Richards v. State

Jermaine RICHARDS v. STATE of Connecticut

No. CR13272145T

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield, Bridgeport

January 8, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

File Date: January 24, 2018

OPINION

RICHARDS, J.

Before the court is a motion for new trial filed by the defendant Jermaine Richards, on the ground that he was denied a fair trial based on juror misconduct. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion on December 18, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the court held a hearing and oral arguments on the motion and took the matter under advisement. For the reasons detailed below, the defendant’s motion for new trial is denied.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following factual and procedural history is relevant to the defendant’s motion. On May 18, 2013, the defendant was arrested for the April 20, 2013, murder of his girlfriend Alyssiah Wiley. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and elected to be tried by a jury. The first two trials in 2015 and 2016 ended in hung juries. Tamara Warren, the mother of the defendant’s first cousin’s children, testified as a defense witness in the first two trials. In July 2017, the court commenced jury selection for a third trial, and R.B.^[1] was called as a venireman. R.B. did not serve as a juror in the first two trials. During voir dire, the state asked R.B. whether he knew the defendant or any potential witness in this case. R.B. answered in the negative.

The defendant was present at all times during voir dire, and Warren’s name was included in the witness list as a potential state witness. R.B. further testified that he previously served on a criminal jury, there was nothing about the nature of the case that would impair his ability to be fair and impartial, he could follow the judge’s instructions, and he had a positive experience as a prior juror. At the conclusion of voir dire, R.B. was accepted as a juror.

In September 2017, the court commenced a five-day jury trial. The state subpoenaed Warren for this trial, but she was never called as a witness. On September 15, 2017, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54(a). Following the jury trial, the defendant filed this motion for new trial on October 19, 2017. The substance of the defendant’s position is that he was denied a fair trial due to R.B.’s acquaintance with him and Warren. According to defense counsel, Warren also claimed that R.B made social media posts about this case. In response, the state asserts that the defendant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of juror misconduct to warrant a new trial, and that Warren and R.B.’s attenuated relationship is insufficient to show prejudice. Both Warren and R.B testified at the hearing.

DISCUSSION

It is well established that a criminal accused is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. See State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 522, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995). " Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution ... In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors ... The modern jury is regarded as an institution in our justice system that determines the case solely on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it] in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the law by the court." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 522-23.

In Connecticut, " where ... the trial court was in no way responsible for the juror misconduct ... a defendant who offers proof of juror misconduct bears the burden of proving that actual prejudice resulted from that misconduct." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Newsome, 238 Conn. 588, 628, 682 A.2d 972 (1996). To succeed on a claim of juror misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate that: " (1) misconduct occurred; and (2) misconduct resulted in actual prejudice." (Footnote omitted.) State v Berrios, 320 Conn. 265, 277-78, 129 A.3d 696 (2016). The determination of juror impartiality turns on " whether or not the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial ... The defendant has been prejudiced if the misbehavior is such to make it probable that the juror’s mind was influenced by it so as to render him or her an unfair and prejudicial juror." (Citation omitted.) State v. Newsome, supra, 238 Conn. 628. In assessing juror impartiality, the court is mindful of the fact that " [n]ot every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial." State v. Sims, 12 Conn.App. 239, 245, 530 A.2d 1069, cert. denied, 206 Conn. 801, 535 A.2d 1315 (1987).

A pair of cases are instructive on the issue of whether juror acquaintance with a witness is considered a form of jury misconduct, sufficient enough to grant a motion for new trial. In State v. Sims, supra, 12 Conn.App. 239, the defendant appealed a trial court’s decision to deny his motion for mistrial, which argued that a juror was acquainted with the state’s principal witness. Id., 244. During a hearing, the juror testified that he did not initially recognize the witness’ name, they were not friends, and that he did not personally know the witness, but met him at his sister’s home on several occasions. Id., n.1. The Appellate Court held that the fact that a juror was acquainted with a state’s principal witness was not reversible error. Id., 246. In its view, the trial court appropriately determined that the juror was capable of being fair and impartial, and exercised its discretion in assessing the credibility of the juror’s statements. Id.

Likewise, in State v. Benedict, 323 Conn. 654, 148 A.3d 1044 (2016), the defendant appealed the Appellate Court’s judgment, which concluded that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s principal challenge. Id., 656. The defendant challenged a juror’s selection on the ground that he had a direct relationship with the state police who investigated his case, and several of whose officers were on the witness list. Id., 656-57. The juror, however, was a police officer for the town of Southbury. Id., 657. The only connection between the juror and the state police was through his supervisor, who was a state police sergeant and worked under the agency. Id. The juror testified that he did not personally know any of the officers on the witness list, and that he had no direct relationship with the state police or any officers involved in the investigation. Id., 658.

The Benedict court held that the defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing a close relationship between the juror and a party or witness that would warrant juror disqualification. Id., 667. More importantly, the Supreme Court emphasized that " a potential juror’s employment relationship as a police officer, standing alone, is not a ground to remove that juror under a principal challenge. [H]owever, if a defendant establishes that under the circumstances of a particular case, the specific relationship between the challenged juror and the investigating authority is ... so close ... that it is likely to produce, consciously or unconsciously, bias on the part of the juror, then the court should grant the defendant’s motion to remove that juror ..." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 666.

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