Rice ex rel. Estate of Rice v. Bituminous Cas. Corp.

666 F.Supp.3d 674

Linda RICE, ON BEHALF OF the ESTATE OF Marlin D. RICE, Plaintiff,Linda Rice, Intervenor, v. BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORP., Defendant.

No. 6:21-cv-00173-REW-HAI

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division. London

Signed March 31, 2023

Evan Barret Smith, AppalReD Legal Aid, Prestonsburg, KY, for Plaintiff/Intervenor.

Mark Solomons, Pro Hac Vice, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Washington, DC, Matthew J. Zanetti, Ferreri Partners, PLLC, Louisville, KY, for Defendant.

ORDER

Robert E. Wier, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiff Linda Rice's motion for summary judgment (See DE 19) and Defendant Bituminous Casualty Corporation's cross-motion for summary judgment (See DE 22). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

a) Factual Background

This tale began in September of 2002, when Marlin D. Rice¹ filed a claim to receive black lung benefits under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act with the United States Department of Labor. See DE 1 at 3 (Complaint). Mr. Rice, a former coal miner, worked in Harlan County, Kentucky for Karst Robbins Coal Company. Id. See also DE 19 (Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment). Defendant Bituminous Casualty Corporation is a corporation that was organized in Illinois. See DE 1 at 2. Defendant, as to relevant subject matter, insures Karst Robbins Coal Company. Id. Upon review, the district director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP), who administers the Black Lung Benefits Act, found that Mr. Rice was not entitled to receive benefits "because although he had established the existence of complicated pneumoconiosis and total disability, he was unable to establish that his disease was caused by coal mine work." Id. at 3. Mr. Rice would ultimately file four subsequent requests for modification. Id. The first request was denied in April 2005. Id. The second request was never adjudicated. Id.

Mr. Rice filed his third request on September 24, 2007. The district director treated Mr. Rice's third request for modification as a subsequent claim. Id. He found Mr. Rice established all of the elements necessary for entitlement and issued a Proposed Decision and Order. Id. See also, DE 19-1 (District Director's Proposed Decision and Order). Mr. Rice was awarded $17,247.40, representing benefits that accrued up to and including September 2007, and monthly payments of $1,022.60 for future benefits. See DE 19-1 at 2. Afterwards, Defendant requested a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). See DE 1 at 3-4. ALJ Paul Johnson treated Mr. Rice's third request as a subsequent claim and denied Mr. Rice's claim for benefits. Id. at 4. Mr. Rice appealed the denial to the Benefits Review Board ("BRB"), who then vacated the denial. Id. The BRB held that the claim should be treated as a request for modification rather than a subsequent claim. Id. The case was remanded back to ALJ Johnson, who reaffirmed his denial of benefits. Id.

Mr. Rice finally found recourse with his fourth, and final, request for modification, filed on October 23, 2013. Id. Mr. Rice's initial request was denied by the district director, but after Mr. Rice requested a formal hearing, ALJ Daniel Solomon issued an order awarding Mr. Rice benefits on August 1, 2017. Id. See also, DE 19-2 (ALJ Solomon's Decision and Order). ALJ Solomon found that Karst Robbins Coal Company is the responsible operator and Defendant is the correct carrier. See DE 19-2 at 11. After evaluating Mr. Rice's chest x-ray and CT scan evidence, ALJ Solomon found that Mr. Rice had established the existence of complicated pneumoconiosis. Id. at 31. As such, Mr. Rice was entitled to the presumption that his complicated pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment. Id. Further, based on a review of opinions from three different doctors, ALJ Solomon found that Mr. Rice was totally disabled due to coal worker's pneumoconiosis (CWP). Id. at 38. Mr. Rice was awarded benefits dating back to August 2006, when he established disability. Id.

ALJ Solomon's Decision and Order became effective on September 6, 2017. See DE 1 at 4. Following the decision, the District Director issued a computation of benefits owed. Id. See also, DE 19-3 (Computation of Benefits). Per the prior Order, the computation letter specified that Defendant commence monthly payments of $976.40 to Mr. Rice, beginning in September 2017, payable on or around October 15, 2017. See DE 19-3 at 1. The computation tabulated retroactive benefits, under the Order, at $123,139.20 for the period of August 2006 through September 2007 and for the period of October 2008 through September 2017. Id. Further, the computation notified Defendant of the specifics of the reimbursement to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ("Trust Fund"), the sum of $12,500.70 for interim benefits paid to Mr. Rice from October 2007 through September 2008. Defendant, which had appealed the ALJ decision on August 25, 2017, failed to make any payments to Mr. Rice. See DE 1 at 5; DE 17 at 3 (Answer).

