Reynolds v. Merrill Lynch Basic Long Term Disability Plan

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, DOC. NO. 7

Plaintiff Mark Reynolds ("Plaintiff") asserts a single claim against Defendants Merrill Lynch Basic Long Term Disability Plan, Merrill Lynch Supplemental Long Term Disability Plan, and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (collectively, "Defendants" or "Merrill Lynch") for violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), in particular, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), based on their failure to respond to Plaintiff's January 2004 request for a copy of his employee benefit plan with Merrill Lynch.

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Currently before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Based on the following, the court agrees and GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

A. Factual Background

As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff worked for Merrill Lynch for 15 years until 2004 when he became unable to work due to disability. Doc. No. 1-1, Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff made a claim for benefits under the Basic and Supplemental Plans (collectively, the "Plan") provided by Merrill Lynch, and was ultimately successful on his claim. Id. ¶¶ 23-29.

In the meantime, Plaintiff "first requested a copy of his plan of disability insurance from defendants in January 2004, and made repeated verbal requests afterward. [Plaintiff's] attorney repeated this request [] on December 8, 2004."¹ Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff asserts that he needs copies of the Plan to determine if he was properly paid and what rights his survivors may have. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff therefore asserts a single claim for "relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) based

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on defendant's failure to timely respond to Mr. Reynold's request for documents," and seeks "penalties of $110/day² from January 2004, through the date judgment is entered, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)," and attorneys' fees. Id. ¶ 37; id. at Prayer for Relief.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action on March 31, 2015. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on April 23, 2015, Doc. No. 7, Plaintiff filed an Opposition on May 26, 2015, Doc. No. 9, and Defendants filed their Reply on June 2, 2015. Doc. No. 10. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(d), the court determines the Motion to Dismiss without a hearing.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

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"A statute-of-limitations defense, if 'apparent from the face of the complaint,' may properly be raised in a motion to dismiss." Seven Arts Filmed Entm't Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013) ("When an affirmative defense is obvious on the face of a complaint, however, a defendant can raise that defense in a motion to dismiss.") (citing Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 177 F.3d 1126, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1999)).

That said, "a complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim." Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint, except for legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court must then determine, based on the complaint's factual allegations, "whether the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint." Huynh v.

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Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

ERISA's 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) provides that the administrator of a benefits plan "shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of [plan documents]."³ In turn, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) provides that if an administrator fails to comply with such request within thirty days, the court has discretion to hold the administrator liable for up to $100 a day:

Any administrator . . . who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary . . . by mailing the material requested to the last known address of the requesting participant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper.

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Section 1132 does not provide its own statute of limitation, and as a result, "courts must apply the most analogous statute of limitation under state law." Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 438 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the parties agree that the most analogous statute of limitation under Hawaii law is Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 657-1, which provides a six-year statute of limitation for "personal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by the laws of the State." See Doc. No. 7, Def.'s Mot. at 5; Doc. No. 9, Pl.'s Opp'n at 13. The parties disagree, however, as to when Plaintiff's claim accrued.

Defendants argue that the court should follow the plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) to find that Plaintiff's claim accrued 30 days after Plaintiff made his January 2004 written request for Plan documents such that this action, filed over ten years later, is time-barred. The court agrees.

Based on the plain language of § 1132(c)(1), an ERISA claim for non-disclosure accrues when an administrator "fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary . . . within 30 days after such request." After thirty days, a claimant "know[s] of all the material facts relevant to [his § 1132(c)(1)] claim," and therefore is on notice to bring an action. Tritt v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan Adm'r, 2008 WL

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2228841, at *7 n.11 (D. Conn. May 27, 2008). And given this...