Renteria v. Neb. Dep't of Corr.

CHASIN RENTERIA, Plaintiff, v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant.

8:20CV166

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

June 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Chasin Renteria ("Renteria"), is a state prisoner who currently is incarcerated at the Omaha Correctional Center ("OCC"). Renteria commenced this action on April 30, 2020, and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on May 4, 2020. (Filing No. 6.) After Renteria paid the required initial partial filing fee, the court conducted an initial review of his Complaint (Filing No. 1) and determined it does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Memorandum and Order entered on June 3, 2020 (Filing No. 7). However, the court on its own motion gave Renteria leave to amend within 30 days. Renteria filed an Amended Complaint on June 15, 2020 (Filing No. 8). The court now conducts an initial review of the Amended Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The court is required to review "as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a). On such initial review, the court must dismiss the complaint if it: "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(b). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring dismissal of in forma pauperis complaints "at any time" on the same grounds as § 1915A(b)).

"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

"A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

Liberally construing Renteria's Amended Complaint, he is asserting two types of discrimination claims against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services ("NDCS")¹ under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Renteria first claims that NDCS failed to accommodate his alleged disability during a 2-week period, from March 14, 2020, to March 27, 2020, when he was confined at the Nebraska State Penitentiary ("NSP") pending an investigation into an incident that occurred a OCC. Renteria complainshe was placed in a cell in the segregation unit which was accessible only by stairs and did not have a handicap-accessible toilet or shower. Renteria alleges he was forced to crawl up the stairs while handcuffed and shackled, and that he was injured after twice falling in the shower. Secondly, Renteria claims he is not being allowed to play softball with other inmates at OCC because of his disability. The court finds Renteria has alleged sufficient facts in his Amended Complaint to permit these ADA claims to go forward at this time.

Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Act authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a).

The Act defines "public entity" to include "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, ... or other instrumentality of a State," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). This term includes state prisons. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006).²

In order to sufficiently plead that NDCS violated Title II, Renteria must allege "(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of NDCS's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise subjected to discrimination; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or other discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010); Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998).

The term "qualified individual with a disability" means "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, orthe provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). A "disability" is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

Renteria alleges he was involved in an automobile accident in 2013 in which he broke his T11 and T12 vertebrae and suffered a pinched spinal cord, as a result of which he has only partial use of his legs. Renteria alleges this condition leaves him unable to stand up straight or to walk without the use of a walker; unable to use stairs safely; unable to use a shower safely unless it is equipped with a handicap accessible entry, handrails, and shower chair; and unable to use a toilet without the aid of a handrail to sit and stand. (Filing No. 8, p. 1.) These allegations are sufficient to show that Renteria has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

Under the ADA, there are two means of discrimination: (1) disparate treatment and (2) the failure to make reasonable accommodations. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2004). Disparate treatment discrimination is based on "intent or actual motive," whereas in the second type of claim, "the 'discrimination' is framed in terms of the failure to fulfill an affirmative duty—the failure to reasonably accommodate the disabled individual's limitations." Id. at 767.

The "deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [an inmate's] disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and ... other prison programs" may constitute a violation of Title II. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157; see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (noting that the phrase "services, programs, or activities" in § 12132 includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs).

With respect to his 2-week confinement at NSP, Renteria asserts three failure-to-accommodate claims: (1) that his request to be placed in a cell on the first floor or in a cell that had elevator access was denied, thereby preventing him from participating in activities, programs, and services, such as going to health services for treatment, using the law library, getting haircuts, or attending recommendedprogramming due to his inability to traverse stairs safely (Filing No. 8, pp. 2, 3); (2) that his request for a cell equipped with a handrail next to the toilet was denied, thereby forcing him to use the toilet in an unsafe and unsanitary manner (Filing No. 8, p. 2); and (3) that his request for a handicap-accessible shower equipped with handrails and shower seat was denied, thereby forcing him to shower using an unsafe walker, and causing him to suffer injuries when he fell on two separate occasions (Filing No. 8, pp. 2-3).

With respect to his current confinement at OCC, Renteria alleges that even though he is not on any sort of sports restriction, recreation staff told him he could not participate in softball games with other inmates, or even be on the field, because of his disability. Renteria further alleges that he explained this to the warden, but is still not allowed to play softball. (Filing No. 8, p. 3.) Renteria does not allege that he requires any accommodation in order to have meaningful access to this recreational activity, so, as pled, this is a disparate treatment claim.

For relief, Renteria states he is seeking to recover $1 million in damages from NDCS. (Filing No. 8, p. 4.) No injunctive relief is requested.³

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) requires that a pleading contain "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks," the prayer for relief is not considered part of the claim for purposes of testing the sufficiency of the pleading under Rule 8(a)(2). Schwan v. CNH Am. LLC, No. 4:04CV3384, 2006 WL 1215395, at *35 (D. Neb. May 4, 2006) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1255, at 508-09...