Rhine v. First Baptist Dall. Church

TRACY RHINE, Plaintiff, v. FIRST BAPTIST DALLAS CHURCH, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:14-CV-3055-M-BH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

October 4, 2016

Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se in forma pauperis case has been automatically referred for full case management. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the case should be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Tracy Rhine (Plaintiff) filed suit against First Baptist Dallas Church (First Baptist), Ron Criswell, Walter King, and Officer Seidat Cruz (Defendants) on August 26, 2014. (See docs. 3 at 1;¹ 10 at 16-22.²) She alleges violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and several state law claims. (See docs. 3, 10.)

Plaintiff claims she is a "white female who is from a lower socio-economic class." (doc. 3 at 1.) On Sunday, August 26, 2012, she attended church at First Baptist as she did "every Sunday," although she was not a church member. (Id.) She observed an African American female panhandler and reported her to the head of security and a uniformed Dallas Police Officer who was working as security. (Id.) The head of security, Mr. King, was African American, and Officer Cruz wasHispanic. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Criswell was the director of First Baptist, and that Officer Cruz and Mr. King "were acting on the authority and direction" of Mr. Criswell and the church. (Id.)

After she reported the panhandler, Plaintiff alleges that she was singled out in retaliation by Mr. King and Officer Cruz. (Id.) She "was followed and humiliated by [Officer Cruz] at the direction of [Mr. King]." (docs. 3 at 1; 10 at 20.) Additionally, Officer Cruz "ordered [Plaintiff] to relinquish her private property[, her bag,] or she could not attend church services," stating, "Hey you, you can't enter service with that bag," ordered her to hand over bag as she was entering the church service, and "snatched the bag away from [her] grasp and stalked off." (doc. 10 at 20-21.) Following the service, when she attempted to retrieve her bag, Plaintiff alleges that she was told by Mr. King not to return. (Id. at 20-21.) Since the incident, Plaintiff "suffered social anxiety and lost faith in fellowship." (doc. 3 at 1.) She also"fear[s] approaching churches and church members for fear of being shunned due to [her] being of a lower socio-economic back ground [sic]." (Id.) She seeks $100,000 in compensatory and special damages, and $200,000 in general and punitive damages from Defendants. (doc. 10 at 21.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, her complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to "raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Mere "labels and conclusions" nor "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" suffice to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.

III. SECTION 1983

Plaintiff sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. (docs. 3 at 1; 10 at 16-18.)

Section 1983 "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). It "afford[s] redress for violations of federal statutes, as well as of constitutional norms." Id. A plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005).

A. Officer Cruz

Federal courts within Texas have previously found "[a]n off-duty police officer employed as a private security guard [is] considered a 'state actor' for purposes of section 1983 liability." Smith v. Machorro, No. 3-07-CV-1547-BD, 2008 WL 656500, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008)(citing Salazar v. Luty, 761 F. Supp. 45, 47 (S.D. Tex. 1991)). "[P]olice involvement in support of legitimate private property rights does not convert a private property owner's actions into state action," however. Sw. Cmty. Res., Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1250 (D.N.M. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest Home, 667 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1981)). "[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1971) (emphasis in original); accord Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73, 81 (5th Cir. 1973); Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 135 (3rd Cir. 1975). "Private actors are typically not subject to its constraints, and owners of private property are generally permitted to exclude strangers without First Amendment limitations." Rodriguez v. Winski, 973 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513-21; Kalfus v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 476 F. App'x 877, 879 (2d Cir. 2012) ("In the absence of any government nexus to the challenged action, however, the First Amendment does not prevent a property owner from restricting press access to private property.")).

As with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a private party's search or seizure of property does not automatically violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Shield, 117 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1997). "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). A "seizure" of property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). "A search or seizure by a private party doesnot implicate the Fourth Amendment," however, unless the private party is acting as an "instrument or agent" of the government. Shield, 117 F.3d at 325 (emphasis added) (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-22 (1984)); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487). A federal circuit court addressing a private carrier's search of a package and Fourth Amendment violations considered "whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct and whether the private party's purpose in conducting the search was to assist law enforcement agents or to further [its] own ends." Koenig, 856 F.2d at 847 (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is not a member of First Baptist, but an "invitee."³ (docs. 3 at 1; 10 at 16.) She does not allege that the church met on public property, that she was excluded from public property, or that she was even excluded from church services on August 26, 2012. (docs. 3, 10.) She alleges that she was treated different from "other church goers" because she was "not dressed as nicely as other church goers" and was not a member of the church. (doc. 10 at 20.) She further alleges that because she was not a member of the church, Officer Cruz—who was working as security for the church—told her that she could not enter the church service with her bag. (docs. 3 at 1; 10 at 20-21.) Officer Cruz took Plaintiff's bag and then apparently allowed her to retrieve it after the service. (doc. 10 at 21.) Because she was on private property and she alleges that her treatment by Officer Cruz, as security for the church, was based on First Baptist's policies and her status as a non-member, Plaintiff has not alleged that she was deprived of a right securedby the Constitution and the laws of the United States by a state actor. Accordingly, she fails to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted against Officer Cruz.

B. Private Parties

Plaintiff also sues First Baptist and Messrs. Criswell and King. (doc. 10 at 16-17.)

In some circumstances, a private party may be acting "under color of state law" and held liable under § 1983. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1989). Additionally, a private party can be held to be a state actor under only three circumstances, (1) where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the private party so that the action of the party may be fairly treated as that of the state itself, (2) where the private party has exercised powers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state," or (3) where the state has exercised coercive power or has...