Riggs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

337 So.3d 950

Dominic RIGGS

v.STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Wayne M. Hebert, and GEICO Casualty Company

21-218

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 6, 2022

Lawrence Blake Jones, David C. Whitmore, Blake Jones Law Firm, LLC, 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4100, New Orleans, Louisiana 70139, (504) 525-4361, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Dominic Riggs

Joseph T. Puhekker, Leah B. Guilbeau & Associates, Caffery Plaza, Suite 100, 4023 Ambassador Caffery Parkway, Lafayette, Louisiana 70503, (337) 988-7240, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and Wayne M. Hebert

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Chief Judge, Jonathan W. Perry and Charles G. Fitzgerald, Judges.

PERRY, Judge.

This is an appeal by Dominic Riggs ("Riggs") from a judgment granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement urged by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") on behalf of its insured, Wayne M. Hebert ("Hebert") (collectively "Defendants"). For the following reasons, we find the parties’ compromise constitutes res judicata; thus, we affirm the judgment dismissing Riggs's claims against Defendants with prejudice.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant litigation began on April 29, 2020, when Riggs filed a petition for damages against State Farm, Hebert, and his own uninsured motorist insurer, GEICO Casualty Company ("GEICO"). In his petition, Riggs alleged he was involved in two separate automobile collisions with Hebert on April 30, 2019. The first cause of action set forth in Riggs's petition alleged that "Riggs was operating his 2015 Dodge Journey vehicle on Louisiana Avenue in Lafayette, Louisiana, when suddenly and without warning the 2015 Chevrolet 1500 owned and operated by Wayne M. Hebert changed lanes into [Riggs's] vehicle and then left the scene." The second cause of action additionally claimed:

Shortly following the afore-described impact on Louisiana Avenue in Lafayette, Louisiana, on April 30, 2019, Dominic Riggs continued operating his 2015 Dodge Journey vehicle behind Wayne M. Hebert[.] While they were on Webb Street in Lafayette, Louisiana, [Riggs] was stopped behind [Hebert's] vehicle when [Hebert] backed into [Riggs's] vehicle and then drove off again.

Both asserted causes of action alleged that Riggs "sustained loss and damage ... for which defendants are liable unto him."

Riggs settled his claims against GEICO. Pursuant to a Joint Motion and Order of Partial Dismissal signed by the trial court on September 23, 2020, Riggs's claims against GEICO were dismissed with prejudice.

In response to Riggs's petition, State Farm filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement on September 29, 2020. According to State Farm, its insured, Hebert, had already been released from all liability from Riggs under the terms of a settlement agreement perfected approximately three months before Riggs filed the instant suit. On February 3, 2020, Riggs executed a written settlement agreement ("the Release") in consideration of State Farm's policy limits of $15,000.00, which stated, in pertinent part:

For and in consideration of the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) Dollars, Dominic Riggs hereby fully and forever release[s] and discharge[s] [Hebert]..., who does not admit any liability to the undersigned but expressly denies any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries known and unknown, which may have resulted or may in the future develop from an incident on or about the 30th day of April, 2019, at or near Louisiana Ave, Lafayette, LA.

In opposition, Riggs argued the language of the Release covered only one of the two motor vehicle collisions which he alleged had occurred on April 30, 2019. Riggs contended the Release was restricted geographically to an accident occurring on Louisiana Avenue and did not cover a second impact that occurred on Webb Street almost immediately after the first impact.

A hearing was held via Zoom on November 16, 2020, after which a written judgment was signed on December 7, 2020, granting State Farm's motion and dismissing Riggs's lawsuit against State Farm and Hebert with prejudice. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Riggs contends the trial court "erred in granting [State Farm]’s Motion to Enforce Settlement which was, in reality, an exception of res judicata, because State Farm did not carry its burden of proof and demonstrate that there was no doubt regarding the application of res judicata to the facts of this case." Riggs submits the rules pertaining to the exception of res judicata dictate the exception should be overruled when there is doubt regarding whether its requirements have been met. Riggs argues doubt exists as to the parties intent. According to Riggs, the parties to the Release have conflicting opinions as to what differences the parties intended to settle therein. He alleges the Release only covers the accident referenced in the first cause of action stated in his petition, i.e., the impact that occurred on Louisiana Avenue. Therefore, Riggs urges this court to vacate the trial court's judgment and reinstate his action which concerns the second impact that occurred on Webb Street.

In reply, State Farm argues the exception of res judicata is not before this court because it was not submitted to the trial court. In support, State Farm cites Ewing v. Westport Ins. Corp. , 19-551, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20), 290 So.3d 707, 711, aff'd , 20-339 (La. 11/19/20), 315 So.3d 175 ("An appellate court cannot consider issues raised for the first time on appeal which have not been addressed by the trial court."). See also Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1–3, ("Courts of Appeal will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court[.]").

Contrary to State Farm's assertion that the exception of res judicata should have been raised before the trial court, we note La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B) provides that an appellate court may, \sua sponte , raise and consider the peremptory exception of res judicata.¹ Accordingly, we shall consider whether res judicata bars the instant litigation instituted by Riggs on April 29, 2020.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Res judicata is a peremptory exception raised to bar a subsequent action. La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(A)(3). The objectives of the exception of res judicata are the promotion of judicial efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. Steckler v. Lafayette Consol. Gov't , 11-427 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 76 So.3d 161, writs denied , 11-2639, 11-2677 (La. 2/10/12), 80 So.3d 477, 487. Whether a prior judgment has the effect of res judicata in subsequent litigation is a question of law which we review de novo. Fogleman v. Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. , 10-1210 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 1057, writ denied , 11-712 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 995.

The general principles of res judicata are set forth in La.R.S. 13:4231, which provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in considering La.R.S. 13:4231, has set forth the following prerequisites which must be met for res judicata to bar a second action:

(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.

Burguieres v. Pollingue , 02-1385, p. 8 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049, 1053. Consequently, for res judicata to bar the instant litigation instituted by Riggs on April 29, 2020, all five of the aforementioned factors must be satisfied.

The Release signifies a "compromise," which La.Civ.Code art. 3071 defines as "a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship." Under La.Civ.Code art. 3076, "A compromise settles only those differences that the parties clearly intended to settle, including the necessary consequences of what they express." According to La.Civ.Code art. 3080, "A compromise precludes the parties from bringing a subsequent action based upon the matter that was compromised." Thus, "[w]hile the doctrine of res judicata is ordinarily premised on a final judgment on the merits, it also applies where there is a transaction or settlement of a disputed or compromised matter that has been entered into by the parties." Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 14-808, p. 6 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So.3d 761, 766.

The meaning and intent of the parties to a written instrument, including a compromise, is ordinarily determined from the instrument's four corners, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible either to explain or to contradict the instrument's terms. When a dispute arises as to the scope of a compromise agreement, extrinsic evidence can be considered to determine exactly

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