Regner v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., C4-02-463.

652 N.W.2d 557

Thomas A. REGNER, Appellant, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.

No. C4-02-463.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

November 5, 2002.

Susan M. Coler, Sprenger & Lang, PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Timothy R. Thornton, Scott G. Knudson, Susan E. Ryan, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by G. BARRY ANDERSON, Presiding Judge, PETERSON, Judge, and HUDSON, Judge.

OPINION

PETERSON, Judge.

Appellant Thomas A. Regner, an airline mechanic employed by respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc., was fired after he filed reports of alleged safety violations with the Federal Aviation Administration. Regner sued under the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a), contending that he was fired for making the reports. In this appeal from a summary judgment for Northwest, Regner challenges the district court's conclusion that under the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713, Congress intended to preempt state whistleblower claims when an employee reports a violation or suspected violation of a Federal Aviation Administration safety regulation. We affirm.

FACTS

Northwest hired Regner as an aircraft mechanic in August 1989 and promoted him to the position of crew chief in 1996. As a crew chief, Regner was responsible for assigning maintenance and repair work to crew members and making sure that the maintenance and repair work and required paperwork were properly completed.

Under federal safety regulations, an aircraft used to carry passengers must have an airworthiness certificate in effect. 49 U.S.C. § 44711(a)(1). When a nonroutine repair was required on a Northwest aircraft, a mechanic or crew chief wrote up a card stating what work was required. Before the aircraft could be returned to service, the repair either had to be completed or, if the repair was not related to airworthiness, it could be deferred. Completion or deferral of a repair was indicated on the card.

Federal aviation regulations also require aircraft mechanics to report safety violations to the Federal Aviation Administration. On five occasions between March and April 1998, Regner reported possible safety violations by Northwest to the Federal Aviation Administration. A factual dispute exists regarding whether Regner made the reports in good faith or as part of an orchestrated work slowdown. Northwest discharged Regner from employment on May 5, 1998, and Regner brought this action claiming that he was fired for reporting the safety violations. The district court concluded that Regner's claim is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) and granted summary judgment for Northwest.

ISSUE

Is Regner's whistleblower claim brought under Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) preempted by the ADA?

ANALYSIS

"Whether a claim is preempted is a question of congressional intent that is `at bottom' a legal question of statutory construction." Leonard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Minn.App.2000). Statutory construction is subject to de novo review. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n v. County of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn.1997).

Preemption analysis begins with the assumption that the "historic police powers of the [s]tates" are not to be eclipsed unless to do so was "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."

Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn.1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). When determining the preemptive effect of the ADA,

our ultimate touchstone is the purpose of Congress. We begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. We do not lightly infer pre-emption in the area of employment law, for it falls within the traditional police power of the State.

Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488, 492-93 (8th Cir.2002) (quotations and citations omitted).

The FAA [Federal Aviation Act] was passed by Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a single authority the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the nation's airspace. To that end, Congress set out a legal duty, enforceable by the Secretary of Transportation, that interstate air carriers perform their services "with the highest possible degree of safety * * *."

Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 134 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1047 (D.Minn.2001) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(A)) (other quotation omitted), aff'd, 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir.2002). The FAA was amended by the ADA in 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713 (1995).

The enactment [of the ADA] was motivated by congressional belief that maximum reliance on competitive market forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices as well as variety and quality of air transportation services.

Leonard, 605 N.W.2d at 429 (quotation omitted).

The ADA contains the following preemption provision:

[A] State * * * may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier * * *.

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1); see Leonard, 605 N.W.2d at 429 (purpose of preemption provision is to prevent states from undoing deregulation).

The United States Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for determining whether the ADA preempts a state claim. Leonard, 605 N.W.2d at 429 (citing American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226, 115 S.Ct. 817, 823, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992)). "To be preempted, the claim must (1) relate to prices, routes, or services, and (2) constitute an enactment or enforcement of state law." Id. (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226, 115 S.Ct. at 823). Because this lawsuit arises under the Whistleblower Act, the second prong is satisfied. See id. at 431 (distinguishing between contract claims that seek simply to enforce the bargain of the parties and those that require the enforcement of state law or policy outside the contract). Thus, the question is whether this lawsuit relates to prices, routes, or services.

The Minnesota Whistleblower Act states:

An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because:

(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee, in good faith, reports a violation or suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official;

(b) the employee is requested by a public body or office to participate in an investigation, hearing, inquiry;

(c) the employee refuses an employer's order to perform an action that the employee has an objective basis in fact to believe violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law, and the employee informs the employer that the order is being refused for that reason; or

(d) the employee, in good faith, reports a situation in which the quality of health care services provided by a health care facility, organization, or health care provider violates a standard established by federal or state law or a professionally recognized national clinical or ethical standard and potentially places the public at risk of harm.

Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1 (Supp.1997).

In Botz, the federal district court summarized the Supreme Court's decisions in Wolens and Morales as follows:

The [Morales] Court stated that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "related to" is broadly defined as "to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with." The question before the Court in Morales was whether the enforcement of state law, prohibiting deceptive advertising by airlines, was "related to" airline rates, and within the preemptive scope of § 41713(b)(1). The Court found that the state law was sufficiently related to airline's rates to fall within the scope of the FAA's preemption, reasoning that restrictions on the advertising of airline rates would serve to increase the difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller and reduce the incentive to price competitively. The Supreme Court, therefore, applied a very broad reading of the term "related to."

The Supreme Court also addressed the breadth of the FAA's preemption in [Wolens.] In Wolens, the Court held that the FAA preempted the plaintiff's state Consumer Fraud Act claims, but did not preempt plaintiff's common-law contract claims. With respect to the plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act claims, the Court relied on its holding in Morales to find that the Act was preempted. The Court reasoned that applying the Act to airlines amounted to a policing of the marketing practices of the airlines. Accordingly, the Court held that the Act was related to the airline's services. The Court declined, however, to apply FAA preemption to plaintiff's breach of contract claim because the claim did not arise from a state-imposed obligation, as required for FAA preemption. Under Morales and Wolens, the term "related to a service" and the scope of FAA preemption are to be interpreted broadly by this Court.

Botz, 134 F.Supp.2d at 1045-46.

In Botz, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, based on the plain language of the ADA's preemption provision and on Morales and Wolens, held that the ADA preempted a flight attendant's claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Botz v. Omni Air Intern., 286 F.3d 488, 498 (8th Cir.2002). The flight attendant was terminated after she refused to accept an assignment that she believed violated regulations governing the maximum hours a flight attendant can fly in a specified time period. Botz, 286 F.3d at 490. The Eighth Circuit court explained:

When applied to the facts surrounding Botz's discharge, the Minnesota

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