Rindahl v. Noem, 4:20-CV-04044-RAL

RANDY LEE RINDAHL, Plaintiff, v. KRISTI NOEM, GOVERNOR FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTAIN HER OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY; MIKE LEIDHOLT,SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS IN HIS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY;DARIN YOUNG, WARDEN IN HIS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY;TROY PONTO, ASSOC. WARDEN IN HIS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY;JOHN BENTING, ASSOC. WARDEN, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY;CLIFF FANTROY, DIRECTORY OF SECURITY IN HIS OFFICIALAND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY; CHAD ROBERT, MAJOR IN HIS OFFICIALAND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY; KEITH DITMANSON, SECTION MANAGERIN HIS OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY; CATHY WYNIA,WELDING, SSGT. INDENTIFICATION OFFICE IN HIS OFFICIALAND UNOFFICIAL CAPACITY; IAN MILLER, GLOBAL TEL LINK CORPORATION,STEVE MONTANARO¹, MIKE KING, LORAH OLSEN, Defendants.

4:20-CV-04044-RAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA SOUTHERN DIVISION

November 16, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, GRANTING MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS, GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff Randy Lee Rindahl (Rindahl) filed this pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Communications Act, and state law against numerous defendants. Doc. 1. The Defendants in this action fall into two categories. The Defendants in the first category are government officials, most of whom are employed with the South Dakota Department of Corrections (SDDOC). This Court will refer to them collectively as the SDDOC Defendants. The remaining Defendants are Global Tel Link Corporation (GTL), Steve Montanaro, Mike King, and Lorah Olsen. This Court will refer to them collectively as the GTL Defendants. Rindahl's claims relate to a contract between SDDOC and GTL under which GTL provides email, e-books, phone services, and streaming services to inmates like Rindahl. Doc. 1 at ¶ 2. There are currently several pending motions in this case. This Court will address each motion in the order in which it was filed.

I. Motions for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

Rindahl has filed two motions for injunctive relief. The first motion is a motion for preliminary injunction in which he seeks to enjoin the SDDOC Defendants from withholding medical treatment. Doc. 14. The second motion is a motion for "imminent" temporary restraining order in which Rindahl seeks to enjoin the defendants from transferring him to Springfield, South Dakota, where there are no single-status cells available. Doc. 20. This Court interpreted Rindahl's motion for "imminent" temporary restraining order as a motion under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and denied the motion. Doc. 24 at 3. However, this Court ordered the SDDOC Defendants to respond to Rindahl's temporary restraining order request at the same time it responded to Rindahl's other motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. 24 at 3. Having given the other party notice and an opportunity to respond, this Court treats Rindahl's motion for "imminent" temporary restraining order as a motion for preliminary injunction. The SDDOC Defendantsoppose both motions. Docs. 26, 27. This Court denies both of Rindahl's motions for injunctive relief.

Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs entry of a preliminary injunction. "[A] party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). "It is inappropriate to grant a preliminary injunction for matters 'lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.'" Brakeall v. Stanwick-Klemik, 4:17-CV-04101-LLP, 2019 WL 3807272, at *1 (D.S.D. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)).

The Eighth Circuit has previously considered the relationship requirement in prisoner lawsuits. In Devose, an inmate filed a complaint alleging that he was being denied adequate medical treatment. 42 F.3d at 471. Then he filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in which he sought to enjoin the defendants from engaging in retaliatory conduct for filing his lawsuit. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the injunction, noting that it was "self-evident that Devose's motion for temporary relief [had] nothing to do with preserving the district court's decision-making power over the merits of Devose's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit." Id. The Eighth Circuit further provided, "[t]o the contrary, Devose's motion is based on new assertions of mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief request in his . . . lawsuit." Id.; see also Martin v. Keitel, 205 F. App'x 925, 928-29 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff's request to enjoin defendants from retaliating against him was legally deficient because it had no relation to the underlying claim in his § 1983 suit).

