Reynolds v. State

David William Reynolds, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A21-0282

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

September 7, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Otter Tail County District Court File No. 56-CR-18-1322

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson Assistant County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey, Judge.

REYES JUDGE.

In this appeal from the postconviction court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that (1) he did not validly waive his constitutional right to counsel and (2) either probable cause did not support the search warrant to obtain his DNA, or police did not validly execute the search warrant, such that the district court erred by not suppressing the DNA evidence. Appellant also makes several arguments in his pro se brief. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant David William Reynolds kept 40 to 60 cats around his property near Deer Lake in Otter Tail County, Minnesota. Neighbors complained of excess feces from the cats on their properties and on the beach. The Otter Tail County Public Health Department worked with the Otter Tail County Humane Society (Humane Society) to set live traps on appellant's neighbors' properties, including near the cabin of M.L. and J.L., to remove the cats. Appellant strenuously objected to these efforts.

The Humane Society received an anonymous letter around July 5, 2017, objecting to its interference with "the Reynolds' cats." The letter stated essentially that the cats should roam free and threatened that "[i]f any of our cats don't come home, it will take 5 fire departments to put out the fire." A few weeks later, M.L. and J.L. returned to Deer Lake to find their deep fat fryer's propane tank next to their cabin with a char mark from the tank going up the side of the cabin.

A police detective investigated and hypothesized that appellant tried to burn down M.L.'s and J.L.'s cabin. As part of the investigation, the detective spoke with appellant who used the word "roam" when describing that he had heard of a federal law allowing cats to roam to hunt. The detective obtained and executed a search warrant for appellant's DNA for comparison to DNA from the propane tank. The detective collected insufficient DNA from the propane tank for testing, but DNA collected from the envelope containing the anonymous letter matched appellant's DNA. Based on this and other evidence, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant in an amended complaint with first-degree arson (count I), second-degree arson (count II), and three counts of felony animal cruelty (counts III-V).

Appellant appeared before five different district court judges in the course of this matter. At each proceeding, the district court asked appellant if he would represent himself. Each time, appellant indicated that he would. The district court advised him several times that he might benefit from having a lawyer. The prosecutor also discussed the risks of self-representation with appellant at least twice.

At a hearing early in the proceedings, the prosecutor expressed concern that count I could involve commitment to prison. The prosecutor discussed this with appellant and suggested that the district court appoint standby counsel. Appellant confirmed that he did not want an attorney "unless [the district court] can find a common law attorney." The district court responded that it cannot find him an attorney. It did not appoint standby counsel. The district court then explained appellant's offenses and the maximum penalties and suggested that appellant would benefit from having a lawyer given those offenses and penalties.

Appellant also completed two written waiver-of-counsel forms. On both forms, he stated that he never received or read the complaint and did not understand his charges. He listed no crimes where he could list his charges. However, on the first form, he checked answer boxes stating that he "read and understood" the benefits of representation, the disadvantages of self-representation, and other pretrial rights. Also on the first form, he wrote question marks by questions asking whether he understood the benefits of representation and his other pretrial rights. He wrote at the bottom of both forms that he is a freeborn, sovereign citizen.

Appellant represented himself at a jury trial in November 2018. The district court warned that he must follow the rules of court and that it would not give him much leeway. He said he understood, "so long as you understand that I'm a common law citizen and not . . . an equity court or corporation citizen." The state presented its witnesses and evidence, and appellant testified in his own defense. The jury found him guilty of all charges.

The district court convicted appellant and sentenced him to 48 months in prison on count I, 13 months on count III, 15 months on count IV, and 17 months on count V, but stayed execution of the sentences.^[1] Appellant later violated the conditions of the stay, and the district court executed the sentences. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. In January 2021, he filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the postconviction court, the same judge who presided over appellant's trial, denied. This appeal follows.

DECISION

A convicted person may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction "violated the person's rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state." Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing entitlement to relief by a preponderance of evidence. Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 2019). We review the denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we review legal issues de novo and the postconviction court's factual findings for clear error. Id.

I. Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

Appellant argues that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive his right to counsel because the district court did not advise him of the risks of self-representation. We are not persuaded.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. A criminal defendant's waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009). Before waiving the right to counsel, defendants should be advised of the risks of self-representation to ensure "[they] know what [they are] doing and [their] choice is made with eyes open." State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975)).

Defendants ordinarily must complete a written waiver of their right to counsel. Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) (stating that defendant must enter written waiver); Minn. Stat. § 611.19 (2020) ("[W]aiver shall in all instances be made in writing, signed by the defendant, except . . . if the defendant refuses to sign the written waiver."). Before accepting a waiver of counsel, the district court must advise the defendant of the following:

(a) nature of the charges;

(b) all offenses included within the charges; (c range of allowable punishments;

(d) there may be defenses;

(e) mitigating circumstances may exist; and

(f) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel, including the advantages and disadvantages of the decision to waive counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4); see also State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885-86 (Minn. 2012). However, whether the defendant's waiver is valid depends on the facts of each case and context of the entire record. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 889. Even if the district court fails to conduct an on-the-record waiver inquiry, we will not reverse when the circumstances, including the "background, experience, and conduct of the accused," demonstrate a valid waiver. Id. We review the postconviction court's finding of a valid waiver of counsel for clear error. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504; Pearson, 891 N.W.2d at 596.

Here while the district court's on-the-record inquiry covered much of the Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4), advisory, the inquiry did not discuss that "there may be defenses" or that "mitigating circumstances may exist" or some other "consequences of the waiver." Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4)(d)-(f); see Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 885-86 (requiring "comprehensive" inquiry). However, other circumstances show that appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived counsel, including appellant's background, experience, and conduct, Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d at 886, 889, and his opportunities to discuss waiving counsel with the prosecutor. Here, appellant has a college education. He has some experience with the justice system, including four criminal traffic matters and several civil property disputes. He has been represented by an attorney in prior matters and appears to have represented himself in a jury trial. Further, appellant engaged in disruptive conduct during several proceedings. He asserted that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him because he is a "sovereign citizen." He also interrupted and talked over the district court. This made it difficult for ...