Rieff v. Jesse James Riding Stables, Inc.

656 S.W.3d 225

Sylvia RIEFF, Appellant

v.JESSE JAMES RIDING STABLES, INC., Appellee

NO. 2022-CA-0161-MR

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 2, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Aaron M. Williams, Louisville, Kentucky.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Steven B. Lowery, Louisville, Kentucky.

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

OPINION

CETRULO, JUDGE:

Appellant Sylvia Rieff ("Ms. Rieff") appeals the order of the Barren Circuit Court granting the motion for summary judgment of the Appellee Jesse James Riding Stables, Inc. ("JJ Stables").

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 2019, Ms. Rieff and her two children visited JJ Stables and took a guided horseback riding tour. Before beginning the tour, Ms. Rieff signed the "Horse Rental Agreement and Liability Release Form" (the "Release"), which detailed potential risks of participating in the tour and provided guidance on how to avoid some injuries, e.g. , it recommended wearing a helmet and notifying employees of concerns with the saddle. Further, the Release outlined the participant's assumption of risk and included a liability release for bodily injury and medical expenses, among other things.

The preamble of the Release stated that the agreement was "by and between Sylvia Rieff [who had written her name in the blank space provided] who will sign below for and on behalf of all under-age family members, and those for whom I am guardian, hereinafter referred to as ‘I/WE,’ and [JJ Stables] ...." Ms. Rieff then wrote each participant's name, which included herself and her two children, in Section I of the Release, titled "Registration of Riders." That section further stated that "I/WE" included the individuals Ms. Rieff had listed.

Section II, titled "Warnings and Assumption of Risk Agreement," stated, in pertinent part, that

I/WE understand ... that there are inherent elements of risk always present in any such activity despite all safety precautions. I fully accept such risk, some examples of which are listed as follows: ... Saddle girths may naturally loosen during a ride and if a rider notices this he should alert the nearest guide as quickly as possible to avoid any slippage of saddle.

Section III, titled "Release Agreement," detailed the exclusionary provision of the Release and stated, in pertinent part, that

I/WE understand and agree that except in event of THIS STABLES'S gross negligence, I/WE accept full responsibility for bodily injury, property damage, death, medical and other financial loss expenses to include, but not limited to, time lost from school or work or disability, which are sustained by any member of my group so listed above, on or in relationship to the premises and operations of THIS STABLE and/or while riding or handling horses or other animals owned by same; and that I/WE hereby, for myself, my heirs, administrators and assigns, do hereby release and discharge the owners, operators, sponsors of the premises and their respective servants, agents, officers and all other participants of and from all claims, demands, actions and causes of action for same injuries, damages, and death ....

Finally, in Section IV, "Closing Statement and Signatures," the Release stated that "THE UNDERSIGNED HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT AND RELEASE WAIVER" and provided three lines for signatures: one of which stated it was solely for a rider; the next was for signatures of parents, guardians, and/or spouse #1; and a third line was for signatures of the other parent, guardian, and/or spouse #2. The third line noted that spouses must sign for themselves. Ms. Rieff signed the second line and circled "Parent."

After completing the paperwork, employees of JJ Stables fit Ms. Rieff and her children for gear and began the tour. Approximately 20 minutes into the tour, as the trail entered the surrounding woods, Ms. Rieff's saddle became loose, and she slid off the side of the horse, falling to the ground. Following the fall, Ms. Rieff testified that her husband took her to a nearby hospital for x-rays and at some point in the days that followed, a doctor determined she had broken four ribs and fractured some vertebrae.

The next year, in March 2020, Ms. Rieff filed a complaint claiming JJ Stables negligently (1) failed to properly secure the saddle, (2) failed to recognize the faulty saddling of the horse, (3) provided unsafe equipment, and (4) failed to properly warn Ms. Rieff of the risk of a loosening saddle. The case proceeded through discovery, and both parties conducted depositions.

In September 2021, JJ Stables moved for summary judgment, claiming, in pertinent part,¹ that Ms. Rieff's claims were barred because she signed the Release, which served as an exculpatory, pre-injury liability waiver. In the circuit court's January 2022 order, it granted the motion for summary judgment of JJ Stables and concluded that "[a]fter a careful review of the [R]elease ... and strictly construing it in a light most favorable to [Ms. Rieff], the Court finds that the [R]elease meets ... the Hargis tests"² and therefore was enforceable to waive JJ Stables’ liability for negligence. Further, the circuit court found that Ms. Rieff was bound by the Release, individually, because the "first line of the release indicates that she is a party, and she testified by deposition that she signed the document.... Her signature, combined with her participation on the ride, suffice to establish that she was a party to the release and is bound by it."

Ms. Rieff appealed. She now argues that the circuit court erred when it found (1) the Release was enforceable under Hargis ; and (2) that she, individually, was bound by the Release.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Scifres v. Kraft , 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citing CR ³ 56.03 ). Therefore, we "need not defer to the trial court's decision on summary judgment and will review the issue de novo because only legal questions and no factual findings are involved." CLK Multifamily Mgmt., LLC v. Greenscapes Lawn & Landscaping, Inc. , 563 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted).

We will review the record "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment "is only proper where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances." Id. (citation omitted).

Once the moving party meets its burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present ‘at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.’ " Lewis v. B & R Corp. , 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001) (quoting Steelvest , 807 S.W.2d at 482 ).

Additionally, "[t]he construction and interpretation of a contract, including questions regarding ambiguity, are questions of law to be decided by the court." First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West , 55 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Ky. App. 2000) (citation omitted). Therefore, we must also review questions of ambiguity de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Ms. Rieff argues that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment against her because (A) the Release did not meet any Hargis alternative and, therefore, was not a valid waiver; and (B) the Release was ambiguous; therefore, it was not enforceable against her, individually.

A. Validity of the Release

Although "disfavored and ... strictly construed against the parties relying upon them[,]" an exculpatory, pre-injury release "for negligence, whether ordinary or gross, is not invalid per se." Hargis , 168 S.W.3d at 47 (citations omitted). However, the text of the release must be "so clear and understandable that an ordinarily prudent and knowledgeable party to it will know what he or she is contracting away; it must be unmistakable." Id. (citation omitted).

To assist in this analysis, the Kentucky Supreme Court outlined a series of alternatives to consider:

a preinjury release will be upheld only if (1) it explicitly expresses an intention to exonerate by using the word "negligence;" or (2) it clearly and specifically indicates an intent to release a party from liability for a personal injury caused by that party's own conduct; or (3) protection against negligence is the only reasonable construction of the contract language; or (4) the hazard experienced was clearly within the contemplation of the provision.

Id. (citations omitted).

In Hargis , the plaintiff was an independent contractor whom the defendant had hired to haul logs for his lumber yard and sawmill. Id. at 39. When the plaintiff began working for defendant, he signed a release, which stated in pertinent part that "[i]t is hereby agreed and acknowledged that I am a self-employed independent contractor.... I accept responsibility for my own property and person and release [defendant], and forever hold him harmless for any property damage/bodily injury sustained by me or any other person I authorize to be on the working premises while performing services for said contractor. " Id. at 46 (emphasis original). Seven months into his work with defendant, a log struck and killed plaintiff while unloading a shipment. Id. at 39. Plaintiff's widow then brought suit against defendant, claiming negligence. Id.

There, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that such "release" did not "exculpate [defendant] from liability for [plaintiff's] death because [ ] the ‘Release’ d[id] not explicitly purport to release [defendant] from liability for his own negligence and d[id] not identify the type of injury or damage for which liability is being released[.]" Id. at 47.

Here, Ms. Rieff argues that the Release did not...