Rev. Xiu Hui "joseph" Jiang v. Porter

REV. XIU HUI "JOSEPH" JIANG, Plaintiff, v. TONYA LEVETTE PORTER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:15-CV-1008 (CEJ)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

December 29, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant N.M. to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has responded in opposition, and the issues are fully briefed. Also before the Court are the motions of N.M. to strike statements made in plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss and for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. Background

Plaintiff Reverend Xiu Hui "Joseph" Jiang is a Chinese-born ordained Catholic priest in the Archdiocese of St. Louis. Jiang asserts that defendants A.M. and N.M. falsely accused him of sexually abusing their minor son for the purpose of monetary gain. Jiang also asserts that defendants Jaimie D. Pitterle and Tonya Levette Porter, officers of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, conducted an inadequate investigation of the abuse allegations and targeted plaintiff for prosecution because of his religion and ethnicity. He alleges that defendant City of St. Louis failed to properly train the officers and that the officers' conduct was the result of the city's unconstitutional policies and practices. Jiang further asserts that defendants Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, its executive director David Clohessy, and its registered agent in Missouri Barbara Dorris (the "SNAP defendants") led a public smear campaign against him which included making false accusations of child molestation in the media. The criminal case against Jiang remained pending in state court from April 17, 2014 until June 17, 2015, when it was voluntarily dismissed shortly before trial.

The fifteen-count complaint consists of the following claims: religious discrimination, selective enforcement and prosecution based on religion, race and national origin, and conduct shocking the conscience, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants Porter and Pitterle (Counts I-VI); conspiracy to violate civil rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, against all defendants except the City of St. Louis (Count VII); willful, malicious and reckless official acts in violation of Missouri law against defendants Porter and Pitterle (VIII); vicarious liability and Monell claims for unconstitutional policy and practice and failure to train and supervise against defendant City of St. Louis (Counts IX-XI); abuse of process against defendants Porter, Pitterle, A.M. and N.M. (Count XII); intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants except the City of St. Louis (Count XIII); and defamation against A.M., N.M., and the SNAP defendants (Counts XIV-XV). Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief.

II. Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The factual allegations of a complaint are assumed true and construed in favor of the plaintiff, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.506, 508 n.1 (2002)); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (stating that a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of his claim. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. A viable complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see id. at 563 (stating that the "no set of facts" language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), "has earned its retirement"); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-84 (2009) (holding that the pleading standard set forth in Twombly applies to all civil actions). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Count VII - Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights

In Count VII, plaintiff alleges that defendant N.M. conspired with the other defendants to violate plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. To state a claim for a civil rights conspiracy under the equal protection provisions of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege "(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving another of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to a person or property, or the deprivation of a legal right." Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Defendant N.M. first contends that plaintiff failed to plead any facts showing that N.M. conspired with any of the other defendants. In a civil conspiracy claim, "the plaintiff must allege with particularity and specifically demonstrate with material facts that the defendants reached an agreement." Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 685 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Omaha Emps. Betterment Ass'n v. City of Omaha, 883 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can satisfy this burden "by pointing to at least some facts which would suggest that [the alleged conspirators] reached an understanding to violate [his] rights." City of Omaha, 883 F.2d at 652 (internal quotations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

The complaint alleges direct communication between N.M. and a police defendant. Specifically, the complaint asserts that on or about April 17, 2014, N.M. contacted defendant Porter to notify her that N.M.'s minor child was ready and willing to view a photo array. Plaintiff describes this phone call as a significant turning point in his prosecution. Previously, the minor had been unable to identify plaintiff by name and refused to view a photo array. After N.M. called the police and the minor agreed to view the photo array, the police defendant defendants arrested plaintiff.

The complaint also alleges that at all relevant times N.M. knew or should have known that the minor's accusations of sexual abuse against plaintiff were false and unreliable. The minor had made unfounded allegations of sexual abuse in the past. The minor had not had any personal acquaintance with plaintiff, could notidentify plaintiff by name when he first made the allegation, and his identification of plaintiff was based on a public news report. The complaint also asserts that A.M. and N.M. had a history of asserting unfounded claims against the Catholic Church for monetary gain, providing a motive for N.M. to enter into a conspiracy with the police and SNAP defendants and suggesting prior dealings between A.M. and N.M. to support the inference of a conspiracy. See United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence for defendant's conviction on a conspiracy claim when the government introduced relevant circumstantial evidence of the defendant's motive to organize the conspiracy and the relationship among codefendants). The Court finds these factual allegations sufficient to support the inference that N.M. participated in a conspiracy.

Next, defendant N.M. argues that plaintiff failed to plead any facts to show that she had the intent to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or of equal privileges and immunities under the law. To satisfy § 1985(3), a conspiracy must have the purpose of denying equal protection, not simply an effect upon a protected right. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 275 (1993). The conspiracy must have an "invidiously discriminatory animus" where the defendant acted at least in part for the purpose of producing the deprivation of a right. Id. at 275-76.

The complaint alleges that N.M. pursued false allegations against plaintiff for pecuniary gain, because the accusations would be deemed more credible against a Catholic priest due to public outrage over sexual abuse by Catholic priests, and because plaintiff was a Chinese national who was easily identifiable among the Roman Catholic priests in the City of St. Louis. Accordingly, the complaintsufficiently alleges that N.M. acted on the basis of discriminatory animus against plaintiff's race, religion and national origin. Additional facts alleged in the complaint provide further support for the inference that N.M. acted with discriminatory animus: that the minor had made previous unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, that defendants A.M. and N.M. had a history of making unfounded claims against the Catholic Church, that the minor had been "coached" not to provide details of the abuse, and that defendants A.M. and N.M. targeted plaintiff for the abuse allegation because, as a Chinese national, he was easily identifiable among other priests in the city.

Defendant N.M. further contends that several of the allegations supporting plaintiff's conspiracy claim are based upon information and belief, which amount only to speculation and conjecture that a conspiracy existed. After Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts have found allegations pled "on information and belief" sufficient to state a claim. See Van Stelton v. Van Stelton, No. C11-4045-MWB, 2013 WL 3776813, at *10 (N.D. Iowa July 17, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The Tw...