Riojas v. Gurman

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JUAN PABLO RIOJAS, Petitioner, v. MARK GURMAN, et al., Respondents.

Civil No. 3:20-CV-00202

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

February 14, 2023

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON United States District Court Judge.

Before the court is a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Juan Pablo Riojas. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss the petition.

Procedural History

Juan Pablo Riojas (“Petitioner”) is a self-represented litigant who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his state court judgment with this court in February of 2020. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner was released from the State Correctional Institute in Mercer in May of 2022. (Doc. 13.)

The procedural history of Petitioner's state criminal convictions and subsequent appeals are properly summarized in the memorandum entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County on August 22, 2019. (Doc. 11-2, pp 16-22.)^[1] The court will provide the following brief summary: Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of rape, one count of false imprisonment, one count of terroristic threats, one count of simple assault, and one count of intimidation of a witness on March 4, 2014, following a jury trial. (Id., p. 21.) Petitioner filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied by the state court. (Id.) Petitioner then filed a direct appeal challenging the admission of the Commonwealth's expert witness, the admission of prior bad acts testimony, the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court's granting of the Commonwealth's motion to quash, the trial court's denial of a defense DNA expert, and the court's denial of Appellant's motion for continuance of trial due to the absence of a necessary witness. (Doc. 11-2, p. 21.) On September 7, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. (Doc. 11-2, pp. 21-22); Commonwealth v Riojas, 158 A.3d 169, 2016 WL 5940424 (Pa. Super. Sep. 7, 2016).

On August 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a PCRA petition raising sixteen issues. Commonwealth v. Riojas, 1530 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 3969507 (Pa. Super. Aug. 22, 2019.) On July 19, 2018, the PCRA court issued an opinion detailing why none of Petitioner's sixteen issues entitled him to relief. Id. Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal raising three new issues. Id. These three issues were dismissed by the PCRA court, finding two to be factually inaccurate and the third to be waived for failure to raise the claim in response to its 907 notice. Id.

Plaintiff then filed an appeal addressing three issues: (1) the dismissal of his PCRA petition as untimely; (2) the requirement to file under the sex offender registration and notification act (SORNA); and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 12-2, pp. 23-40.) The Superior Court detailed that Plaintiff's PCRA petition was not dismissed as untimely, but fully adjudicated. (Id., p. 24.) The SORNA challenge was deemed to be waived because it was not raised before the PCRA court. (Id., pp. 24-25.) The Superior Court found Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to lack merit. (Id., pp. 25-40.)

Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus action raising four issues under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) that the Court of Common Pleas erred when it admitted Dr. Valliere as an expert; (2) that the Court of Common Pleas erred when it permitted the victim to testify about Petitioner's prior bad acts; (3) that the Court of Common Pleas erred when it denied his sufficiency of the evidence claims with regard to the rape by forcible compulsion and false imprisonment counts; and (4) that the Court of Common Pleas erred when it denied his motion for continuance in order to procure the testimony of a “necessary defense witness.” (Doc. 1.) Petitioner also alleges that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. (Id.) Finally, Petitioner claims that his sentence requiring him to register as a sexual offender under Pennsylvania SORNA is illegal and violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. (Id.)

Venue

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254 can be filed in either the district where the petitioner is in custody, or in the district where the petitioner was convicted and sentenced. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, which is located in this district.

Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is an “‘extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were ‘grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings.” See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 414, 146 (1998)). The exercise of restraint by a federal court in reviewing and granting habeas relief is appropriate due to considerations of comity and federalism. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). “The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional law.” Id. States also have a recognized interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 620 (1993).

A district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless:

the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Id. § 2254(d).

Discussion

A. Petitioner's SORNA Claim is Procedurally Defaulted, but the Remaining Grounds for Relief Have Been Exhausted in the State Courts.

The court must first determine whether Petitioner's grounds for relief presented in his § 2254 petition have been exhausted in the state courts and, if not, whether circumstances exist to excuse Petitioner's procedural default of his claims.

Absent unusual circumstances, a federal court should not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Under § 2254(c), a petitioner will not be deemed to have exhausted his available state remedies if he had the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, (1999). A petitioner may exhaust a federal claim either by raising it on direct appeal or presenting it in postconviction PCRA proceedings. See id. at 845. In addition, a claim is exhausted when it has been “fairly presented” to the state court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). To that end, the federal habeas claim “must be the substantial equivalent of that presented to the state courts.” See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). The petition must do so “in a manner that puts [the respondents] on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005). “The Supreme Court has instructed that a claim is not ‘fairly presented' if the state court ‘must read beyond a petition or brief. . . in order to find material' that indicates the presence of a federal claim.” Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)). Moreover, a habeas corpus petitioner has the burden of proving the exhaustion of all available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Overall, the exhaustion requirement advances the goals of comity and federalism, while reducing “piecemeal litigation.” See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180 (2001).

“When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly presented' to the state courts, but state procedural rules bar the applicant from seeking further relief in state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied because there is an absence of available State corrective process.” McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999). Claims deemed exhausted because of a state procedural bar are considered to be procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2000). The district court then analyzes the claims under the procedural default doctrine. See id. The purpose of this rule is to prevent habeas petitioners from avoiding the exhaustion doctrine by defaulting their claims in state court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991).

Respondents have stated that “Petitioner was in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for his claims in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,” and proceeded to address his claims on the merits. (Doc. 11, p. 10.) However, a review of the state court determinations has shown that Plaintiff's SORNA claim has been procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner claims in this habeas matter that his sentence requiring him to register as a sexual offender under Pennsylvania SORNA is illegal and violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1, p. 8.) The Superior...