Rensing v. Walmart, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A. DAVID COPPERTHITE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendant, Walmart, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Walmart"), moves this Court for summary judgment (the "Motion") (ECF No. 28) on Plaintiff Kristen Rensing's ("Plaintiff") Complaint (ECF No. 1). After considering the Motion and responses thereto (ECF Nos. 31, 32), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). In addition, having reviewed the pleadings of record and all competent and admissible evidence submitted by the parties, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to the claim asserted. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant's Motion.

Factual and Procedural Background

On January 4, 2020, Plaintiff entered the Walmart Super center at 3200 North Ridge Road in Ellicott City, Maryland. ECF No. 1 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs husband, Christopher Rensing ("Mr. Rensing"), dropped Plaintiff off at the front of the store and waited in the car while she entered the store. ECF No. 28-1 at 2; ECF No. 31 -1 at 3. Plaintiff was wearing sling-back heels, approximately¹/₂" to 1" high. ECF No. 28-1 at 2. Both Plaintiff and Mr. Rensing contend it was raining that day, . with Plaintiff describing the rain as "drizzling" or "misting." ECF No. 28-1 at 2; ECF No. 31-1 at 2-3. However, Walmart associate Jeanette Sanchez stated that it was not raining at the time of

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Plaintiffs fall. ECF No. 28-3 ¶11. Plaintiff did not have an umbrella or raincoat and did not recall seeing water on the floor while entering the store. ECF No. 28-1 at 2. Plaintiff walked through the vestibule at the store entrance and entered the store interior without issue. Id. After taking a couple of steps into the store interior, Plaintiff rolled her ankle and fell. Id. at 3; ECF No. 28-5 at 10:05:24. Plaintiff noticed her legs were wet after falling and that the floor looked "wet" or "glistening." ECF No.28-l at 2.

Sanchez assisted Plaintiff and did not see any water on the floor. Id. at 3. Mr. Rensing similarly did not observe any water on the floor after entering the store to assist Plaintiff. Id. After Plaintiffs fall, no Walmart associates marked off or cleaned the area where Plaintiff fell. Id. at 3-4. Video surveillance footage captured the incident. Id. at 3. See generally ECF No. 28-5. The footage shows that both prior to and after Plaintiffs fall, patrons and carts came and went through the area where Plaintiff fell without incident. ECF No. 28-1 at 3. The footage does not clearly show whether there was water on the floor or whether it was raining, beyond that patrons did not appear to be carrying umbrellas. Id. at 6. During wet weather, Walmart employees deploy mats in the vestibule to keep water from being tracked in and fans to dry the floor. Id. at 4. These mats and fans were not present at the time of Plaintiff s fall. Id. Walmart employees are also trained to look for and correct hazards on the floor of the store. Id. at 3-4. However, no Walmart employees cleaned water off the floor following Plaintiffs fall; the footage shows only an employee use a broom and dustpan in the area approximately twenty minutes later. Id.

As a result of Plaintiff s fall, she experienced bilateral knee bone contusions and a fractured right patella. ECF No. 30-1 at 6. On December 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging that Walmart is liable to Plaintiff for her injuries sustained from slipping and falling on water on

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the floor of one of its stores. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3-4.^[1] On August 25, 2021, Walmart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiffs Complaint. ECF No. 28. After the Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29), Plaintiff responded in opposition on October 1, 2021. ECF Nos. 30, 31. Walmart then replied. ECF No. 32.

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 56, a movant is entitled to summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ("[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." (emphasis in original)). An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of the case,' resolution of the factual dispute could affect the outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. There is a genuine issue as to material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. See Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). On the other hand, if after the Court has drawn all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and "the evidence is merely colorable,

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or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing either that no genuine issue of material fact exists or that a material fact essential to the non-movant's claim is absent. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the onus is on the non-movant to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In order to meet this burden, the non-movant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," but must instead "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

B. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

In its Motion, Walmart argues first that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the floor was not wet. ECF No. 28-1 at 6. In the alternative, Walmart contends, even assuming that there was water on the floor, that Plaintiff has not shown that Walmart had actual or constructive notice of the alleged liquid on the floor, that Walmart is not liable because the wet floor was an open and obvious hazard and Plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that Walmart failed to take necessary precautions or conduct reasonable inspections of its store. ECF No. 28-1 at 8-17.

A claim for negligence requires plaintiff prove "1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of that duty."^[2] Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 469 Md.704, 727 (2020).

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It is further well-established in Maryland that the duty of care owed by an owner or occupier of the premises in "slip and fall" cases is determined by the owner's legal relationship to the person entering the premises. Garner v. Supervalu, Inc., 396 Fed.Appx. 27, 29 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A business invitee is one who enters the property for a business purpose. Rehn v. Westfield America, 153 Md.App. 586, 592-93 (2003) (citation omitted). One in possession of land and operating a store owes a business invitee "the duty of reasonable care for the protection of the business invitee." Tucker v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 689 F.Supp. 560, 562 (D.Md. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1989).

A storekeeper has a duty to protect a business invitee "against dangers which may arise from some . . . unsafe condition . . . [and] dangers which may be caused by negligent acts of his employees." Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636-37 (1994) (quoting Eyerly v. Baker, 168 Md. 599, 607, 178 A. 691, 694 (1935)). There are, however, limits to the duty. Liability for negligence is not presumed simply because a business invitee is injured on storekeeper's premises. Rehn 153 Md.App. at 593. "The evidence must show not only that a dangerous condition existed, but also that proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of it, and that that knowledge was gained in sufficient time to give the owner the opportunity to remove [the hazard] or to warn the invitee." Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, evidence to support a negligence claim must be more than "mere speculation or conjecture": it must provide "a logical relation and connection between the circumstances proved and the conclusion sought to be adduced from them." Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 119 (1955) (quoting Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 55 (1898)).

Plaintiff must first prove the existence of the dangerous condition. See Rehn, 153 Md.App. at 593. While the Court normally does not resolve factual disputes, "a party's self-serving

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opinion ... cannot, absent objective corroboration, defeat summary judgment." McCoy v. Biomet Orthopedics, LLC, No. CV ELH-12-1436, 2021 WL 252556, at *21 (D.Md. Jan. 25, 2021) (quoting CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647, 658-59 (4th Cir. 2020)) (applying the stated principle to a motion for summary judgment on a negligence claim). Here, Plaintiff has provided little evidence to show that the dangerous condition-the water on the floor-existed, relying exclusively on her testimony that she had water on her legs after falling, her testimony that the floor "look[ed] wet" or "glistening," and her testimony and Mr. Rensing's testimony that it was raining. ECF No. 31-1 at 16-17. However, Sanchez did not observe water on the floor. ECF No. 28-1 at 3. Plaintiff could not say if the floor...