Rich v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

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ANTHONY E. RICH, Plaintiff, v. META PLATFORMS, INC.; MARK ZUCKERBERG; JENNIFER NEWSTEAD; and ANDREW BOSWORTH, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-11956-FDS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

December 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS

F Dennis Saylor IV Chief Judge.

This case is about a disabled Facebook account. Plaintiff Anthony Rich, proceeding pro se, brought this action against defendants Meta Platforms, Inc., Mark Zuckerberg, Jennifer Newstead, and Andrew Bosworth, seeking to restore his personal profile, amend Facebook's content-flagging and appeal procedures, and obtain damages. The first amended complaint alleged breach of contract against Meta (Count One) and negligence against all defendants (Count Two).

The Court entered a notice of default against defendants following the filing of executed summonses and the failure of defendants to plead or otherwise defend within the allotted time frame. Defendants allege that service was improper. They have moved to vacate the default and dismiss the suit with prejudice for insufficient service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and as barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. For the following reasons, the entry of default will be vacated, and the amended complaint will be dismissed.

I. Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the first amended complaint.

A. Factual Background

Meta Platforms, Inc., is the owner and operator of Facebook, a global social media platform. (FAC ¶ II(b)(i)). Anthony Rich is a resident of Massachusetts who alleges that he has been actively using Facebook since 2004. (Id. ¶¶ II(a)(i), IV(a)).

Sometime in 2010 or 2011, Rich started a business under the name Event Horizon Solutions, a fitness and nutrition digital-media company that relies heavily on Facebook. (Id. ¶ IV(1)). The complaint alleges that he amassed more than 160,000 followers on Facebook, using the site for communicating with friends and clients, live-streaming, hosting a podcast, and posting or reposting content. (Id.). He became a “Level-Up Creator,” and used a Facebook Business Suite account, Facebook advertising account, and Facebook Creator Studio. (Id. ¶¶ IV(e)-(h)).

Rich was also awarded a $2,500 cash grant from the Facebook Small Business Grants Program for Black-Owned Businesses. (Id. ¶ IV(k)). That award included an additional $1,500 advertising credit, which he was using when Facebook disabled his account. (Id.).

On March 13, 2021, Rich received an email from Facebook stating that one of his “video[s] has been partially muted because it may contain music that belongs to someone else.” (Id. ¶ IV(m)).

On March 27, 2021, after he had posted no new content, he received a second email from stating he was temporarily blocked from posting on Facebook. (Id. ¶ IV(n)).

On March 29, 2021, he received a third email from Facebook, warning about posts that 2 “infringe[] or violate[] someone else's intellectual property rights.” Id. ¶ IV(o). His account was disabled. (Id. ¶ IV(p)).

According to the complaint, since March 29, 2021, Rich has attempted to obtain further explanation concerning why his account was disabled. He contends that he sent appeals through Facebook's appeal website and Facebook's Intellectual Property Appeal websites; replied to Facebook messages to request additional details; entered support tickets with Oculus, a virtual reality product owned by Meta; contacted Meta Executives on LinkedIn, including Andrew Bosworth, head of Facebook's virtual reality, and Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO; hired a law firm to assist with appeals, letters, and arbitration, including to Jennifer Newstead, chief legal counsel at Meta; and filed reports with multiple government agencies. (Id. ¶¶ IV(p)-(rr)). He received brief responses, which explained, in substance, that his account had “content removed for intellectual property reasons,” and in cases of repeat infringement Facebook “may remove the entire Page, Profile, or Ad Account.” (See, e.g., Id. ¶ IV(ss); see also ¶¶ IV(s), (ll), (qq)).

On November 17, 2021, Rich sent a second letter to Newstead. (Id. ¶ IV(vv)). On December 23, 2021, his attorneys received a response from Weil, Gotshal & Manages LLP that referred to the November letter to Jennifer Newstead, which explained Meta had received three reports of infringing content from Discovery Communications. (Id. ¶ IV(xx)).

B. Procedural Background

On December 3, 2021, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, followed by an amended complaint on August 19, 2022. He filed certifications from a process server indicating that defendants had been served by leaving the summonses on August 30, 2022, with Phillip Voy, lead security for Meta, who purportedly was authorized to accept service. (ECF Nos. 810).

On December 12, 2022, plaintiff moved for default judgment. On March 8, 2023, the Court entered an order denying the motion without prejudice because plaintiff had not first sought an entry of default under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). The Court further advised plaintiff that no default would enter “without a showing that defendants were properly served in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) and that the Court has both personal jurisdiction over the defendants and subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.” (ECF No. 13).

On March 22, 2023, plaintiff filed a motion for notice of default, including proof of service of the request for entry of default on defendants. All defendants failed to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The clerk entered a default against them on April 18, 2023. Plaintiff has now moved for default judgment as to all defendants. Defendants have moved to vacate the entry of default and dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice.

II. Standard of Review

Where, as here, a motion to dismiss is filed against a pro se litigant, any document filed by the pro se party is “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). However, while pro se complaints “are accorded ‘an extra degree of solicitude' . . . even a pro se plaintiff is required ‘to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.'” Wright v. Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009) (quoting Adams v. Stephenson, 1997 WL 351633, at *1 (1st Cir. 1997) (per curiam)).

III. Analysis

A. Removal of Default

“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c). The “good cause” standard is “a liberal one,” Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989); the relevant factors are “whether (1) the default was willful, (2) a set-aside would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) the alleged defense was meritorious.” United States v. $23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 164 (1st Cir. 2004).

Courts have consistently found that claims of insufficient process and lack of personal jurisdiction may constitute a meritorious defense that provides good cause to set aside the entry of default. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bank of Am., N.A., 557 Fed.Appx. 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Where a plaintiff's service of process is insufficient, a court may have good cause to set aside an entry of default because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and, as a result, had no power to render judgment against it.”); Ilaw v. Dep't of Just., 309 F.R.D. 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that as service was not properly executed, default was not appropriate because “the Clerk entered default on the basis that Defendant had failed to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint after the April 30, 2015, service attempt.”); Forward Fin. LLC v. Moss Supermarket LLC, 303 F.Supp.3d 209, 210 (D. Mass. 2018) (“[B]efore a default can be entered, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the party against whom the judgment is sought, which also means that the party must have been effectively served with process.”); Brown v. Dash, 2020 WL 6806433 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2020) (“[B]ecause defendants have asserted a meritorious defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court will grant the portion of their motion that requests the setting-aside of the entry of default.”); Aly v. Hanzada for Imp. & Exp. Co., 2014 WL 2829513, at *7 (W.D. Mo. June 23, 2014) (“Because a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is void, a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defaulting party constitutes ‘good cause' to vacate an entry of default.”); Hale v. McCall, 425 F.Supp. 396, 399 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (“Lack of jurisdiction provides a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's action and provides good cause for setting aside the entry of default.”); Lichtenstein v. Jewelart, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 511, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting motion to set aside default for lack of personal jurisdiction under state long-arm statute and dismissing action).

Here, because defendants have asserted meritorious defenses of lack of sufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court will grant the motion to set aside the entry of default.

B. Service of Process

Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, proper service of process must be effected. Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff &amp Co., 484 U.S. 97,...