Reyes v. Greer

686 F.Supp.3d 524

Eduardo Daniel REYES, Plaintiff, v. Anthony Paul GREER et al., Defendants.

CAUSE NO. EP-22-CV-367-KC

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division

Filed August 11, 2023

Brad D. Hall, Levi A. Monagle, Hall Monagle Huffman Wallace, LLC, Albuquerque, NM, Alejandro Acosta, III, Flores, Tawney & Acosta P.C, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.

James O. Darnell, Sr., Cris Estrada, James (Jeep) O. Darnell, Jr., Jim Darnell, P.C., El Paso, TX, for Defendant Anthony Paul Greer.

Eric M. Brittain, Windle Hood Norton Brittain & Jay LLP, El Paso, TX, for Defendants Armando Diaz, Frederick Gomez, Mike Lara.

Evan Daine Reed, El Paso City Attorneys Office, El Paso, TX, Mathew Jacob Engelbaum, DOJ-USAO, El Paso, TX, Eric M. Brittain, Windle Hood Norton Brittain & Jay LLP, El Paso, TX, for Defendants Greg Allen, City of El Paso, Texas.

ORDER

Kathleen Cardone, Judge

On this day, the Court considered Defendant Armando Diaz's Motion to Dismiss ("Diaz Motion"), ECF No. 22; Defendants Greg Allen and City of El Paso's Motion to Dismiss ("City Motion"), ECF No. 27; Defendant Mike Lara's Motion to Dismiss ("Lara Motion"), ECF No. 33; Defendant Frederick Gomez's Motion to Dismiss ("Gomez Motion"), ECF No. 34; and Defendant Anthony Greer's Motion to Dismiss ("Greer Motion"), ECF No. 41. For the reasons below, the Diaz Motion is GRANTED, the City Motion is GRANTED, the Lara Motion is GRANTED, the Gomez Motion is GRANTED, and the Greer Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from Reyes' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 17, and are taken as true for purposes of adjudicating Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002).

A. Fight with Diaz

On the night of January 30, 2021, Plaintiff Eduardo Reyes had a "verbal confrontation" with employees of The Tap, a bar and restaurant in downtown El Paso, and was asked to leave the establishment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. While leaving, Reyes "exchanged a few words" with Defendant Armando Diaz, an off-duty detective for the El Paso Police Department ("EPPD"). Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Because Diaz was not in uniform, Reyes did not know he was an EPPD detective. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.

Diaz followed Reyes out of the bar. Id. ¶ 18. Though Reyes' "hands were at his sides," and though he was making no physically threatening gestures toward Diaz, Diaz "initiated a physical altercation with [Reyes], striking [him] at least twice in the face." Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Reyes "swung wildly to defend himself . . . but did not land any punches." Id. ¶ 24.

Reyes walked away from Diaz, and "Diaz followed [Reyes] as if to continue his attack." Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Diaz then walked to his car, "opened the door and reached inside (where he had guns including his service revolver)." Id. ¶ 27. Afraid that Diaz was reaching for a gun and would "escalate matters," Reyes put on a set of brass knuckles that he had in his car. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 100. Diaz approached Reyes, but the two did not continue fighting; they "exchanged words," Reyes dropped his brass knuckles, and one of them kicked the brass knuckles away. Id. ¶¶ 31-34. They shook hands and ceased fighting. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.

B. Greer shooting and the City's body-worn camera policy

Two blocks away, Defendant Anthony Greer—an EPPD officer—was patrolling downtown on his bicycle and received a call about a "potential 'fight in progress' at the Tap." Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Greer and his partner biked there, but by the time they arrived, the confrontation had ended. Id. ¶ 42. Reyes was emptyhanded, and Greer did not know that Reyes had ever had brass knuckles. Id. ¶¶ 44-45. "[Reyes] posed no immediate threat to anyone." Id. ¶ 51. Greer got off his bike, and—without investigating the scene or "utiliz[ing] [ ] de-escalation techniques"—shot him in the chest. Id. ¶¶ 46-50. About three months later, Greer was criminally charged for shooting Reyes. Id. ¶ 63. The Complaint is silent regarding the status of the criminal charges against Greer at the time this lawsuit was filed.

