Rich v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice

ELIZABETH AUSTIN RICH, Plaintiff, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-15-1439

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

May 12, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court¹ is Plaintiff Elizabeth Austin Rich's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Referral and for Relief (Docs. 26, 32) and Defendant Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ")'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31). The court has considered the motion, all relevant filings, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Plaintiff's motions and GRANTS TDCJ's motion.

I. Case Background

Plaintiff filed this action against TDCJ on December 18, 2014, alleging employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (the "ADEA") after she resigned her position at TDCJ after seventy-two days of training.

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff was hired by TDCJ in March 2014 in Tyler, Texas.² As part of the hiring process, Plaintiff was given a signing bonus.³ On March 5, 2014, Plaintiff traveled to Tennessee Colony, Texas, to begin training.⁴

In April 2014, Plaintiff began working at a TDCJ facility in Midway, Madison County, Texas.⁵ Plaintiff stated that she was "continually harassed" by fellow employees because she and other new hires had received bonus incentives to work at the prison.⁶ Plaintiff alleged that she was asked questions of an "intrusive nature" and harassed by coworkers asking her age and marital status.⁷ Plaintiff alleged that she felt harassed when coworkers "constantly" told her that other female officers had been fired for violating work policies.⁸ Plaintiff was "laughingly" told by other officers that she may be an officer who would conduct "nefarious acts" while on duty.⁹

On May 15, 2014, Plaintiff observed an officer violating safety regulations during food delivery to prisoners.¹⁰ Plaintiff requested to go home early after the incident and her request was granted.¹¹

The next night, Plaintiff was training in a position where she was to open and close cell doors.¹² An officer who was not wearing a name tag instructed her from a distance to open a particular cell, and not understanding him, Plaintiff opened an incorrect cell.¹³ The officer yelled at Plaintiff, called her "trainee" in front of the cell block, and accused Plaintiff of intentionally opening the wrong cell.¹⁴ Plaintiff and the officer then argued with one another.¹⁵ Plaintiff heard inmates threaten her and refer to her as "trainee."¹⁶

Plaintiff reported the incident to Lieutenant Jordan ("Jordan"), a supervisor with TDCJ.¹⁷ Plaintiff became emotional recounting the incident, and requested to go to her vehicle torecover.¹⁸ Plaintiff was provided materials to make a report of what had occurred and an officer delivered Plaintiff's report to Jordan.¹⁹ Plaintiff then called Jordan by phone from her car and stated she was too upset to return to work, and went home without completing her shift.²⁰ The following day, Plaintiff called the assistant warden and resigned.²¹

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 11, 2014, stating that she believed TDCJ had violated her rights under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.²² Plaintiff's charge alleged that she was repeatedly referred to as "trainee" and yelled at, and that she was questioned about her age.²³ On November 20, 2014, the EEOC closed its file, stating that it was unable to conclude there had been a violation of any applicable law, and issued a right-to-sue letter.²⁴

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her complaint on December 18, 2014, in theEastern District of Texas.²⁵ On December 29, 2014, a magistrate judge ordered that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Texas based on the venue provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).²⁶ Plaintiff objected to the order, but on May 22, 2015, the district court overruled Plaintiff's objections and ordered that the case be transferred.²⁷

On July 13, TDCJ filed an unopposed motion for a more definite statement because pages were missing from Plaintiff's complaint.²⁸ On August 12, 2015, Plaintiff wrote the court a letter with a corrected copy of her initial complaint.²⁹

On September 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to refer the case back to the Eastern District of Texas.³⁰

On November 13, 2015, TDCJ filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims.³¹ Plaintiff filed a motion for relief, again asking that this case be removed to the Eastern District of Texas on November 30, 2015.³² Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff'smotion on December 3, 2015.³³

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1), dismissal of an action is appropriate whenever the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does exist. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). The court may exercise jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" and over actions between citizens of different states when more than $75,000 is in controversy. See 28 U.S.C §§ 1331, 1332. The court may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under state law if they "form part of the same case or controversy" as the action over which the court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Dismissal of an action is also appropriate whenever the complaint, on its face, fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" but must include sufficient facts to indicate the plausibility of the claims asserted, raising the "right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility means that the factualcontent "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the factual allegations must allow for an inference of "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of an action whenever the complaint, on its face, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should construe the allegations in the complaint favorably to the pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F. 3d 787, 803 n.44 (5^th Cir. 2011)(quoting True v. Robles, 571 F. 3d 412, 417 (5^th Cir. 2009)).

A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" but must include sufficient facts to indicate the plausibility of the claims asserted, raising the "right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility means that the factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff mustprovide "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In other words, the factual allegations must allow for an inference of "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Additionally, a plaintiff who proceeds in forma pauperis is subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) if pleading standards are not met. Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5^th Cir. 2011). Such complaint shall be dismissed "at any time" if the court determines the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or "is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff moves to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas. TDCJ moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA, and contract claims. It argues that Plaintiff's ADEA claims are abrogated by sovereign immunity, there was no contract of employment, and Plaintiff's constructive discharge and hostile work environment claims are too speculative to survive Rule 12(b)(6)scrutiny. In response, Plaintiff detailed new incidents where she was harassed by other female officers and argued that TDCJ fraudulently induced her to agree to the work contract because it made a practice of hiring "intolerant, non-assimilated" workers.³⁴

B. ADEA Claim

The court must decide a Rule 12(b)(1) motion before addressing any attack on the merits. Ramming, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the federal rules, dismissal of an action is appropriate whenever the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); 12(h)(3). Federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases only as authorized by the United States Constitution and the jurisdictional statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5^th Cir. 2001). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the cause falls outside the court's limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Howery, 243 F.3d at 916, 919. In considering such a motion, the court must take as true all uncontroverted...