Riggins v. Polk Cnty.

DAVID RIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. POLK COUNTY, a politicalsubdivision of the State of Florida

CASE NO. 8:12-CV-1755-T-17TBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

August 8, 2014

ORDER

This cause is before the Court on:

Dkt. 26 Motion for Summary Judgment

Dkt. 27 Statement of Undisputed Facts

Dkt. 28 Affidavit

Dkt. 29 Response

Defendant Polk County moves for summary judgment on the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff Riggins opposes Defendant's Motion.

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear theburden of proof at trial."

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

The appropriate substantive law will guide the determination of which facts are material and which facts are...irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11^th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. But, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable...or is not significantly probative...summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standing

Defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits of this case, to which Plaintiff Riggins has filed a response. Neither party has addressed Plaintiff's standing. The Court is required to inquire into the issue of standing sua sponte whenever it may be lacking. Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975 (11^th Cir. 2005).

The issue of standing is distinct from the "real party in interest" issue. Standing is determined as of the commencement of a lawsuit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 (1992). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; jurisdiction is limited to situations in which there is a justiciable "case or controversy" between the litigants. The Court has an independent obligation to examine its jurisdiction. University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11^th Cir. 1999). Whether a party is the real party in interest is a waivable issue; however,standing is not an issue that can be waived. If a district court determines that there is no standing, therefore no subject matter jurisdiction, the district court cannot hear the merits of the case. Where a jurisdictional issue implicates the merits of a complaint, and the Court has some doubt as to its jurisdiction, it is appropriate to permit discovery to proceed, and for the Court to resolve the jurisdictional issue on a complete record.

The elements of standing are not mere pleading requirements, but an indispensable part of the case; each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, in the manner and with the degree of evidence required at successive stages of litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury may suffice, since it is presumed that general allegations embrace the specific facts necessary to support the claim. In response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts which will be taken as true for the purpose of the motion for summary judgment. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

At the pleading stage, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the complaint as true. However, the duty to accept the facts of the complaint as true does not require that the Court ignore the specific factual details of the pleading in favor of general or conclusory allegations. When the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the exhibits govern. See Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5^th Cir. 1974). In this case, the Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint, and Plaintiff Riggins has sought to eliminate every reference to D.C. Riggins, Inc. from it. Plaintiff has attached 4 exhibits: Exhibits A, M, S and EEOC Form 5, Charge of Discrimination. Plaintiff Riggins attached additional exhibits to the initial Complaint, including correspondence and e-mails from Plaintiff to Defendant.

At the summary judgment stage, the Court can look beyond the four corners of the Second Amended Complaint, and consider other evidence in the record. The Court takes judicial notice of the additional exhibits attached to the Complaint (Dkt. 1) in resolving the issue of standing.

There are constitutional as well as prudential requirements for standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). As to the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff has Article III standing to assert a claim if: 1) [it] can show [it] suffered an injury that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant; and 3) it is likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819-20 (11^th Cir. 2003). "[The Court] ha[s] consistently stressed that a plaintiff's complaint must establish that he has a "personal stake" in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him." Raines v. Bvrd, 521 US 811, 818-19 (1997). In this context, "particularized injury" means injury personal to the plaintiff. The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). If a party cannot satisfy the constitutional standing requirements, the case lies outside the authority given to federal courts by Article III, and must be dismissed.

The Court must consider the following prudential requirements: 1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue: 2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches; and 3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties. Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11^th Cir. 1994).

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Riggins seeks injunctive relief as well as other forms of equitable relief, and the award of attorney's fees. The Court notes that, in the Claim for Relief (Dkt. 21, p. 10), Plaintiff Riggins alleges that American Hydraulics, Inc. has benefitted financially from the award of the Contract 12-037, but Plaintiff does not request the award of compensatory or nominal damages. Where a party seeks injunctive relief, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer future injury, that he is likely to suffer such injury at the hands of the defendant, and that the relief the plaintiff seeks will likely prevent such injury from occurring. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38-41 (1976).

The Court notes that the Invitation to Quote was directed to D.C. Riggins, Inc. (Dkt. 1, p. 3). The Instructions (Dkt. 1, pp. 11-13) request the submittal of quotes from vendors that are interested in providing all labor, equipment, materials and supplies necessary [for] Pump Station Maintenance. The Instructions explain the Local Preference policy and define "Polk County entity":

"Polk County entity" means any business having a physical location within the boundaries of Polk County at which employees are located and from which business is regularly transacted."

(Dkt. 1, p. 12). The Instructions further explain the Vendor Preference policy and define "Women or Minority Owned Entity":

The term "Women or Minority Owned Entity" means any business having at least 51% ownership by women or minority group members who independently control the management and day-to-day operations of the firm. Group members are Females, African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Native Americans and Asian-Indian Americans.

The Vendor Preference Policy further provides that it does not supersede the LocalPreference Policy. (Dkt. 1, p. 12).

In the context of an equal protection challenge to a minority set-aside program for government contracts, the "injury-in-fact" required for standing is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process. Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656 (U.S. 1993)(injury-in-fact is denial of equal treatment resulting from imposition of barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain benefit than members of another group, citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970)). The same type of "injury-in-fact" is involved in this equal protection challenge to Defendant's Vendor Preference Policy as outlined in Defendant's Ordinance 10-005. Plaintiff alleges that Polk County Ordinance 10-005 requires Plaintiff Riggins to bid 5% lower than other bidders to be awarded contracts [,] based solely on his race and...