF No. 188-6; Ex. 9, ECF No 181-9. Plaintiffs use these facts to essentially contend that Defendant Alexander, despite this knowledge, did not have Defendant Sowards “seriously investigate Defendant Meddings” and “had Defendant Sowards focus the investigation only on Mr. Reeves.” Pls.' Resp. at 8. But there is no evidence that Mr. Alexander controlled the methods of the investigation, or its targets. Mr. Alexander occasionally spoke to Deputy...