Riley v. Gen. Motors, LLC, Case No. 2:21-cv-00924

591 F.Supp.3d 259

Mark RILEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 2:21-cv-00924

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed March 15, 2022

Sergei Lemberg, Pro Hac Vice, Lemberg Law LLC, Stamford, CT, Subodh Chandra, Donald P. Screen, The Chandra Law Firm, LLC, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

Daniel R. Birnbaum, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, Joseph J. Orzano, Pro Hac Vice, Michael A. Kippins, Pro Hac Vice, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant General Motors, LLC's ("GM") Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike. (ECF No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Id. ); GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's request for Punitive Damages; and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claim.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On June 15, 2017, Mark Riley purchased a new 2017 GMC Acadia ("Acadia") from an authorized General Motors dealership in Columbus, Ohio. (ECF No. 1 at 9). That dealer assured Riley that his Acadia was defect free and under GM's New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (Id. ). Soon after his purchase, however, Riley began experiencing problems with his new vehicle. (Id. ).

Up to six times per week, Riley had trouble parking his Acadia. (Id. ). When Riley shifted his Acadia into the "Park" gear, his vehicle often flashed an error signal in the instrument panel. (Id. at 4). This signal indicated that the vehicle was not in "Park" when, in fact, Riley had moved the shifter to the "Park" position. (Id. ). Importantly, when the vehicle was unable to detect that it was in "Park," it could neither be shut off nor locked. (Id. ). To solve this problem, Riley developed some practical solutions: he wiggled the shifter; shifted through gears; or turned the engine on and off. (Id. at 10). After performing one or more of these techniques, Riley's Acadia would eventually recognize the vehicle as "Parked." (Id. ).

In addition to addressing the problem on his own, Riley also alerted the GM dealer from which he purchased the vehicle. (Id. ). In response, the dealer's service advisor represented to Riley that although there was no recall then, GM was aware of the issue. (Id. ). On two subsequent occasions, Riley repeated his initial complaint to the same GM dealer. (Id. ). Finally, on November 1, 2018, Riley, through counsel, complained directly to GM about the shifter issue. (Id. ).

Approximately fourteen months later in January 2020, Riley tried his luck with a different authorized GM dealer. (Id. ). By then, GM had issued a Technical Service Bulletin that purportedly addressed the shifter problem: TSB, No. 19-NA-206. (Id. at 7). This second dealership worked on Riley's Acadia pursuant to TSB, No. 19-NA-206. (Id. at 10). Despite this effort, Riley's Acadia continued to experience the shifter problem as late as January 27, 2021. (Id. ).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his putative class action Complaint on March 4, 2021, alleging breaches of contract and warranty arising from the sale or lease of certain GM vehicles. (ECF No. 1). On May 7, 2021, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7). Defendant seeks dismissal on a number of bases. (Id. ). First, Defendant moves to dismiss or stay the case sub judice pending the outcome of a related action against GM— Napoli-Bosse v. Gen. Motors LLC , 453 F. Supp. 3d 536 (D. Conn. 2020) —under the first-to-file rule. (Id. at 7). That case seeks a nationwide class action and various state sub-classes covering a subset of the vehicles at issue here. (See ECF No. 7-8 at 15–16). Next, Defendant also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7 at 9). Further, asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendant seeks to limit the scope of the putative class to those who purchased or leased the exact same vehicle model and manufacturing year as purchased by Plaintiff. (Id. at 18). Additionally, in the event any of Plaintiff's claims survive its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. (Id. at 19). Plaintiff timely filed his Response in Opposition (ECF No. 14), and Defendant timely filed its Reply (ECF No. 15). Finally, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 16). Thus, Defendant's motion is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth. , 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Stratton Industries, Inc. , 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986) ). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss based upon subject matter jurisdiction generally come in two varieties: (1) a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. See Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) (identifying the two types of 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss). Facial attacks on subject matter jurisdiction "merely question[ ] the sufficiency of the pleading." Id. A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. In a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a court "must ... weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject matter jurisdiction exists or does not exist." Id. See also Nat'l Assoc. of Minority Contractors v. Martinez , 248 F. Supp.2d 679, 681 (S.D. Ohio 2002).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a cause of action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion "is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations." Golden v. City of Columbus , 404 F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although liberal, Rule 12(b)(6) requires more than bare assertions of legal conclusions. Allard v. Weitzman , 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Generally, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In short, a complaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). It must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Defendant moves to dismiss or stay the action based on the first-to-file rule. Alternatively, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the event Plaintiff's claims survive its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on vehicles distinct from the one he purchased based on subject matter jurisdiction. The Court considers each in turn.

A. Motion to Dismiss or Stay under First-to-File Rule

The first-to-file rule "provides that, when actions involving nearly identical parties and issues have been filed in two different district courts, the court in which the first suit was filed should generally proceed to judgment." Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC , 814 F.3d 785, 789 (6th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp. , 511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) ) (internal quotations omitted). In this way, the first-to-file rule "conserves judicial resources by minimizing duplicative or piecemeal litigation, and protects the parties and the courts from the possibility of conflicting results." Baatz , 814 F.3d at 789 (citing EEOC v. Univ. of Pa. , 850 F.2d 969, 977 (3d Cir. 1988) ; West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24 , 751 F.2d 721, 729 (5th Cir. 1985) ). The first-to-file rule thus recognizes the inherent inefficiency of allowing two, largely identical suits, to proceed to judgment at the same time. Hence, "[t]he first-to-file rule is a prudential doctrine that grows out of the need to manage overlapping litigation across multiple districts." Id. Additionally, the first-to-file rule "encourages comity among federal courts of equal rank." Zide Sport Shop of Ohio v. Ed Tobergte Assoc., Inc. , 16 F. App'x 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2001).

Courts examine three factors in determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule: "(1) the chronology of events, (2) the similarity of the parties involved, and (3) the similarity of the issues or claims at stake." Baatz , 814 F.3d at 789 (citing Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc. , 946 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991) ). If these factors are met, then "the court must also determine whether any equitable considerations, such as evidence of ‘inequitable conduct, bad faith, anticipatory suits, [or] forum shopping,’ merit not applying the first-to-file rule in a particular case." Id. (quoting Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC , 511 F.3d at 551–52 ).

If faced with "a duplicative suit, [a federal court] may exercise its discretion to stay the suit before it, to allow both suits to proceed, or, in some...