Rega v. Georgia

LORRAINE REGA, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF GEORGIA; GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;GROVETOWN MEDICAL PRISON (AUGUSTA); BRIAN OWENS;DENNIS BROWN; ELIZABETH ROBERTS; ED SPRATT; GAIL THOMAS;JACQUELINE CHAMPION; VERONICA SAMUELS; AMICINA MACK;SHUNETTE BURTON; MILDRED GILLIAM; and RICHARDINE MOORE, Defendants.

CV 115-087

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION

April 1, 2016

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff commenced the above-captioned employment discrimination case pro se and is proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"). On August 21, 2015, the Court directed Plaintiff to amend her complaint due to multiple deficiencies within her original complaint. (Doc. no. 15.) On October 14, 2015, Plaintiff amended her complaint in compliance with the Court's August 21st Order. (Doc. no. 21.)

Because she is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect potential Defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Pleadings drafted by pro se litigants must be liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but the Court may dismiss a complaint, or any part thereof, that is frivolous or malicious or that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii).

I. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT

A. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names fourteen defendants in her amended complaint: the State Of Georgia; Georgia Department of Corrections; Grovetown Medical Prison (Augusta); Brian Owens; Dennis Brown; Elizabeth Roberts; Ed Spratt; Gail Thomas; Jacqueline Champion; Veronica Samuels; Amicina Mack; Shunette Burton; Mildred Gilliam; and Richardine Moore. The individual defendants who worked with Plaintiff at Augusta State Medical Prison. (Doc. no. 21, pp. 4-8.) Plaintiff's complaint spans an almost two-year period between April 1, 2011 and March 8, 2013, when she was "ultimately dismissed and/or placed on permanent leave from her employment." (Id. at 22.)

Plaintiff alleges she was dismissed but left on the payroll to prevent her from filing a discriminatory discharge action. (Id.) Plaintiff extensively details alleged mistreatment by her co-workers, primarily Defendants Mack, Burton, Samuels, and Thomas. For example, Plaintiff alleges that on May 1, 2011, she filed a complaint due to Defendants Mack and Burton making derogatory remarks to her and improperly taking food from the jail. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff alleges she raised these concerns with Defendant Champion, the director of food services, who chastised her for bringing this to her attention. (Id.) Her complaint describes various similar incidents where she complained about her managers violating various prison regulations only to be chastised by prison administrators for making these complaints. (Id. at9-18.)

Among the fifty-five or so separate incidents she alleges, approximately eight involve racial slurs, epithets, or racially motivated conduct. (Id. at 9-18.) Plaintiff alleges she was the only Caucasian working on her shift in the food services department. (Id. at 10-11.) On June 14, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mack stated to her "you know we get rid of whites" in response to a complaint Plaintiff made about Defendant Mack possessing contraband. (Id. at 10.) This was approximately two months after Plaintiff began working at the prison. (Id. at 22.) On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Samuels stated, "I am tired of your white ass," after she complained of her locker being broken into by an inmate. (Id. at 11.) On that same day, Plaintiff alleges she overheard Defendant Burton tell Defendant Thomas she was tired of Defendant's "white miserable ass." (Id.)

Plaintiff describes an incident on November 19, 2011, where after a mandatory meeting to discuss Plaintiff's complaints about the defendants, Defendant Mack stated "fuck you Rega" and Defendant Samuels threatened to fire any inmate from food services if they helped Plaintiff. (Id. at 13.) Two days later, Defendant Samuels told Plaintiff in regards to her journal that she "better get rid of that dam[n] ledger, or [her] white ass [would] be gone soon." (Id. at 14.) Due to the mistreatment, Plaintiff filed a harassment complaint and wrote letters to the Georgia Attorney General's office, the Georgia Department of Corrections, and internal human resources on November 22, 2011. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff also alleges that, on January 16, 2012, Defendant Thomas filed a false negative performance report about Plaintiff losing her keys. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff alleges this report was filed for discriminatory reasons. (Id.) On February 9, 2012, Defendant Thomasstated "your white ass is on my last nerve" to Plaintiff after she refused to change her statement that Defendant Burton was hitting inmates. (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff alleges that, on March 28, 2012, she lodged a complaint due to Defendant Mack continuing to use racial slurs such as "white bitch." (Id. at 17.)

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2013, she was so ridiculed for refusing to change a statement about Defendant Gilliam she left the facility and drove to a hospital due to a panic attack. (Id. at 18.) This was shortly after Defendant Gilliam filed a contrived negative performance report alleging Plaintiff passed tools to inmates in a common but apparently improper manner. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act until May 5, 2013, after which she was discharged when her doctor did not release her back to work. (Id. at 43.) However, this complaint allegation conflicts with Plaintiff's contrary allegation that she was dismissed and placed on permanent leave by the prison but left on the payroll in order to avoid a discriminatory discharge claim. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants' mistreatment of her was racially motivated and in retaliation for her filing constant complaints about their conduct, some of which involved racial epithets. (Id. at 22-37.) Plaintiff further alleges her ultimate dismissal from the job was part of a scheme by defendants to file contrived performance complaints until Plaintiff left or was terminated. (Id. at 20, 22.) Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and timely filed suit within sixty days of receiving her right to sue letter. (Id. at 49.)

B. DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard for Screening

The amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, of if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Moreover, "[f]ailure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 F. App'x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it "offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'" or if it "tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a "'plain statement'possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Finally, the court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).

2. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim against Augusta State Medical Prison

Plaintiff has failed to state a viable §1981, § 1983, negligence or Title VII claim against Defendant Augusta State Medical Prison because it is not subject to liability in a § 1983 suit. According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3), the general rule is that the "capacity to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located . . . ." Accordingly, in this case, Georgia law controls. The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that: "[i]n every suit there must be a legal entity as the real plaintiff and the real defendant. This state recognizes only three classes as legal entities, namely: (1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue." Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1988) (quotation omitted).

Jails and prisons are not legal entities subject to liability under Georgia law. E.g., Sneed v. Wheeler Corr. Facility, No. CV 314-085, 2015 WL 1757502, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2015) report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Sneed v. Wheeler Corr....