Reigelsperger v. Utah

1

DONALD RAYMOND REIGELSPERGER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF UTAH,^[1]Respondent.

No. 4:18-CV-85-DN

United States District Court, D. Utah

September 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING HABEAS-CORPUS PETITION

DAVID NUFFER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this federal habeas-corpus case, pro se inmate Donald Raymond Reigelsperger,^[2]attacks his Utah state convictions. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2022) ("[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.").

Having carefully considered the Petition, (ECF No. 1), State response, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner's Reply Brief, (ECF No. 12), the Court concludes Petitioner has not overcome the federal habeas standard of review on any of his challenges. The petition is therefore denied.

I. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 2

II. PETITIONER'S ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL-HABEAS RELIEF ..................... 3

III. MERITS ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 4

A. Standard of Review ................................................................................................................ 4

B. Application of Standard of Review ........................................................................................ 8 1. Jury-Instruction Challenges ................................................................................................ 8

a. Allegation that jury instructions did not match up with the State's theory of the case presented in the information, preliminary hearing, and trial. . ............................................ 8

b. Allegation that jury instructions about four sexual assault offenses erroneously led jury to think Petitioner could be convicted of the sexual crimes without a culpable mens rea particularly as to consent. . ................................................................................................ 15

2. Motion to Suppress ........................................................................................................... 19

a. Challenge to state court's factual determinations. . ........................................................ 20

i. Federal standards governing review of factual determinations and evidentiary sufficiency. . ................................................................................................................... 20

ii. Utah Court of Appeals recitation of facts. . ............................................................... 22

b. Challenge to Utah Court of Appeals's legal analysis and conclusions. . ....................... 28

i. Utah Court of Appeals' legal analysis and conclusions. . ........................................... 28

ii. Utah Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. 36

iii. Summary .................................................................................................................. 40

IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 41

ORDER 41

I. BACKGROUND

A jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated kidnapping and four sexual-assault counts, perpetrated against his then-wife. Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101, ¶ 1. Petitioner was sentenced to one term of fifteen-years-to-life, to be served consecutively to concurrent two five-to-life sentences and two one-to-five-year sentences. (ECF No. 1, at 1.)

Petitioner pursued these issues on appeal: (A) the allegation "that he was given an incomplete Miranda warning and therefore the trial court should have suppressed the statements he made during his interview in the hospital," which he identifies as a "custodial interrogation"; (B) the contention "that the State improperly expanded the scope of its prosecution at the close of trial" by impermissibly broadening "the jury instructions addressing the assault offenses" beyond "the State's asserted theory of the case, with regard to both nonconsent and the intent required to commit forcible sexual abuse"; (C) the assertion that "the jury was not adequately instructed that the State was required to prove he possessed (1) a culpable mens rea as to Wife's nonconsent, for purposes of the sexual assault offenses; and (2) intent or knowledge with respect to the elements of the aggravated kidnapping offense." Reigelsperger, at ¶¶ 36-37, 40, 60 (alteration in original). Analyzing these issues on the merits, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions. Id. at ¶¶ 40-97. And the Utah Supreme Court denied Petitioner's certiorari petition. State v. Reigelsperger, 409 P.3d 1048 (Utah 2017) (table).

II. PETITIONER'S ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL-HABEAS RELIEF

Petitioner raises the following issues on federal habeas review:

(a) An allegation that the information was "constructively amended when, after the trial, the jury was instructed on elements which impermissibly modif[ied] the state's theory of the case presented in the information, preliminary hearing, and trial." (ECF No. 1, at 8.) More specifically, Petitioner asserts that "the court impermissibly instructed the jury that it could base guilt on different theories of non-consent . . . as well as theories of specific intent."^[3] (Id. at 8, 18.)

(b) An allegation that the "jury instructions failed to properly define mens rea." (Id. at 10.) More specifically, "[f]or each of the four sexual assault offenses, counts 2-5, Petitioner was convicted of . . . 'the jury [was led] to believe he could be convicted of the sexual crimes absent a culpable mens rea specifically regarding consent.'" (Id. at 20.)

(c) An allegation that the jury instructions regarding the aggravated-kidnapping offense were "ambiguous and confusing." (Id. at 11.) More specifically, the instructions here "were written in such a way that it was unclear which of the . . . [crime] elements [that] the mens rea instruction was linked to . . . thus relieving the state of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that" Petitioner had the necessary intent during the kidnapping. (Id. at 21-22.)

(d) An allegation that "the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements obtained during an illegal [custodial] interrogation." (Id. at 13.) More specifically, while Petitioner was in a "mental facility," "involuntarily confined," police officers interrogated him to gain a confession leading to his arrest. (Id. at 23-25.)^[4] On this issue, Petitioner attacks the state court's factual and legal determinations. (ECF Nos. 1, 12.)

III. MERITS ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review

The standard of review to be applied in federal habeas cases is found in § 2254, under which this habeas petition is filed. It states:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(e)(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2022).

The Court's inquiry centers on whether the Utah Court of Appeals's^[5] rejection of Petitioner's claims "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1) (2022). This "'highly deferential standard,'" Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citations omitted); see also Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 824 (10th Cir. 2013), is "'difficult to meet,' because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a '"guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,"' and not as a means of error correction." Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment))). The Court is not to determine whether the court of appeals's decision was correct or whether this Court may have reached a different outcome. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). And, "[t]he petitioner carries the burden of proof." Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1398.

Under Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), the first step is determining whether clearly established federal law exists relevant to Petitioner's claims. House v Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 825. Only after answering yes to that "threshold question" may the Court go on to "ask whether the state court decision is either...