Here, in Rindahl's first motion for injunctive relief, he alleges that the SDDOC Defendants are retaliating against him for filing his lawsuit. Doc. 14 at 2. He claims that they have withheldmedical treatment for his left knee and ribs as well as denied him a COVID-19 test. Doc. 14 at 2-4. He asks this Court to issue an order enjoining the SDDOC Defendants from obstructing his medical treatment. Doc. 14 at 4. But in this case, his underlying claims involve violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Federal Communications Act, and state law as it relates to the telecommunication services he receives in prison. Doc. 1. The new assertions of mistreatment in his motion for injunctive relief are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief requested in his complaint. Because Rindahl has not established a relationship between the conduct alleged in the complaint and the injury complained of in the motion for preliminary injunction, Rindahl's motion for preliminary injunction is denied.

Rindahl's second motion for injunctive relief, Doc. 20, suffers from the same problem. In his motion for imminent temporary restraining order, Rindahl alleges that, in retaliation for his lawsuit, the SDDOC Defendants have ordered that he be transferred from the South Dakota State Penitentiary to the Mike Durfee State Prison in Springfield, South Dakota. Doc. 20 at 2. He currently is under single-cell status, but as there are no single cells available in Springfield, he would be forced to share a cell. Doc. 20 at 2. Again, these assertions of retaliation and mistreatment are unrelated to the claims and relief sought in his complaint. Therefore, this motion is denied.

II. Motion for Protective Order

The SDDOC Defendants have filed two motions for protective orders to stay discovery, Docs. 32, 49, and memorandums in support thereof, Docs. 33, 50. The SDDOC Defendants contend that discovery should be stayed until the Court determines whether the SDDOC Defendants are entitled to dismissal under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Although the SDDOC Defendants have not filed a motion for summary judgment, they have made clear that they intend to do so. This Court grants both motions for protective orders.

Cases from the Supreme Court of the United States stress that "[q]ualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not simply from liability," Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), and thus the immunity defense should be decided as early in the case as possible, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-19 (1982); O'Neil v. City of Iowa City, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2007). This immunity from suit applies to discovery because it "can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Qualified immunity protects government officials from the burdens of broad discovery. Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 2006). Of course, the "purpose in moving for summary judgment, under the privilege of qualified immunity, is to avoid having government officers subjected to the expense and delay of discovery." Fitzgerald v. Patrick, 927 F.2d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In light of such considerations, this Court has previously stayed discovery when defendants intend to file motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity grounds. See Gard v. Kaemingk, Civ. No. 13-4062-LLP, 2014 WL 4092776, at *4 (D.S.D. Aug. 18, 2014) (granting defendant's motion to stay discovery in light of their prospective summary judgment motion to resolve the issue of sovereign immunity); Smith v. Woodward, No. Civ. 10-4053-KES, 2010 WL 3937139, at *1 (D.S.D. Oct. 4, 2010) (same).

Here, the SDDOC Defendants have asserted qualified immunity as an affirmative defense in their answer to Rindahl's suit. Doc. 16 at 5. Further, they intend to file a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Doc. 32 at 2. In the interim, Rindahl has already sought numerous documents, see Doc. 33 at 2-4, demonstrating that "concern with the burden of discovery on public officials is well founded." Smith, 2010 WL 3937139, at *1. This Court concludes that the qualified immunity issues should be resolved before the SDDOC Defendantsare subject to discovery. Therefore, their motions for protective orders are granted, provided they promptly file their motion for summary judgment.

III. Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

At the outset, this Court conducted an initial screening of Rindahl's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Doc. 6. While many of Rindahl's claims were dismissed, his due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as his claims under the Federal Communications Act and state law survived as against all defendants. Doc. 6. In that same opinion and order, this Court granted Rindahl's motion to amend his complaint to add Defendants GTL, Steve Montanaro, Mike King, and Lorah Olsen to the...