Defendant appealed ALJ Solomon's Decision and Order. See DE 1 at 5. During the appeal, Defendant continued to refuse to make any payments to Mr. Rice. Id. First, Defendant appealed the Decision and Order to the BRB. Id. The BRB affirmed ALJ Solomon's Order and denied Defendant' subsequent motion for reconsideration. Id. Defendant then appealed to the Sixth Circuit. See DE 22 (Defendant' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment). The Sixth Circuit affirmed ALJ Solomon's Order and issued a mandate. Id. at 4. See also DE 1 at 5. Afterwards, the district director issued another computation of benefits, recalculating Mr. Rice's retroactive benefits of $123,883.20, in addition to monthly payments of $1,040.40. See DE 1 at 5-6. The computation detailed the Trust Fund recoupment of $52,696.70. Id. at 6. On February 4, 2021, Defendant paid Mr. Rice the $123,833.20 in retroactive benefits and began making monthly payments of $1,040.40. Id. at 6. A few months later, the district director detailed the interest obligation, in Mr. Rice's favor, totaling $65,44378. Id. See also DE 19-4 (District Director's Interest Calculation). After Defendant challenged the interest calculations, the interest amount was confirmed by the U.S. Department of Labor. See DE 22 at 5; DE 19-5 (Letter from District Director). Defendant has not paid Mr. Rice, nor his estate, any of the ordered interest or any additional compensation for unpaid benefits. See DE 19 at 4.

b) Procedural History

On October 6, 2021, Mr. Rice sued Defendant to enforce payment and receive additional compensation and interest from and triggered by Defendant's late payment of the benefits awarded to him. See DE 1 (Complaint). On May 6, 2022, Mr. Rice filed a motion for summary judgment. See DE 19 (Motion for Summary Judgment). Mr. Rice asked the Court to enjoin Defendant to pay: (1) 20% additional compensation based on untimely payment of retroactive benefits and prospective monthly payments; (2) interest on unpaid retroactive benefits and late monthly benefits; and (3) interest on the 20% additional compensation. Id. at 19. Defendant responded, see DE 23, and filed a cross motion for summary judgment, see DE 22. Both motions, now fully briefed, are ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff's and Defendant's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

a) Jurisdiction

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) gives federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce properly made and served final orders awarding benefits under the act. 33 U.S.C. § 921(d) ("If the court determines that the order was made and served in accordance with law, and that such employer or his officers or agents have failed to comply therewith, the court shall enforce obedience to the order[.]"). The LHWCA's procedures are largely incorporated into the Black Lung Benefits Act via 30 U.S.C. § 932(a); this includes § 921(d). Thacker on behalf of Estate of Clevenger v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 416 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660 (E.D. Ky. 2019) ("33 U.S.C. § 921(d) is incorporated by reference into the BLBA.").

Notably, the Court has a cabined role under § 921(d), that of enforcement. The statute directs scrutiny of whether the compensation order "was made and served in accordance with law." If so, and if the employer and its agents have not complied, enforcement is a mandate. Thus,

It is clear from the statutory scheme that our enforcement powers under s 921(d) . . . are not of substantive dimension. That is to say s 921(d) reposes in this court the responsibility of screening compensation orders for procedural defects and thus affording responsible employers a measure of procedural due process before enforcement can be effected.

Marshall v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 432 F. Supp. 935, 939 (W.D. Pa. 1977); see also Grimm v. Vortex Marine Constr., 921 F.3d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that the statute gives district courts no jurisdiction "over the merits of the litigation," that a district court "cannot affirm, modify, suspend, or set aside the order" but that "jurisdiction extends only to the enforcement of compensation orders") (quoting Thompson v. Potashnick Const. Co., 812 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1987)). While not in the cross motion for summary judgment, Defendant stated in that it "denies . . . that [the ALJ's findings] were correct, either legally or factually[.]" See DE 8 at 2. The Court will not evaluate the merits of the Order, rather, the Court will evaluate whether the Order is enforceable and has been complied with by Defendant.

b) Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute exists, the Court considers all facts and draws all inferences in...