Rice v. City of N.Y.

275 F.Supp.3d 395

Geoffrey RICE and Ophelia Rice, Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK; The New York City Police Department; NYPD Lt. David Goldstein; NYPD Officer Darrell Shannon; NYPD Officer Glenda Holloman; NYPD Officer Christos Drakakis; Willoughby Court Apartments L.P. ; Shinda Management Corporation; Vanessa Peterson ; Kenneth P. Mintz; Jesse R. Baker; Neil D. Sonnenfeldt ; Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, LLP; Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C.; and Moses Ginsberg, Defendants.

15–CV–3928 (WFK) (MDG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed July 26, 2017

Philip Jay Dinhofer, Philip J. Dinhofer, LLC, Rockville Centre, NY, for Plaintiff.

Melanie Mary Speight, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, Evan Edward Richards, Law Offices Baker Greenspan & Bernstein, Robert L. Bernstein, Jr., Baker Greenspan & Bernstein, Esqs., Bellmore, NY, Greg Mann, Jacqueline K. Siegel, Kenneth Adam Novikoff, Rivkin Radler, LLP, Uniondale, NY, for Defendants.

The City of New York Police Department, pro se.

John Doe Goldstein, pro se.

Shannon Richard Doe, pro se.

DECISION & ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:

Geoffrey and Ophelia Rice ("Plaintiffs") bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983¹ and New York law against the City of New York; the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"); NYPD Officers David Goldstein, Darrell Shannon, Glenda Holloman, and Christos Drakakis; Vanessa Peterson; Willoughby Court Apartments L.P. ("WCA"); Shinda Management Corporation ("SMC"); Kenneth P. Mintz; Jesse R. Baker; Neil D. Sonnenfeldt; Moses Ginsberg; Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, LLP; and Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C. (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiffs assert claims of (1) unlawful arrest, unlawful search, and excessive force, as well as deprivations of their property without due process of law and their right to the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2) negligence under New York law; (3) unlawful discriminatory practices, in violation of the New York Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. ; (4) unlawful discriminatory practices, in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–101 et seq. ; (5) assault under New York law; (6) false arrest under New York law; (7–8) loss of services under New York law, derivatively by Mrs. and Mr. Rice, respectively; and (9) attorney misconduct, in violation of section 487 of the New York Judiciary Law, and seek compensatory and punitive damages totaling $822,000,000.00, as well as interest, costs, and attorneys' fees. These claims arise from events surrounding Plaintiffs' landlords' entry into Plaintiffs' apartment pursuant to a New York City Housing Court ("Housing Court") order, and assisted by NYPD officers, to perform maintenance against Plaintiffs' wishes. Kenneth P. Mintz; Jesse R. Baker; Neil D. Sonnenfeldt; Moses Ginsberg; Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, LLP; and Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C. (together, the "Gutman Defendants") now move for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Specifically, they seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against them with prejudice and to dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims against them without prejudice. For the reasons that follow, the Gutman Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND²

This action arises primarily out of a dispute between Plaintiffs, their landlords (WCA and SMC), and their building managing agent (Ms. Peterson), concerning attempts by WCA, SMC, and Ms. Peterson (together, the "Willoughby Defendants") to gain access to Plaintiffs' apartment for the purpose of performing heating, ventilation, and air conditioning ("HVAC") work therein. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10–11,13, 20. Relevant here, it also concerns certain actions of the Gutman Defendants, who were engaged by the Willoughby Defendants to obtain a Housing Court order permitting them entry into Plaintiffs' apartment and to represent them in a lawsuit against Plaintiffs. See id. ¶¶ 13a-o, 20–21.

On April 1, 2014, the Willoughby Defendants, through the Gutman Defendants, filed an order to show cause and a verified petition in Housing Court seeking a preliminary injunction permitting them access to Plaintiffs' apartment for the purpose of performing the above-mentioned HVAC work. See id. ¶ 20. According to the Amended Complaint, the proposed order also contained a provision for a temporary restraining order granting the Willoughby Defendants "more immediate" access to Plaintiffs' apartment, but it did not include a formal application for such an order or supporting documentation.³ See id. ¶¶ 21–22. Nevertheless, on April 2, 2014, the Housing Court judge signed the proposed order as presented, including the temporary restraining order, without conducting a hearing.⁴ See id. ¶ 22.

On April 4, 2014, Ms. Peterson arrived at Plaintiffs' apartment, accompanied by HVAC construction workers and NYPD Officers Goldstein, Shannon, Holloman, and Drakakis. See id. ¶¶ 23–25. According to the Amended Complaint, Ms. Peterson had summoned the officers at the instruction of the Gutman Defendants; Plaintiffs do not allege, however, that the Gutman Defendants were present at the apartment that day or include any details of conversations between the Gutman Defendants and any other of the Defendants. See id. ¶ 25. After producing a copy of the Housing Court's order to show cause, the police officers and HVAC workers then "forcibly" entered the apartment against Plaintiffs' wishes. See id. ¶¶ 26, 29. Once inside, the police officers allegedly committed various constitutional violations and state law torts, including unlawful arrest, unlawful seizure, and excessive force. See id. ¶¶ 26–39, 41.

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on July 6, 2015, see ECF No. 1, and an Amended Complaint on December 24, 2015, see ECF No. 21. On August 5, 2016, the Gutman Defendants filed a fully briefed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. See Def. Br., ECF No. 42–1; Pl. Resp., ECF No. 42–4; Def. Reply, ECF No. 42–6.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(c) provides that, "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by "the same standard" as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayden v. Paterson , 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Rowley , 569 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) ). Thus, the Court must accept all of the non-movant's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a party must plead sufficient factual allegations "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. As such, the Complaint must include "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "A grant of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is proper ‘if, from the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Dargahi v. Honda Lease Trust , 370 Fed.Appx. 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Int'l Union , 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) ).

"On a 12(c) motion, the court considers ‘the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.’ " L–7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC , 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Roberts v. Babkiewicz , 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) ). The Court may also review any document incorporated by reference in one of the pleadings, see Sira v. Morton , 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004), or any document not specifically incorporated by reference but on which the Complaint relies and which is integral to it, see Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims

The Gutman Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims should be dismissed as against them because they are private parties and Plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead either state action or a § 1983 conspiracy claim. The Court agrees.

Under § 1983, "constitutional torts are only actionable against state actors or private parties acting ‘under color’ of state law." Betts v. Shearman , 751 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ciambriello v. County of Nassau , 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) ). By virtue of this requirement, " § 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’ " Am. Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky , 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) ). Accordingly, "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. , 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) ; cf. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 941 F.2d 1292, 1295–96 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state action.’ "). For the purposes of § 1983,

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