Richards v. City of Atlanta

SYLVESTER RICHARDS, Plaintiff,

v. CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, DAVID ST. PIERRE in his official and individual capacity,and ROBERT HUNTER in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-03928-CC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

SO ORDERED: March 19, 2013

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 20]. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

This case arises from the Reduction in Force ("RIF") that the City of Atlanta, Georgia implemented in 2008. (Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts "PSMF" ¶ 17; Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts "DSUMF" ¶ 4.¹ ) Plaintiff Sylvester Richards is a black male of Jamaican national origin. (PSMF ¶ 1.) Richards worked for Defendant City of Atlanta, Georgia (the "City") Department of Watershed Management ("DWM"), Bureau of Wastewater Treatment and last held the title of senior watershed director. (DSUMF ¶¶ 1-2; PSMF ¶ 3.) Richards worked for theCity for more than 20 years and had received several promotions. (PSMF ¶ 3.) In 2006, because of arthritis in his hip, Richards started taking Family and Medical Leave Act² ("FMLA") leave. (PSMF ¶ 6.)

Defendants Robert Hunter and David St. Pierre are Caucasian males of United States national origin. (PSMF ¶ 5.) At all times relevant to the RIF, Hunter was the Commissioner of the DWM; he had the authority to hire and fire employees within his department. (DSUMF ¶ 8; PSMF ¶¶ 4, 37.) St. Pierre was hired in July 2007 and was the Deputy Commissioner of the DWM's Bureau of Wastewater Treatment. (DSUMF ¶ 9; PSMF ¶ 8.) St. Pierre reported to Hunter and was Richards's direct supervisor. (PSMF ¶ 4.) When St. Pierre arrived in July 2007, he was displeased that Richards was intermittently absent on FMLA leave, but he did not have the authority to deny Richards's FMLA leave requests. (PSMF ¶¶ 9, 10.) According to St. Pierre, sometimes he could not contact Richards when Richards was on FMLA leave. (PSMF ¶ 12.) St. Pierre and Hunter were concerned about not being able to contact Richards, and Hunter took a "negative" view of that fact. (Id.) St. Pierre made disparaging and insinuating remarks about Richards's ability to "work hard"; he criticized Richards for "never [being] here" and also told Richards that he "might want to step back" to lesser duties "at this point in his career." (PSMF ¶¶ 9, 11.) St. Pierre wanted Richards to leave the DWM and hoped he would retire or otherwise leave "through attrition." (PSMF ¶ 13.) St. Pierre stripped Richards of many job duties and gave those duties to other employees who were not taking FMLA leave. (PSMF ¶ 14.) Instead, Richards was assigned menial tasks such as organizing how things were filed. (PSMF ¶ 15.) That helped give St. Pierre the excuse thatRichards's position was not needed and should be RIFed. (PSMF ¶16.)

In or around 2007 through 2008, the DWM faced a significant budgetary shortfall. (DSUMF ¶ 3.) In the fall 2008, the City determined that a RIF was required because of the budget problems. (PSMF ¶ 17.) The City then implemented a RIF and separated employees because of the budgetary shortfall. (DSUMF ¶ 4.) The Commissioner of Human Resources governed the RIF policies. (DSUMF ¶ 17.) And St. Pierre was responsible for selecting positions within his bureau to RIF. (PSMF ¶ 17.) Positions were selected based on reducing duplication of services, budget cuts, streamlining management, centralizing functions, and combining job responsibilities. (DSUMF ¶ 10.)

In September 2008, Richards applied for FMLA leave for October 16, 2008 through April 30, 2009. (PSMF ¶ 19.) Shortly thereafter, St. Pierre decided that Richards's position should be RIFed, and Hunter endorsed and "signed off" on the decision. (PSMF ¶¶ 21, 37.) Hunter and St. Pierre "put[] together our [sic] plan" to recommend Richards's position for RIF and decided to RIF Richards in or around November or December 2008. (PSMF ¶¶ 23, 38.) St. Pierre did not factor Richards's FMLA leave into the decision to eliminate his position. (DSUMF ¶ 12.)

In December 2008, Richards was informed that his position would be eliminated because of the budgetary shortfall. (DSUMF ¶ 5.) On December 10, 2008, Richards was dismissed from employment because of the RIF and lack of funds/budget reduction. (DSUMF ¶ 6; PSMF ¶¶ 2, 24.) Pursuant to the RIF, 97 positions, including Richards's position, were eliminated. (DSUMF ¶ 7.) The RIF was not targeted at Richards or the other 96 employees who were dismissed due to budget issues. (DSUMF ¶ 11.) St. Pierre could have come up with other scenarios where Richards would not have been RIFed. (PSMF ¶ 22.)

Richards complained about his termination to Mayor Shirley Franklin, and theDirector of Human Resources responded by sending Richards a letter in July 2009. (PSMF ¶ 25.) In the letter, Richards was informed that the Office of Diversity Management (the "Office") had investigated his complaint. (Id.) Based on information that Hunter provided, the Office concluded that it had found no evidence of wrongdoing because it was a financial necessity to "eliminat[e] the management layer as to which [he was] assigned." (Id.)

In September 2009, as a way to develop new "talent," Hunter and St. Pierre began seeking candidates for a new senior director position with duties similar to those of Richards's old position. (PSMF ¶ 28.) St. Pierre decided to resurrect the senior director position and had intended to create that new position before he decided to RIF Richards. (PSMF ¶¶ 29, 30.) Defendants hired Rob Bush for the senior director position. (PSMF ¶ 33.) Bush is a white male of United States national origin. (Id.)

B. Relevant Procedural Background

In December 2010, Richards filed the above-styled action against the City and Hunter and St. Pierre, in their official³ and individual capacities ("Defendants"). His Complaint⁴ alleges claims under the FMLA⁵ and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In April 2011,Defendants filed their answer. After the Court extended the time to complete discovery and to file dispositive motions, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. In their motion, Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor on Richards's FMLA-retaliation claim and his § 1983 claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes the entry of summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that summary judgment is appropriate. Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). "Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). When evaluating the merits of a motion for summary judgment, the court should view all evidence and factual inferences raised by the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable doubts concerning the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The court is not permitted to make credibility determinations,weigh conflicting evidence to resolve disputed facts, or assess the quality of the evidence. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008).

If after adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of a necessary element of that party's case, the court should grant summary judgment. Nolen v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 373 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. ANALYSIS

A. FMLA-Retaliation Claim

Defendants argue that the City is entitled to summary judgment because Richards cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The Court agrees. To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his employer intentionally discriminated against him in the form of an adverse employment action for having exercised an FMLA right. See Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd., 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999)). That can be done through direct or indirect evidence. Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2008). When the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of an employer's intent, courts apply the burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Richards must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the decision was causally related to the protected activity. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1207 (citing Parris v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000)). If Richards meets his burden, then Defendants must come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action; if they do, the burden shifts backto Richards to establish pretext. See Walker v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 379 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04, 93 S. Ct. at 1824-25.

To establish his prima facie case for retaliation, Richards alleges, but ultimately does not show, that his December 2008 leave was statutorily protected. The FMLA's most fundamental substantive guarantee gives an eligible employee the right to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2012); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide,...