Reynolds v. Willert Mfg. Co.

567 F.Supp.3d 553

Matthew REYNOLDS, Plaintiff,

v.WILLERT MFG. CO., LLC, Defendant.

No. 5:21-cv-01208

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed October 19, 2021

Steven Auerbach, Law Office of Steven T. Auerbach, Narberth, PA, Christopher David Mandracchia, Mandracchia Law, LLC, Skippack, PA, for Plaintiff.

Eileen Monaghan Ficaro, Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck LLP, Blue Bell, PA, Gregory S. Hyman, Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck LLP, Daniella Gordon, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 27 – Denied

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 29 – Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves a claim of wrongful termination by Plaintiff Matthew Reynolds against his former employer, Defendant Willert Mfg. Co., LLC. Reynolds claims that his termination from Willert violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act (PMMA). At the close of fact discovery, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on this sole claim in the Complaint.

Following a review of the factual record and the law governing PMMA claims, this Court concludes that Reynolds has failed to set forth facts sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Accordingly, Reynolds’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Willert's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 4, 2021, Reynolds initiated this action with the filing of a Complaint in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas. See Not. of. Removal ("Not."), ECF No. 1. On March 12, 2021, Willert removed the action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id. Willert filed its Answer to the Complaint on March 19, 2021. See Ans., ECF No. 3. At the close of fact discovery, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Pl.’s Mot. SJ, ECF No. 27; Def.’s Mot. SJ, ECF No. 29. Following a series of responses and replies, the motions are ready for review. See Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 30; Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 33; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 34.

III. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

From October 16, 2020 through November 5, 2020, Reynolds was employed by Willert as a maintenance manager. See Def.’s Stmt. Undis. Facts ("DSUF") ¶ 1, ECF No. 29-2; Pl.’s Stmt. Undis. Facts Resp. ("PSUF Resp.") ¶ 1, ECF No. 32. Reynolds’ offer of employment with Willert was contingent on the successful completion of a drug test. See DSUF ¶ 57; PSUF Resp. ¶ 57. On October 28, 2020, Reynolds underwent the drug test, and he tested positive for "D-THC-marijuana metabolite 50/15." See DSUF ¶ 61-62; PSUF Resp. ¶ 61-62. Following the positive result, the testing center's medical review officer (MRO) contacted Reynolds to inquire into the reasons behind the result. See DSUF ¶ 67; PSUF Resp. ¶ 67. Reynolds testified that he told the MRO that he was a medical marijuana patient. See DSUF ¶ 68; PSUF Resp. ¶ 68. Reynolds also indicates that he told the person who performed the drug screen that he was a medical marijuana patient. See DSUF ¶ 69; PSUF Resp. ¶ 69.

During his initial interview for the position, Reynolds did not disclose to Bryan Willert, part owner of Willert Mfg., that he was a medical marijuana patient. See DSUF ¶ 70; PSUF Resp. ¶ 70. Prior to starting work at Willert, Reynolds met with Bryan Willert and Jack Bonsky, the plant manager at Reynolds’ location; however, he did not disclose that he was a medical marijuana patient at that time. See DSUF ¶ 71-72; PSUF Resp. ¶ 71-72. Reynolds’ offer letter with Willert indicated that the offer was "contingent upon successful completion of a pre-employment drug test." See DSUF ¶ 73; PSUF Resp. ¶ 73. However, Reynolds did not disclose his medical marijuana status to anyone when he received that offer letter. See DSUF ¶ 74; PSUF Resp. ¶ 74.

On November 5, 2020, Reynolds was terminated from Willert. See DSUF ¶ 78; PSUF Resp. ¶ 78. On that date, Bonsky called Reynolds to read him the contents of the termination letter. See DSUF ¶ 79; PSUF Resp. ¶ 79. After Bonsky finished reading the letter, Reynolds told him that he was a medical marijuana patient. See DSUF ¶ 80; PSUF Resp. ¶ 80. Notwithstanding, Reynolds was terminated. See DSUF ¶ 78; PSUF Resp. ¶ 78.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Review of Applicable Law

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ; Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (stating that the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts"). The party opposing the motion must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

B. Wrongful Discharge under the PMMA – Review of Applicable Law

The PMMA provides, in relevant part, that

[n]o employer may discharge, threaten, refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges solely on the basis of such employee's status as an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.

35 P.S. § 10231.2103(b)(1).

However, the PMMA does not require "an employer to make any accommodation of the use of medical marijuana on the property or premises of any place of employment," nor does it limit "an employer's ability to discipline an employee for being under the influence of medical marijuana in the workplace or for working while under the influence of medical marijuana." See id. § 10231.2103(b)(2). Finally, the PMMA does not require an employer "to commit any act that would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf in violation of Federal law." See id. § 10231.2103(b)(3).

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the PMMA contains an implied private right of action for individuals who suffer an adverse employment action on account of their status as a certified user of medical marijuana. See Palmiter v. Commw. Health Sys., Inc. , 260 A.3d 967, 975–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021).

C. Agency Relationship – Review of Applicable Law

"Under Pennsylvania law, to establish the existence of an agency relationship, a party must show that: (1) there was a manifestation by the principal that the agent would act for it; (2) the agent accepted such an undertaking; and (3) the principal retained control of the endeavor." Rychel v. Yates , No. CIV.A. 09-1514, 2011 WL 1363751, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2011) (citing Castle Cheese, Inc. v. MS Produce, Inc. , Civ. A. No. 04-878, 2008 WL 4372856, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008) ). "The burden of establishing the existence of an agency relationship rests on the party making the assertion." See id. (citing Goodway Mktg., Inc. v. Faulkner Advert. Assocs., Inc. , 545 F. Supp. 263, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ).

"Agency results only if there is an agreement for the creation of a fiduciary relationship with control by the beneficiary." See eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advert., Inc. , 811 A.2d 10, 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (quoting Basile v. H & R Block , 563 Pa. 359, 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (2000) ); see also Walton v. Johnson , 66 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (noting courts "do not assume agency by a mere showing that one person does an act for another" (citing Ferry v. Fisher , 709 A.2d 399, 405 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) )).

V. ANALYSIS

Reynolds asserts that the undisputed facts show that his termination was motivated by his status as a medical marijuana patient, and accordingly, he seeks entry of judgment in his favor. On the other hand, Willert asserts that the uncontroverted facts indicate that the decision was not based on Reynolds’ status, and it similarly seeks entry of judgment in its favor. Very few courts have had the opportunity to mark the boundaries of an employment discrimination claim brought under the PMMA. Accordingly, this Court begins by reviewing the PMMA to determine what conduct it prohibits and to what extent that conduct must relate to the adverse employment action. Applying those principles to the undisputed facts of this matter, this Court concludes that a reasonable jury could not find that Reynolds was discriminated against solely on the basis of his status as a medical marijuana patient. For that reason, Reynolds’ motion is denied, and Willert's motion is granted.

A. The PMMA prohibits only that discrimination that is based solely on an individual's status as certified to use medical marijuana.

When sitting in diversity and reviewing a question of state law, as this Court does here, a...