Rice v. Cecil Cnty.

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CRYSTAL RICE, Plaintiff, v. CECIL COUNTY, MARYLAND, et. al., Defendants.

Civ. No. MJM-23-2344

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 27, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Matthew J. Maddox, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Crystal Rice (“Plaintiff”), in her individual capacity and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Cynthia Rice (“Ms. Rice”), brings this action against defendants Cecil County, Maryland (“Cecil County”); PrimeCare Medical, Inc. (“Prime Care”); Scott Adams, Sheriff of Cecil County (“Sheriff Adams”); sixteen named individual deputy sheriffs who served as custody officers at Cecil County Detention Center (“CCDC”); seven named individual employees of PrimeCare; and a number of unnamed individual custody officers at CCDC and employees of PrimeCare (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 1 (Compl.). Plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress wrongful death, respondeat superior, and indemnification. See generally id. Plaintiff's claims arise out of Ms. Rice's death from opioid withdrawal while in custody at CCDC. Id. ¶¶ 77-78.

Cecil County, Sheriff Adams, and eleven of the named deputy sheriffs (collectively, the “Custody Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery. ECF No. 24. PrimeCare filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 30.^[1] Ms. Rice filed responses to both motions. ECF Nos. 38, 39. The Custody Defendants replied. ECF No. 42.

A hearing is not necessary to resolve the pending motions. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the following reasons, the Court shall grant in part and deny in part the Custody Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and grant PrimeCare's Motion to Dismiss.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CCDC is a detention facility located in Elkton, Cecil County, Maryland. ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. Sheriff Adams “was and is responsible for the care and custody of the detainees and inmates at CCDC ” Id. ¶ 26. PrimeCare, a Pennsylvania corporation, is a contract provider of medical services to detainees housed in CCDC. Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.

On August 28, 2020, Cynthia Rice was arrested and detained in Cecil County. Id. ¶ 58. Ms. Rice was booked into CCDC at 11:09 p.m. Id. ¶ 60. During her booking, she informed the staff, including both deputy sheriffs and PrimeCare employees, that she was suffering from opiate withdrawal and rheumatoid arthritis. Id. ¶¶ 12, 61. At her intake medical screening a few hours after her booking, medical staff noted that Ms. Rice was listed as a heroin addict and had suffered heroin withdrawal during previous incarcerations. Id. ¶¶ 65a, 65h. Ms. Rice indicated that she used four bags of heroin a day, seven days a week. Id. ¶ 65i. The medical staff also found that Ms. Rice showed signs of depression; was anxious, panicked, afraid, or angry; appeared to be on a drug at the time of the screening; and had poor gums and teeth. Id. ¶¶ 65c-65d, 65j. Ms. Rice informed the staff in her screening that she consented to be treated and felt body aches but did not have a fever. Id. ¶¶ 65k-65l. During her intake screening, Ms. Rice experienced high blood pressure. Id. ¶ 67. She was placed on a “high priority” detox check appointment and was taken back to her cell at around 3:00 a.m. on August 29. Id. ¶¶ 68-69.

At around 9:00 a.m. on August 29, someone at CCDC put in an order for an opioid detox and clonidine for Ms. Rice. Id. ¶ 70. At 9:52 a.m., Ms. Rice reported being in pain to a level of ten out of ten and was prescribed blood pressure medication. Id. ¶ 72. Despite her intake screening indicating she would need a detox appointment, Ms. Rice was not given any medication for her withdrawal while in CCDC, nor was she given the prescribed blood pressure medication. Id. ¶¶ 71, 74. Throughout the morning of August 29, Ms. Rice remained in pain, screaming, and writhing around in her cell, but received no assistance from custody staff or medical staff. Id. ¶ 75. Instead, “medical and custody staff . . . told her to ‘shut up' while she winced in pain.” Id. ¶ 9. At 12:30 p.m., a deputy found Ms. Rice unresponsive in her cell, and she was later pronounced dead from opioid withdrawal. Id. ¶¶ 63, 77-78.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action on her own behalf and as personal representative for Ms. Rice's estate on August 25, 2023. ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges eight counts against the various defendants: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, against Custody Defendants, PrimeCare, and certain PrimeCare employees (“Count I”); (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy and practice of denial of medical care, against Cecil County and PrimeCare (“Count II”); (3) violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, against all Defendants (“Count III”); (4) negligence, against Custody Defendants (“Count IV”); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, against all Defendants (“Count V”); (6) wrongful death, against all Defendants (“Count VI”); (7) respondeat superior, against Cecil County and PrimeCare (“Count VII”); and (8) indemnification, against Cecil County and PrimeCare (“Count VIII”). See generally ECF No. 1.

On December 27, 2023, Custody Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery. ECF No. 24. On February 12, 2024, PrimeCare filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. ECF No. 30. Ms. Rice filed responses to both motions on May 17, 2024. ECF Nos. 38, 39. On June 18, 2024, Custody Defendants replied. ECF No. 42.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations” to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), but it must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). A complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. “[T]ender[ing] ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement'” does not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (second alteration in Iqbal).

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). At the same time, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” the defendant's liability for the alleged wrong and the plaintiff's entitlement to the remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).

Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). However, a court may consider matters outside the pleadings attached to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” but “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id.

The Fourth Circuit “has articulated two requirements for proper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: (1) notice and (2) a reasonable opportunity for discovery.” Canty v. Corcoran, Civ. No GLR-18-1404, 2022 WL 899278, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2022) (citing Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of...