Richardson v. Texas

1

KERESA RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, in his official capacity, and JANE NELSON, in her official capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-01041

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

August 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (6) or, Alternatively Abate (Dkt. #15). After reviewing the motion, the response and the relevant pleadings the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a challenge to the apportionment of Texas's intermediate appellate courts. Plaintiff Keresa Richardson is a resident of Collin County, Texas and a registered voter who alleges that the current apportionment of the state's appellate courts results in some voters having an outsized influence on the composition of the judiciary (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 1; 13-15). To remedy this alleged malapportionment, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants the State of Texas, Governor Greg Abbott in his official capacity, and Secretary of State Jane Nelson, in her official capacity (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 3-4).

I. Factual Background

In 1891, the citizens of Texas voted to amend the state's constitution to create intermediate courts of civil appeals. Hon. James T. Worthen, The Organizational & Structural Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts in Texas, 1892-2003, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 35 (2004). Within a year, the Texas legislature created the first three courts of appeals in Galveston, Fort Worth, and Austin. Id. As its population exploded over the twentieth century, Texas expanded and reformed its intermediate courts of appeals by establishing eleven additional courts, adding criminal appeals to their jurisdiction, and amending its constitution to allow for more than three justices to a court. Id. at 36-41.

The current composition of Texas's intermediate appellate courts is prescribed by statute. The state is presently divided into fourteen judicial districts with a court of appeals serving each district. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.201.^[1] The courts range in size from three justices in the smallest courts (the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Courts of Appeals) to thirteen justices in the largest court (the Fifth Court of Appeals). Several of these judicial districts have overlapping jurisdiction over certain counties: the Fifth and Sixth Courts of Appeals have overlapping jurisdiction over appeals arising from Hunt County, and the Sixth and Twelfth Courts of Appeals have overlapping jurisdiction over appeals arising from Wood, Upshur, Gregg, and Rusk counties. Id.

The process of redistricting and reapportioning the appellate courts falls primarily to the legislature and two related governmental bodies: the Texas Judicial Districts Board and the Texas Legislative Redistricting Board. The Judicial Districts Board consists of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, who serves as the Board's chairman, the presiding judge of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the presiding judge of each of the administrative judicial districts, the president of the Texas Judicial Council, and one Texas attorney who is appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate for a term of four years. TEX. CONST. ART. V, § 7(b). It is responsible for reapportioning the judicial districts and advising the legislature on the need for additional judicial districts. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.946. Any reapportionment order proposed by the Judicial Districts Board must be adopted by a majority of both chambers of the Texas legislature before it becomes binding and effective. TEX. CONST. ART. V, § 7(h). After each federal decennial census, if the legislature and the Judicial Districts Board do not reapportion the judicial districts, responsibility for reapportionment falls to the Legislative Redistricting Board. Id. at § 7(e). The Legislative Redistricting Board consists of the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, and the Land Commissioner. TEX. CONST. ART III, § 28.^[2] Critically, no statute requires the legislature to redistrict or reapportion the appellate districts at any given time.

In 2021, Governor Abbott called a third special session of the legislature to address issues relating to redistricting. In that session, the legislature created redrawn maps for Texas's House, Senate, Congressional, and Board of Education districts. See S.B. 4, 87th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Tx. 2021); H.B. 1, 87th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Tx. 2021); S.B. 6, 87th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Tx. 2021); S.B. 7, 87th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Tx. 2021). It did not, however, create a redrawn map for the judicial districts.

II. Procedural History

Dissatisfied with the legislature's inaction, Plaintiff initiated this case on December 12, 2022 (Dkt. #1). On the same day, Plaintiff initiated a concurrent action in the 296th Judicial District Court in Collin County, Texas. See generally Keresa Richardson v. State of Texas et al., No. 296-06669-2022 (296th Dist. Ct., Collin County, Tex. Dec. 12, 2022).

Plaintiff is a white, non-Hispanic Republican voter who resides in Collin County, which is located in the Fifth Judicial District (Dkt. #9 ¶ 1). According to Plaintiff, the judicial districts are “malapportioned” in their current form, and voters in less populous counties have a “grossly disproportionate influence” on the composition of the Texas judiciary (Dkt. #9 ¶ 13). As evidence of this malapportionment, Plaintiff points to the fact that voters in neighboring Hunt County, which falls within the Fifth and Sixth Judicial Districts, are afforded the opportunity to vote for justices on both the Fifth Court of Appeals and the Sixth Court of Appeals (Dkt. #9 ¶ 13).

In an effort to remedy this alleged malapportionment, Plaintiff asserts four constitutional and statutory causes of action. In Counts One through Three of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under (1) the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 29-33), (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 34-36); and (3) Article 1, § 3 of the Texas Constitution (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 37-38). In addition, in Count Four, Plaintiff asserts a claim for violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (Dkt. #9 ¶¶ 39-40). Ultimately, Plaintiff seeks an order directing the State of Texas to reapportion its intermediate appellate courts pursuant to a redistricting plan submitted by Plaintiff (Dkt. #9 at p. 16).

On February 14, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs claims, or, alternatively, to stay the case pending resolution of the concurrent state litigation (Dkt. #15). Plaintiff responded on February 28, 2023 (Dkt. #19). On March 7, 2023, Defendants filed their reply (Dkt. #21).

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction when the district court lacks statutory and constitutional power to adjudicate the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). If a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the Court will consider the jurisdictional attack under Rule 12(b)(1) before addressing any attack on the legal merits. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

In deciding the motion, the Court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the [C]ourt's resolution of disputed facts.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Court will accept as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994).

Once a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and challenges jurisdiction, the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). The Court will grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction only if it appears certain that the claimant cannot prove a plausible set of facts to support a claim that would entitle it to relief. Lane, 529 F.3d at 557.

ANALYSIS

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claims on two principal grounds. First, Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims (Dkt #15 at p. 17). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of her claims (Dkt. #15 at p. 24). The Court agrees with Defendants that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking here. Because it lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims, the Court need not consider Defendants' second argument.

I. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Claims

Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents the Court from hearing Counts One through Three of Plaintiff's First Amendment Complaint (Dkt. #15 at p. 17). More specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protect guarantees, § 1983, and Article 1, § 3 of the Texas Constitution are barred by sovereign immunity.^[3] In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot carry her burden of establishing that she has standing to assert any of her claims-including her claim for violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (Dkt. #15 at p. 22).

P...