Richardson v. City of Scottsburg

KRISTIE RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SCOTTSBURG, INDIANA, Defendant.

No. 4:18-cv-00169-SEB-DML

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA NEW ALBANY DIVISION

March 2, 2020

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 33]. Plaintiff Kristie Richardson has brought this action against her former employer, the City of Scottsburg, Indiana ("the City"), alleging that, after her position with the City was eliminated due to budget constraints, the City failed to hire her based on her age and disability for an open position for which she had applied, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), respectively.¹ For the reasons detailed below, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Factual Background

General Background

Ms. Richardson began working for the City in 2001 as secretary to the Mayor. In 2003 or 2004, she shifted to the position of Clerk in the City's Utility Office and again moved in 2007 to a position in the City's Citizens Communication Broadband Department. Except for an approximately one year period when she was not employed by the City, she remained in that position until January 3, 2017, when that job was eliminated due to budgetary constraints. It is undisputed that throughout her tenure Ms. Richardson was never subjected to discipline and that her job performance always met her employer's expectations. After her position was eliminated, she remained eligible for rehire.

Failure to Hire

A few weeks following the conclusion of Ms. Richardson's employment, a Utility Clerk position became available. The vacancy arose when Leslie Bixler, who had previously held the position, was promoted to Utility Office Manager. As the new supervisor, Ms. Bixler was responsible for hiring her replacement. Ms. Bixler, who had graduated from high school in 2013, worked for the City in the Utility Clerk position for approximately four years prior to her promotion.

On February 17, 2017, Jessica Jones, the Mayor's Administrative Assistant, sent an email to Ms. Richardson advising her that there was an opening for the Utility Clerk position, a job which Ms. Richardson had previously performed for a few years early in her tenure with the City. Jones Dep. at 7, 35-36. Ms. Jones also forwarded Ms.Richardson's application to Ms. Bixler, though there were no discussions between them regarding Ms. Richardson's application. Jones at 36. At the time Ms. Richardson applied for the Utility Clerk position she was forty years old.

Ms. Bixler reportedly received "quite a few" resumes and applications for the Utility Clerk position, which she sorted into a "yes" group and a "no" group based on factors such as whether the application and resume looked professional and were easily readable. Bixler Dep. at 16. Ms. Bixler has stated that she believes that Ms. Richardson's application was in the initial "yes" group. Id. at 24.

Following this initial sorting, Ms. Bixler reviewed more closely the "yes" applications, particularly the applicants' education and previous job experience. Ms. Bixler was seeking an applicant with recent customer service and cash handling experience to fill the position. Ms. Bixler also reviewed in search of a candidate with a college degree, despite the fact that the job description for the Utility Clerk position did not list a college degree as a required or preferred qualification and she herself did not at that time have such a degree.² Ultimately, the applicant pool was narrowed to five applicants, four of whom were interviewed for the position.³ Bixler Dep. at 16, 27, 28. Ms. Richardson was not among those five candidates chosen for an interview.

Ms. Bixler as the sole decisionmaker hired Alyssa Cole, who was approximately twenty-three years old at the time, without discussing the applications, interviews, or herselection decision with anyone else during the hiring process. Id. at 32. Ms. Bixler testified that her decision was based in part on Ms. Cole's college degree, her recent cash handling experience, her friendly customer service demeanor, and the high recommendations of her previous supervisor. Id. at 19.

Ms. Bixler testified that, while she was confident that Ms. Richardson could have performed the essential duties of the Utility Clerk, she did not select her for an interview because other applicants were better qualified.⁴ Ms. Richardson had a high school diploma but no other educational training beyond high school and did not hold any job-related certifications. Richardson Dep. at 84-85. Ms. Bixler also noted that Ms. Richardson's resume reflected that her prior experience working in the Utility Office occurred several years earlier (from 2001 to 2005) and she had no recent cash handling experience. Bixler Dep. at 42-43.

Whether Ms. Bixler knew the applicants' exact ages at the time she made the hiring decision is disputed by the parties, but she concedes that she believed Ms. Richardson to be in her mid to late-thirties at the time and Ms. Cole in her twenties.

Plaintiff's Injury

Ms. Richardson maintains that the failure to hire her for the Utility Clerk position was impermissibly influenced by a prior job-related injury she incurred in 2013 resulting in her disability. In 2013, Ms. Richardson fell and injured her ankle while working for the City. As a result of the injury, she required four surgeries between 2013 and 2016.Her medical bills relating to that injury were covered by worker's compensation insurance and she received her full salary and benefits while she was off work. When she returned to work following her injury, Ms. Richardson's job title, duties, and salary remained the same.

In 2016, Ms. Richardson required ankle fusion surgery, after which her ability to walk "long distance[s]" and to stand for "long period[s] of time" had been affected due to pain and swelling. Richardson Dep. at 35-36. Her threshold for walking and standing "just all depends," she says. Id. at 36. As she puts it, she "can just have excruciating pain at any time. So I never know. I can have a good day or I can have a really bad day. It can be—I can walk from here to that door and it can just—have excruciating pain." Id. She can sit "only for so long" and must elevate her ankle several times a day. She was "not sure of the time limits" relating to these activities. Id. at 22-23.

In an August 27, 2017 letter, Ms. Richardson's surgeon, Dr. Jonathan P. Smerek, M.D., determined that, given the condition of her ankle, she has a permanent partial impairment rating of "17% of the whole person." Exh. A to Richardson Decl. Based on that functional capacity evaluation, however, she has no upper body limitations, can occasionally lift weight if needed, and can "[m]ore than likely ... stand for up to 4-6 hr per day for 30 min durations intermittently elevating her foot if needed." Id.

The parties dispute the extent to which Ms. Bixler, at the time of the hiring decision, was aware of Ms. Richardson's ankle injury and her current physical limitations. Ms. Bixler concedes that she had knowledge that Ms. Richardson had suffered an ankle injury while working for the City, had had to undergo surgeries on herankle, and wore a boot when she came to work, but stated that she was unaware of any specifics regarding the seriousness of the injury or its continuing effects. Ms. Richardson believed Ms. Bixler was aware of her physical condition from having been present in the room and even participating in conversations on several occasions when Ms. Richardson's injury and medical follow-ups were discussed. Richardson Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.

The Instant Litigation

Ms. Richardson filed her complaint on September 13, 2018, alleging, inter alia, that she was discriminated against because of her age and disability, in violation of the ADEA and ADA, respectively, when she was not hired for the Utility Clerk position. The City filed its motion for summary judgment on August 26, 2019, which is fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

Legal Analysis

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if it appears that no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmovant on the basis of the designated admissible evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We neither weigh the evidence nor evaluate the credibility of witnesses, id. at 255, but view the facts and the reasonable inferences flowing from them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McConnell v. McKillip, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (S.D. Ind. 2008).

II. Discussion

Ms. Richardson claims that she was not hired for the position of Utility Clerk because of her disability, in violation of the ADA, and her age, in violation of the ADEA. Our analysis of these claims invokes the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016), which requires that regardless of whether the court uses the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) or some other framework to evaluate a plaintiff's employment discrimination claims, "the ultimate legal question 'is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action.'" Reed v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 869 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). Under this "simplified" approach, the "[e]vidence must be considered as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself—or whether just the 'direct' evidence does so, or the...