When Greer shot Reyes, he and his partner were both required to wear a body-worn camera ("BWC"). Id. ¶¶ 64-65. And under the City's Police Policies & Procedures ("Policy"), they needed to "record all events surrounding the contact, stop, detention, interview, and arrest of suspected violators when safe to do so." Id. ¶ 73. Despite its broad recording provision, the Policy keeps BWC recordings "involv[ing] the use of deadly force by a peace officer or that is otherwise related to an administrative or criminal investigation of an officer" from being "released to the public until all criminal matters have been finally adjudicated and all related administrative investigations have concluded." Id. ¶ 81. EPPD "may permit a person who is depicted in a recording . . . to view [it]," and "may release [a recording] to the public," if it "determines that the viewing [or release] furthers a law enforcement purpose." Id. ¶¶ 82-83.

In the Amended Complaint, Reyes alleges that Officer Greer and his partner were not wearing their BWCs and did not record the shooting, despite the City's Policy. Id. ¶¶ 66, 84-85. Alternatively, he alleges that "there are video recording(s) of the [ ] shooting . . . which were [ ] not turned over to [Reyes]." Id. ¶ 86. He also alleges that there were "videos of the [shooting] captured by eyewitnesses and nearby surveillance cameras which were provided [to Reyes]." Id. ¶ 105.

C. Reyes' arrest and prosecution

Reyes was hospitalized for forty days because of the shooting. Id. ¶ 149. Before he was discharged, Detectives Frederick Gomez and Mike Lara—colleagues of Diaz—"conspired with [ ] Diaz to make [Reyes] appear to be the bad actor . . . and to stretch the facts to allege felonies against [him]." Id. ¶ 95 (internal quotation marks omitted). The officers procured a warrant for Reyes' arrest. See id. ¶ 238.

When Reyes left the hospital, he was arrested and taken to EPPD headquarters for an interrogation with Gomez and Lara. Id. ¶ 96. During the interrogation, Reyes explained that he "never swung his brass knuckles" and only put them on in self-defense, because Diaz had hit him and, Reyes feared, reached for a gun. Id. ¶¶ 100-01. Reyes told Gomez that once he put on the brass knuckles, the fight ended. Id. ¶ 102. After he explained what had happened, Reyes was told he was being charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Id. ¶ 107.

Reyes alleges he was charged for three reasons: First, "to exonerate [ ] Diaz at [Reyes'] expense"; second, "to assist [EPPD] in the defense of the shooting"; and third, "because [BWC] footage capturing lethal force cannot be released to the public when criminal matters have not been finally adjudicated." Id. ¶¶ 88, 127, 129 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ¶¶ 174-75.

To achieve those goals, "Gomez [and] Lara . . . met to decide to charge [Reyes]," id. ¶ 126, "Gomez recommended that criminal charges be brought," id. ¶ 125, and Diaz and Gomez brought those charges, see id. ¶¶ 147, 175. Gomez and Lara, however, "knew from various video recordings that . . . Diaz . . . began punching [Reyes] . . . and knew there was unmistakable video of assault and battery committed by Diaz." Id. ¶ 158. For his part, "Diaz lied about feeling fear of being hit by [Reyes'] brass knuckles in order to effectuate [the] criminal indictment." Id. ¶ 139; see also id. ¶ 140. He "provided false information to his fellow police detectives, [ ]or was cajoled into doing so . . . , claiming he had been feloniously assaulted by Reyes." Id. ¶ 168. And "EPPD asked or expected Diaz to pursue criminal prosecution of Reyes knowing that video[s] from passersby and other cameras clearly show Diaz repeatedly punching . . . Reyes, not the other way around, in order to help defend the police shooting case [against Greer]." Id. ¶ 174.

In August 2021, Reyes was indicted with one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Id. ¶ 128. A little over one year later, the charge was dismissed with prejudice. Id. ¶¶ 164-65.

Based on these allegations, Reyes brought excessive force claims against Greer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and malicious prosecution claims against Diaz, Gomez, and Lara—as well as three John Doe Defendants—under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 226-240. He also brought several municipal liability claims against the City of El Paso ("the City") and former EPPD Chief Greg Allen (collectively, the "City Defendants"). Id. ¶¶ 241-261. Greer, Diaz, Gomez, Lara, and the City Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Greer Mot. 1; Diaz Mot. 1; Gomez Mot. 1; Lara Mot. 1; City Mot. 1.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Calhoun, 312 F.3d at 733; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will...