Reimers v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.

584 F.Supp.3d 936

Maria Elena REIMERS, USCIS A#097 107V629, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

NO: 2:20-CV-459-RMP

United States District Court, E.D. Washington.

Signed February 7, 2022

Alycia Truax Moss, Moss Immigration Law PC, Coeur d'Alene, ID, for Plaintiff.

William Bateman, III, DOJ-Civ, Washington, DC, Jessica Alice Pilgrim, U.S. Attorney's Office, Spokane, WA, for Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

William Bateman, III, DOJ-Civ, Washington, DC, for Defendants John West, Leanne Leigh, Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Larry C. Denayer, Chad F. Wolf, Attorney General William Barr, East Dist WA US Attorney.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON, Senior United States District Judge

BEFORE THE COURT, without oral argument, are cross-motions for summary judgment from Defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., ("Defendants"), ECF No. 15, and from Plaintiff Maria Elena Reimers, ECF No. 17. Having reviewed the respective motions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court is fully informed. For the reasons given below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff, an El-Salvadorian citizen, moved to the United States in 2004 and married Richard Reimers, a U.S. citizen, that same year. ECF Nos. 16 at 2, 18 at 3–4. On May 21, 2007, Plaintiff adjusted her status to that of a lawful permanent resident. ECF No. 16 at 2. In 2014, Plaintiff and her husband opened a business called "Cannarail Station" in Ephrata, Washington. Id. Cannarail Station exclusively sells marijuana and marijuana-related paraphernalia. Id.

Plaintiff has worked in several capacities at Cannarail Station, including as a "budtender" who helps answer customer questions and sells the store's marijuana products to customers who are 21 and older. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also manages the store and orders the store's inventory. Id.

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Form N-400 Application for Naturalization ("Form N-400") with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Id. at 2. Plaintiff checked "no" on Form N-400 to the following question: "Have you EVER: Sold or smuggled controlled substances, illegal drugs, or narcotics?" Id. (citing ECF No. 16-1 at 4). In an addendum to her naturalization application, Plaintiff explained her answer about having never sold controlled substances by stating that "[t]he answer to this question is somewhat of a gray area federally." ECF No. 16-1 at 42. She noted that her and her husband "are legally licensed in the State of Washington to sell [m]arijuana[,]" and she provided the name and license information for Cannarail Station. Id.

On August 23, 2017, Plaintiff appeared for a naturalization interview. ECF No. 16 at 2. The interviewer circled Plaintiff's "no" answer to the question about selling controlled substances and noted that Plaintiff stated that "marijuana is legal in W[ashington] State." ECF Nos. 16-1 at 39, 18 at 5. Almost a year later, on May 14, 2018, Plaintiff appeared for a second naturalization interview. ECF Nos. 16 at 2, at 18 at 5.

At the outset of the second interview, the immigration officer placed Plaintiff under oath and began questioning her about her eligibility for naturalization. ECF No. 16-1 at 68. The officer encouraged Plaintiff to say if she needed a question repeated or if she did not understand a question. Id. Plaintiff agreed that she was appearing voluntarily and could end the interview at any time. Id.¹ The officer then began asking questions about Plaintiff's self-employment.

Plaintiff stated that she is employed at Cannarail Station, a state-licensed marijuana store that she co-owns with her husband. Id. at 69. In response, the officer began reading a portion of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), noting that marijuana is a schedule one controlled substance and that the CSA "makes the cultivation, distribution or possession of any amount of marijuana ... a criminal offense." Id. at 70. The officer defined the term "distribution" and set out the specific elements of distribution of a controlled substance as: (1) possession of a controlled substance; (2) that is knowing or intentional; (3) done with the intent to distribute to another person; and (4) results in the knowing distribution of a controlled substance. Id.² The officer asked Plaintiff if she understood the information given to her about the CSA regarding possession and distribution of marijuana and Plaintiff responded, "[n]ot 100 percent." Id. Plaintiff stated that she understood the federal law to mean that she could be viewed as "distributing to [an]other person" and the officer restated the elements of the criminal offense under the CSA. Id. Plaintiff next asked the officer to spell out the CSA, which the officer did. The officer reminded Plaintiff that she was under oath and was "free to leave at any time." Id.

The interview continued and Plaintiff admitted to occasional use of the store's marijuana candies to help her sleep. Id. at 71. Plaintiff also described the types of marijuana products sold at the store and her role as a "budtender" and as a business manager. Id. at 71–73. In her managerial role, Plaintiff stated that she places orders, checks in inventory, supervises employees, and helps customers. Id. at 73. She confirmed that, under Washington State law, all marijuana products sold at the store, other than drug paraphernalia, must contain marijuana. Id. at 72. Plaintiff confirmed that she knowingly and intentionally distributes the store's marijuana products to customers who are 21 and older. Id. at 74.

On July 2, 2018, USCIS denied Plaintiff's application for naturalization, finding that Plaintiff's role as co-owner of Cannarail Station made her an "illicit trafficker of a controlled substance." ECF No. 18-2 at 17. USCIS noted that although "medical and recreational marijuana possession, distribution, and sale are legal in Washington State under state law," they are illegal under federal law. Id. Citing the Supremacy Clause, USCIS applied federal law in determining Plaintiff's eligibility for naturalization and found that Plaintiff's status as an illicit drug trafficker meant that she lacked "good moral character during the requisite statutory period." Id.

Plaintiff requested a hearing on the denial decision with USCIS, and the decision was affirmed on May 4, 2020. ECF No. 16 at 3. Plaintiff filed a complaint for de novo review of the denial of her naturalization application with this Court on December 14, 2020. See ECF No. 1. On July 29, 2021, counsel for Defendants deposed Plaintiff in the presence of Plaintiff's attorney. ECF No. 16-1 at 11–12. Plaintiff confirmed that she took an oath requiring her to answer all questions asked of her at the deposition fully and honestly. Id. at 9. Plaintiff also confirmed that the answers she gave during her naturalization interviews were accurate. Id. at 15–16. Counsel for Defendants asked Plaintiff whether she "intentionally sell[s] the marijuana at Cannarail Station" and she answered as follows: "If someone comes and wants to buy a product, we just provide the service." Id. at 25–26. Plaintiff then confirmed that the service she provides are the marijuana products sold at the store. Id. at 26. Counsel for Defendants asked Plaintiff if she knows that marijuana is a controlled substance and she answered, "I do now." Id. at 29. Both parties now move for summary judgment on whether Plaintiff is eligible for naturalization.

LEGAL STANDARD

Although the Attorney General is vested with the "sole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States[,]" 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a), district courts have jurisdiction to review the denial of a naturalization application. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). "Under § 1421(c), the district court has the last word with respect to denied applications, by conducting its own hearing and reviewing the application de novo." United States v. Hovsepian , 359 F.3d 1144, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). A genuine dispute exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the moving party meets this challenge, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e) ). "A non-movant's bald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both insufficient to withstand summary judgment." FTC v. Stefanchik , 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 631–32 (9th Cir. 1987). If the party opposing summary judgment fails to cite specifically to evidentiary materials, the Court need not search the entire record for evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact or obtain the missing materials. See ...