Riddick v. Mathena

1

STEVE RIDDICK, Plaintiff, v. RANDALL MATHENA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:20-cv-00449

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division

March 20, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Elizabeth Dillon United States District Judge

Plaintiff Steve Riddick, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There are thirteen defendants currently in the case,^[1]but his claims against all the defendants stem from the same basic events. Riddick alleges that defendants removed him from the “Seriously Mentally Ill/Shared Alliance Management” pod at Red Onion State Prison (“Red Onion”) in 2014, and then they failed to return him to that housing pod on July 11, 2017, and throughout the next three years, despite his repeated requests to be housed there. He asserts that it was the best fit for him because of his mental health needs. His claims are not entirely clear, but the court construes his complaint-as defendants do-as including a First Amendment claim, Eighth Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, and a state-law claim of willful and wanton negligence.

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by all defendants (Dkt. No. 23), in which they seek dismissal of all claims against them on several different grounds.^[2]Riddick has not directly responded, but he filed his own motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 29; see also “Additional Evidence” in support of his summary judgment motion, Dkt. No. 31), which defendants have opposed (Dkt. No. 30). Riddick's motion addresses defendants' arguments to some degree, and it is more properly construed as a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth herein, the court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss. To the extent Riddick's motion is a summary judgment motion, it will be denied as moot.

Also in December 2022, Riddick sent a letter to the court complaining about the length of time that the motions had been pending and requesting that the court, when deciding cases, give “preference and urgency” to his cases, including this one.^[3](Dkt. No. 59.) To the extent that letter is properly construed as a motion, it is denied as moot in light of the court's ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background^[4]

Riddick's claims stem from the repeated denials of his request to be housed in what he calls the “SIP/SAM” pod. He describes the pod as a “combined” pod of two units. According to him, the SAM unit houses offenders with mental disorders, and the SIP unit houses inmates who refuse to enter the general population. He claims that the goal of the unit is to slowly integrate inmates into a general population setting, but that “inmates don't have to leave the SIP/SAM and return to population if they're not ready to do so.” (Compl. 5, Dkt. No. 1.)^[5] Although Riddick was housed in the SIP/SAM pod from 2012 through July 17, 2014, he was then removed and housed in C Building. In July 2017, he completed the required programming and thought he would be returned to the SIP/SAM pod because he met the criteria, but he was not moved there. Nor was he given a reason why he was being denied placement in that pod. (Compl. 1, Dkt. No. 1.)

Throughout the rest of 2017 and 2018, Riddick filed complaint forms and grievances about not being returned in the SIP/SAM pod. In response to one of them, Lt. Boyd stated that Riddick would be placed in the SIP/SAM pod. In response to another, around October 30, 2019, he was told by Warden Kiser that he would be put in the SIP/SAM pod once it was moved to D-1 pod. But when the pod was moved, he was not assigned to it. (Id. at 2-3.) Throughout 2019 and 2020, he continued to request placement in the SIP/SAM pod, both via letters and by telling correctional officers, supervisory staff, “treatment officers,” and counselors of his desire. (Id. at 3-4.)

In August, 2019, Dr. Eric McDuffie, a psychiatrist, recommended Riddick for the SIP/SAM pod and wrote in Riddick's mental health records that the pod would be a good fit for him. (Id. at 6.) Nonetheless, he was not reassigned to that pod, despite it being, “as far as [Riddick knew], . . . the only pod that fit [his] needs.” (Id. at 7.)

On specific dates in 2018, 2019, and 2020, Riddick also told the members of the external review team (“ERT”)-whose names he lists in his complaint-that he wanted to be placed in the SIP/SAM pod. (Id. at 4.) He told the ERT about his “mental disorders” and his belief that he “qualifie[d] for the SAM unit.” (Id. at 4.)

Riddick was never moved to that pod, however. (Id. at 4-5.) Instead, the ERT assigned him to a unit where, after 90 days, he would have had a cell mate or be in a “population environment.” (Id. at 6.) Because he refused to go to that housing unit, he was given two disciplinary charges, which resulted in fines and the loss of certain privileges, and he was then kept in segregation. (Id. at 7.) Riddick claims that his stay in segregation caused him mental and physical harm and resulted in him being diagnosed with certain mental disorders and placed on medication. (Id. at 7-8.)

Although not alleged in his complaint, Riddick's sworn opposition to the motion to dismiss states that he was told that defendant Collins did not place him in the SIP/SAM a second time because he did not do well in that pod and that he was “too aggressive.” (Opp'n 2-3, 4, Dkt. No. 29.) He admits that he had what he calls “some isolated incidents” while in the SIP/SAM pod (id. at 3), but he argues that there were several “way more aggressive” inmates in the pod when he was housed there. (Id. at 4). He also emphasizes that he was told he would return to that pod, by both Lt. Boyd and Warden Kiser, but then was not assigned to it. (Id. at 3.) B. Riddick's Claims

The court construes Riddick's complaint as asserting the following four claims:

Claim 1: Defendants violated the First Amendment when they “discriminated against” Riddick by not placing him back in the SIP/SAM pod;

Claim 2: Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment “by being deliberately indifferent to [Riddick's] housing and mental health needs, and mental health and by subjecting [him] to cruel, unusual and inhumane punishment”;

Claim 3: Defendants violated Riddick's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by “not providing [him] and placing [him] in a pod that met [his] needs”; and

Claim 4: Defendants' actions constituted willful and wanton negligence in violation of state law.

(Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2 (citing Compl. 9-10, ECF No. 1).) Riddick does not dispute this characterization of his claims in what the court is deeming his response (Dkt. No. 29).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).^[6]To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2014). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. Pro se complaints are afforded a liberal construction. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006).

B. Statute of Limitations

Defendants first claim that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. They correctly note that a court may dismiss a complaint, even summarily without a motion to dismiss, when it is clear from the face of a § 1983 complaint that a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Cf. Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).

A § 1983 claim based on events that occurred in Virginia is subject to Virginia's statute of limitations for general personal injury claims, see Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1989), which requires that an action be brought within two years of its accrual. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A); A Soc'y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the state limitations period for personal injury actions and in Virginia, that period is two years). The two-year period begins to run when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” A Soc'y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 348. The time period is tolled during the period when a prisoner is exhausting his administrative remedies, Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708 (4th Cir. 2019), but Riddick's complaint does not specify the length of time it took him to exhaust.

The primary dispute between the parties as to the statute-of-limitations issue is whether Riddick's complaint is properly viewed as a single violation of his constitutional rights that occurred when he was first denied placement in the SIP/SAM unit in 2017, discrete violations caused by every subsequent denial to return him to that unit or a single continuing violation based on a pattern or practice. Defendants argue that “[t]his is not a continuing constitutional violation case” because it does not involve “continual unlawful acts,” but only “continual ill effects from an original violation.” (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6 (citing Nat'l Advertising Co. v. Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1991)). They insist that the claim accrued in 2017, when Riddick's first request to return to the SIP/SAM...