Rhodes v. State, s. A13–0560

875 N.W.2d 779

Thomas Daniel RHODES, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

Nos. A13–0560

A15–0136.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 17, 2016.

David T. Schultz, Jesse D. Mondry, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, MN; and Julie Jonas, Marie Wolf, Innocence Project of Minnesota, Saint Louis Park, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, State Attorney General, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

On July 29, 1998, appellant Thomas Daniel Rhodes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2014), and sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment, Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a) ; see also Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. 4 (1996). This is our fourth review of this case. See Rhodes v. State (Rhodes III ), 735 N.W.2d 315 (Minn.2007) ; State v. Rhodes (Rhodes II ), 657 N.W.2d 823 (Minn.2003) ; State v. Rhodes (Rhodes I ), 627 N.W.2d 74 (Minn.2001). The present appeal arises from the summary denial of Rhodes's third and fourth petitions for postconviction relief. The issue presented in this appeal is whether the postconviction statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014), bars these petitions. We hold that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying relief because Rhodes's petitions for postconviction relief were untimely under the postconviction statute of limitations.

I.

On the night of August 2, 1996, Rhodes and his wife took a boat ride on Green Lake, near Spicer.¹ Rhodes returned to shore and told police that his wife accidentally fell overboard. Approximately 13 hours later, his wife's body was found floating near shore. The cause of her death was drowning. Following a police investigation, Rhodes was indicted by a grand jury for first- and second-degree murder. Rhodes pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial.

At trial, the State argued that Rhodes forced his wife overboard with a blow to the neck, struck her with the boat multiple times, and subsequently lied to police about the location of her drowning. Dr. Michael McGee, a medical expert for the State, testified in relevant part that the victim "received some type of trauma to the outer surface of the skin in the neck area ... with enough force to cause breakage of blood vessels." When asked if that external neck trauma could "have been done with a hand, in particular a hand used ... in the V position," Dr. McGee replied, "I believe that is possible, yes." He also testified that the injuries on both sides of the victim's face could have been caused by multiple strikes from the hull of a boat. By contrast, defense expert Dr. Lindsey Thomas opined that the injuries to both sides of the victim's face were caused by blood that had drained into her face from a forehead injury.

There was disagreement at trial among the experts regarding the drowning location and, specifically, when the victim's body could have been expected to resurface given the lake conditions. Captain William Chandler testified that, if the victim's body "had sunk in Minnesota lake water approximately 40 feet deep," which was the depth of the drowning location on Green Lake that Rhodes reported to police, it would have taken "three to four weeks" for the victim's body to resurface. Captain Chandler testified that, "starting about 30 feet on down, the bottom temperature of any Minnesota lake year round is about 39 degrees." He explained that this cold temperature slows the decomposition rate of a drowned body, which lengthens the time period for a body to resurface. Defense expert Dale Morry testified that water temperature varies from lake to lake depending on the depth of the lake, the size of the lake, and the above-surface temperature, but "as a ‘rule of thumb’ a person who drowned in 40 feet of water would resurface in five to eight days." The testimony from Captain Chandler and defense expert Morry supported the State's theory that Rhodes lied about the location of the drowning, because the victim's body was found floating near the shore approximately 13 hours after she allegedly fell overboard.

The jury found Rhodes guilty of first- and second-degree murder. Rhodes filed a direct appeal, which we stayed to allow him time to file a postconviction petition. Rhodes I, 627 N.W.2d at 81. In his first postconviction petition, Rhodes asserted an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, alleging that his trial counsel failed to sufficiently cross-examine Dr. McGee and object to his testimony, and failed to present available medical evidence to counter Dr. McGee's testimony. Rhodes also asserted a newly-discovered-evidence claim consisting of recent medical articles related to drowning forensics. Attached to his petition, Rhodes submitted an affidavit from Dr. John Plunket, a forensic pathologist. Dr. Plunket opined that the internal hemorrhaging in the victim's neck probably occurred "during the process of drowning and the struggle for survival." Id. at 82. The postconviction court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 83. Rhodes appealed. In Rhodes I, we consolidated Rhodes's direct and postconviction appeals. We rejected Rhodes's evidentiary challenges, stayed the consolidated appeal, and remanded to the postconviction court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 85–86, 88–89.

Drs. Wright, McGee, Thomas, and Plunket testified at the evidentiary hearing. Dr. Ronald Wright testified that the hemorrhaging in the victim's neck could have been caused by some kind of pressure to the throat but, equally as likely, could have been caused during the drowning process. Dr. McGee reaffirmed his trial testimony. And Drs. Thomas and Plunket testified that based on their review of recent medical articles, they believed the hemorrhaging in the victim's neck that occurred during the drowning process or postmortem was a result of hypostasis or a breaking of rigor mortis. The postconviction court subsequently denied Rhodes's request for postconviction relief, concluding that the trial counsel's performance was not objectively unreasonable and that the alleged newly discovered medical evidence did not warrant a new trial. We then vacated our stay of Rhodes's consolidated appeal. Rhodes II, 657 N.W.2d at 839.

In Rhodes II, we held that the evidence was sufficient to support Rhodes's conviction. The evidence included witnesses who saw a boat zigzagging and heard yelling from its occupants; inconsistencies in Rhodes's statements; physical evidence that the victim's body could not have sunk at the location marked by Rhodes and resurfaced in 13 hours; the discovery of the victim's body nine-tenths of a mile from that location marked by Rhodes; motive evidence including life insurance proceeds, household debt, and Rhodes's extramarital affair; and medical testimony that the victim's head injuries were consistent with multiple strikes by a boat and her neck injuries were caused by external pressure. See Rhodes II, 657 N.W.2d at 829–32, 839–42.

Our decision in Rhodes II also affirmed the denial of Rhodes's first postconviction petition. 657 N.W.2d at 846. We held that the performance by Rhodes's trial counsel was not objectively unreasonable.

Id. at 843. We also concluded that even if the new medical literature offered by Rhodes "present[ed] ground-breaking research," id. at 846, it failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the Rainer newly-discovered-evidence test, which requires a showing that the newly discovered evidence "will probably produce either an acquittal at a retrial or a result more favorable to the petitioner." Id. at 845 (quoting Race v. State, 417 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn.1987) ); see Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.1997). On this point, we concluded:

This allegedly newly available medical evidence does not diminish the circumstantial evidence heard and considered by the jury. There was sufficient evidence independent of the medical evidence, including physical and motive evidence, testimony as to Rhodes' conduct, and inconsistencies in Rhodes' statements, to conclude that [the victim's] death was a premeditated homicide.... Rhodes has not established ... that [this evidence] would probably produce an acquittal or a result more favorable to him on retrial.

Id. at 846 (emphasis added). Consequently, we held that "the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Rhodes is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered medical evidence." Id.

Three years after his direct appeal was final, Rhodes filed his second petition for postconviction relief. This petition alleged in part that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of lake conditions that purportedly explained why his wife's body was found almost nine-tenths of a mile from where he told searchers that he had last seen her. The postconviction court summarily denied the second petition, and we affirmed its decision. Rhodes III, 735 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Minn.2007). In doing so, we explained that "Rhodes ha[d] not shown that the information about the ‘uneven bottom’ of the lake was not available to him or his counsel during his trial or that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to a lack of diligence." Id.

In 2007, shortly after we released our decision in Rhodes III, the 2–year statute of limitations for Rhodes to petition for postconviction relief expired. See Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2014) ("No petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal."); Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1098 (providing that if a person's conviction became final before the statute's effective date of August...