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CHAPTER 41
RHODE ISLAND
A. Scope of the Statute and Elements of a Cause of Action
The Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act
(the Act)1 prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”2 To maintain a
cause of action under the Act, “a plaintiff must establish that he or she is
a consumer, and that defendant is committing or has committed an unfair
or deceptive act while engaged in a business of trade or commerce.”3 As
discussed below, the scope of the Act is limited by: (1) prohibiting all
private and class actions to those instances involving “purchases or leases
[of] goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes”;4 and (2) exempting all transactions permitted by federal and
state regulation.5
A plaintiff can demonstrate consumer status for purposes of the Act
when he or she can allege a vendor-consumer relationship.6 While the Act
does not define “consumer,” it has been held that “a common sense
understanding of the word [encompasses] economic activities like
1. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 through 6-13.1-27. The sho rt title is “Unfair
Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act.” Id. § 6-13.1-11. Courts,
thus, occasionally use the acronym UTPCPA. See, e.g., Long v. Dell
Comp. Corp., 2007 WL 2463742, at *2 (R.I. Super. 2007); cf. Kelley v.
Cowesett Hills Assocs., 768 A.2d 425, 431 (R.I. 2001) (referencing the
short title, yet referring to it as “the Act”). Other courts, however, pr efer
the acronym DTPA, abbreviating the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, albeit for the same range of statutes. See Park v. Ford Motor
Co., 844 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 2004). For purposes of this treatise, the term
“the Act” is used when referencing the Unfair Trade Practice and
Consumer Protection Act.
2. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-2.
3. Kelley, 768 A.2d at 431 (concluding a tenant was not a consumer for
purposes of bringing claims under the Act that possibly could have been
brought as a breach of the lease agreement).
4. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(a); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL
1515942, at *8 (R.I. Super. 2015) (holding a mortgage loan is not in the
category of goods or services and hence the subject matter of the statu te is
inapplicable).
5. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-4.
6. Laccinole v. Appriss, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 3d 499, 506 (D.R.I. 2020).
