Riley v. Payne

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOE J. VOLPE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Emmitt Riley, an inmate at the Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction, brings this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pro se. (Doc. No. 1.) On September 13, 2018, Mr. Riley was convicted by a jury in Drew County, Arkansas, of First-Degree Murder and Tampering with Physical Evidence. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 287-88). Mr. Riley was sentenced to life in prison. (Doc. No. 9-6). The Arkansas Supreme Court later described the evidence in the case as follows:

The evidence at trial established that [Emmitt] Riley and Josh Martin had a verbal altercation that escalated into a physical fight. The fight continued for an extended period stopped, and resumed. Both parties were alleged to have displayed knives. During the course of the fight, Martin broke Riley's ankle. After the parties separated a second time, Riley drew a pistol and shot Martin, killing him. Riley asserted that he shot in self-defense

There was additional testimony from eye-witnesses. When the fight was broken up the final time, Martin's friend Anthony Thomas pulled Martin away from Riley. At that point Riley told Martin either “I got something for you” or “I know what to do for a n****r like you ” and he shot Martin. Based on witness statements and blood evidence, the police determined that Riley was at least nine feet away from Martin when he shot him.

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Riley v. State, 2021 Ark. 70, at 1-2, 620 S.W.3d 511, 513.

After the Defense rested, the trial court considered the parties' proposed jury instructions. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 232). Mr. Gibson, Mr. Riley's attorney, did not request an instruction on second-degree murder. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 234-36). When deciding to leave out the second-degree instruction, Mr. Gibson agreed with his opposing counsel that the record warranted either the murder or manslaughter instruction. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 234). Below is the discussion regarding the second-degree murder instruction found in the trial record:

THE COURT: He didn't give one on second degree.

MR. SPAIN [Prosecution]: I didn't give one on second degree.

MR. GIBSON [Defense]: Oh. Oh. Oh.

MR. SPAIN: I don't think our client -

MR. GIBSON: Oh. I've got one. That threw me off.

MR. SPAIN: I didn't do second degree because I didn't think it applied because either he purposely caused his death or he, in my opinion, he either recklessly formed a self-defense intent and used more force that was necessary which makes it then --

THE COURT: Manslaughter.

MR. SPAIN: -- Manslaughter.

MR. GIBSON: I --

THE COURT: You go along with that?

MR. GIBSON: I'll go along with that.

(Doc. No. 9-2 at 234).

Mr. Riley appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, and in compliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i)(2019), was appointed counsel. Riley v. State, 2019 Ark. 252, at 1; Riley v. State, 2020 Ark. 99, at 1. Mr. Riley's attorney submitted a no-merit brief stating “there are no meritorious grounds to support an appeal.” Riley, 2020 Ark. 99, at 1. The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed and affirmed Mr. Riley's convictions and sentence stating, “there are no nonfrivolous issues that support an appeal in this case” in light of the introduction of Riley's detailed confession during the 911 call, eyewitness testimony, and his own testimony at trial. Id. at 4.

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On April 9, 2020, Mr. Riley timely filed a Rule 37 petition pro se alleging his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second-degree murder instruction. (Doc. No. 9-7). The Drew County Circuit Court denied Mr. Riley's petition without a hearing, citing the above quoted-trial record as trial strategy. (Doc. No. 9-8 at 2-3). The court concluded that “defense counsel's justification of self defense or alternatively imperfect self defense was the strategy that the defense made” and therefore was not “an error so serious that deprived him ‘counsel' guaranteed by the Constitution.” (Doc. No. 9-8 at 3). Further, the circuit court found Mr. Riley's other “conclusory” argument towards prejudice “did not show that the jury could have considered murder in the second degree.” (Id.).

Mr. Riley, with counsel, timely appealed the denial of his Rule 37 petition. (Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 9 at 14). Mr. Riley argued the circuit court erred in denying his petition because he was not given a hearing and the court failed to find his counsel was ineffective. Riley, 2021 Ark. 70, at 6-8, 620 S.W.3d at 515-16. On April 8, 2021, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Mr. Riley's petition and thoroughly explained its reasoning behind its conclusion. Id. at 6-8, 620 S.W.3d at 515-16.

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus now before the Court, Mr. Riley raises the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserting he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when his counsel decided against requesting a second-degree murder instruction. (Doc. No. 1 at 5-6). Respondent contends Mr. Riley's claim fails to defeat the highly deferential standard given to the State court's reasonable ruling. (Doc. No. 9 at 16-18). On October 22, 2021, Mr. Riley filed “Petitioner's Traverse to Response to Order to Show Cause, ” further elaborating on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Doc. No. 12). After careful consideration of the Petition, Response, and Traverse, I find the Petition must be dismissed with

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prejudice.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Riley has raised this exact argument in his Rule 37 petition and again, through his attorney, in his appeal of the petition's denial. (Doc. No. 9-7; Doc. No. 1 at 4). In the interests of finality and federalism, federal habeas courts, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), are restricted to a “limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions.” Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005); Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Under this statute, federal review of underlying state court decisions is limited because federal courts may only grant habeas relief if the claim was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceeding and the state court's decision:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005).

Under subsection (d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” federal law if the state court arrived “at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 421 (8th Cir. 2007). A decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law when the state court “identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Under subsection (d)(2), a state court decision will

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be based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented . . . only if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2003). Mr. Riley has not shown the...